compliance standard in Minnesota

2009See Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226-27 ; Roe, 43 F.3d at 80-81.

2009See Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226-27 ; Roe, 43 F.3d at 80-81.

2009In Wichelmann v. City of Glencoe, 200 Minn. 62, 66-67 , 273 N.W. 638, 640 (1937), we observed: The provisions of election laws requiring acts to be done and imposing obligations upon the elector which are personal to him are mandatory.

2009In Wichelmann v. City of Glencoe, 200 Minn. 62, 66-67 , 273 N.W. 638, 640 (1937), we observed: The provisions of election laws requiring acts to be done and imposing obligations upon the elector which are personal to him are mandatory.

2009See Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226-27 ; Roe, 43 F.3d at 80-81.

2009See Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226-27 ; Roe, 43 F.3d at 80-81.

2007But in Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd., we clarified that the substantial compliance doctrine should be restricted to cases in which the statute at issue does not “express[ ] the consequences of a failure to comply with its provisions.” 583 N.W.2d 293, 295 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998).

2000Manco, 583 N.W.2d at 295-96 .

2002See A.M.P., 507 N.W.2d at 621 .

2002See A.M.P., 507 N.W.2d at 621 .

2016See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008) (stating that appellate courts “review the construction and application of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure de novo”).

2013The State’s incentive to hide, suppress, or destroy evidence favorable to a defendant is one factor we consider when assessing the presence of bad faith. “ ‘The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.’ ” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 -57 n., 109 S.Ct. 333 ; see also State v. Heath, 685 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Minn.App.2004) (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 -57 n. *, 109 S.Ct. 333 ).

2013The State’s Purpose and the Impact of Normal Practice and Procedure The Supreme Court and our court have previously identified two indices of bad faith: (1) whether the State purposefully destroyed evidence favorable to a defendant so as to hide it, see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 -57 & n. *, 109 S.Ct. 333 ; and (2) whether the State failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the evidence, see State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 626, 629 (Minn.2001) (affirming the district court’s finding that there was no bad faith by noting the police’s compliance with standard procedures helped demons

2013The State’s Purpose and the Impact of Normal Practice and Procedure The Supreme Court and our court have previously identified two indices of bad faith: (1) whether the State purposefully destroyed evidence favorable to a defendant so as to hide it, see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 -57 & n. *, 109 S.Ct. 333 ; and (2) whether the State failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the evidence, see State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 626, 629 (Minn.2001) (affirming the district court’s finding that there was no bad faith by noting the police’s compliance with standard procedures helped demons

2013The State’s Purpose and the Impact of Normal Practice and Procedure The Supreme Court and our court have previously identified two indices of bad faith: (1) whether the State purposefully destroyed evidence favorable to a defendant so as to hide it, see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 -57 & n. *, 109 S.Ct. 333 ; and (2) whether the State failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the evidence, see State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 626, 629 (Minn.2001) (affirming the district court’s finding that there was no bad faith by noting the police’s compliance with standard procedures helped demons

2012Spetz & Berg, 353 N.W.2d at 235 (“Although it appears that the substantial compliance doctrine should be extended to Section 574.31 and public project bonds, that is for the Minnesota Supreme Court to decide, and, accordingly, we reluctantly affirm.”).

2006See In re Estate of Hedstrom, 472 N.W.2d 454, 456-57 (N.D.1991) (finding that failure to present written agreement to court was not fatal because parties agreed on record to compromise, substantially complied with statutory provisions, and committed agreement to writing after presenting all terms to court).

1995See LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Norwest Bank Duluth, 940 F.2d 345, 348 (8th Cir.1991) ("Minnesota law [on the level of compliance required for letters of credit] applies to this case, but the parties have cited us no authority in point and we have found none").

1995See May, 453 N.W.2d at 553-54 (reviewing section 466.05 case law to decide whether compliance with notice requirement is jurisdictional issue under section 340A.802).