compliance rule (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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compliance rule in District of Columbia

13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1948–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Gore v. Newsomegreen
dc · 1992 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2013
2 sentences

2013Loan Trust 1999-B Asset Backed Certificates, 73 A.3d 1047, 1051 (D.C.2013) (use of holder's agent’s address on notice of foreclosure did not invalidate sale where notice "provided [the homeowner] with the information she needed to take steps to prevent the foreclosure or contact the person handling the foreclosure on Wells Fargo's behalf, while avoiding any misleading impression”); cf. Gore v. Newsome, 614 A.2d 40, 43-44 (D.C.1992) (taking care "to eschew overzealous application of the strict compliance rule” and holding notice of tax sale sufficient where abbreviation of homeowners’ names did

2013Although we doubted that a deviation from the name listed as the “record owner” of the property complied with the tax sale statute in all respects, we “were careful to eschew over zealous application of the strict compliance rule.” Id. at 43 .

13
Boddie v. Robinsongreen
dc · 1981 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1983–2001
2 sentences

2001"Strict compliance” does not mean "absolute perfection.” As this court said in Boddie, 430 A.2d at 523 , we do not carry the strict compliance rule to an "illogical extreme” by invalidating tax sales for deviations from statutory mailing requirements that are truly trivial.

1983See note 7 supra. 10 The strict compliance standard requires the Department to ensure “that the notice of expiring redemption period leaves its office addressed to the record owner’s ‘last known address,’ Reg. No. 74-35, supra § 112(c) .. . in a manner accurate in all material respects.” Boddie, 430 A.2d at 523 . 11 The same provision of the regulations, § 112(c), applies to the mailing of all other notices.

13
State v. Bolesgreen
ohioctapp · 2020 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024“For the results of [field sobriety tests] to be admissible, the state must lay a proper foundation as to (1) the administering officer’s training and ability to administer the tests and (2) the actual techniques he used to administer the tests.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing State v. Boles, 2020-Ohio-4485, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.); State v. Boczar, 2007- Ohio-1251, ¶ 28.

11
State v. Nationgreen
ohioctapp · 2023 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Thus, whether the facts satisfy the substantial compliance standard is determined on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Nation, 2023-Ohio-106, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Mapes, 2005- Ohio-3359, ¶ 44 (6th Dist.).

11
In Re Pleshawgreen
dc · 2010 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See In re Pleshaw, 2 A.3d 169 , 173–74 (D.C. 2010) (the fact that attorney properly withdrew his initial fee as a conservator only after requesting and receiving court permission was evidence of his conscious indifference to the rules when he later paid himself commissions from estate funds without court permission).

11
McBride v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1978 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997Fields argues that under the doctrine of substantial compliance, see *490 McBride v. United States, 393 A.2d 123, 128 (D.C.1978), the 180-day requirement of Article III of the IAD started to run on June 11, 1992, and, thus, the 180-day requirement was violated when Ms trial commenced 252 days later on February 18,1993.

11
Brul v. MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co.green
ksd · 1993 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996But to justify a departure from the strict compliance rule, a court must truly be able to say that the variance was “de minimis.” Vanden Brul v. MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 820 F.Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.Kan.1993). 7 III.

11
Western International Forest Products, Inc. v. Shinhan Bankgreen
nysd · 1994 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996“One manifestation of the strict compliance rule is the long-standing practice among issuers to require original documents unless the letter of credit stipulates otherwise.” Western Int’l Forest Prods, v. Shinhan Bank, 860 F.Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y.1994).

1996“One manifestation of the strict compliance rule is the long-standing practice among issuers to require original documents unless the letter of credit stipulates otherwise.” Western Int’l Forest Prods, v. Shinhan Bank, 860 F.Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y.1994).

11
United States v. Andersongreen
dc · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984Id. 406 U.S. at 460-61 , 92 S.Ct. at 1664-1665 ; see also United States v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446, 451 (D.C.1982).

1984Id. 406 U.S. at 460-61 , 92 S.Ct. at 1664-1665 ; see also United States v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446, 451 (D.C.1982).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Rose v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. green
dc · 2013
1 sentence

2013Loan Trust 1999-B Asset Backed Certificates, 73 A.3d 1047, 1051 (D.C.2013) (use of holder's agent’s address on notice of foreclosure did not invalidate sale where notice "provided [the homeowner] with the information she needed to take steps to prevent the foreclosure or contact the person handling the foreclosure on Wells Fargo's behalf, while avoiding any misleading impression”); cf. Gore v. Newsome, 614 A.2d 40, 43-44 (D.C.1992) (taking care "to eschew overzealous application of the strict compliance rule” and holding notice of tax sale sufficient where abbreviation of homeowners’ names did

12013–2013
Associated Estates, LLC v. Caldwell green
dc · 2001
1 sentence

2008This is so because “[o]ne of the principal advantages of the strict compliance rule — the certainty and clarity that it engenders — would be lost if a party could overcome the rule in any given case with an evidentiary showing that the record owner had actual notice.” Id. at 945 .

12008–2008
Malone v. Robinson green
dc · 1992
1 sentence

2001“The strict compliance rule has been this court’s response to claims that conceded but ‘technical’ violations of the statute or *945 regulations should not nullify a sale either because there was ‘substantial compliance’ with the notice requirements or the property owner had actual notice of the proceedings despite the defect.” Gore, 614 A.2d at 43 .

12001–2001
Fex v. Michigan green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

1997In its opposition to the § 23-110 motion, the government filed an affidavit from the New York prison official denying that Fields wrote her on June l'i, and affidavits from the officials here in the District responsible for processing IAD inquests denying receipt of any such requfv' made by Fields. 5 In Fex v. Michigan, 560 U.S. 43, 47-48 , 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1088-89 , 192 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the Supreme Court r - jected the very contention pressed here, namely that “a prisoner’s transmittal of an IAD request to the prison authorities commences the 180-day period even if the '.request gets lost i

11997–1997
Parker v. United States green
dc · 1991
1 sentence

1997In its opposition to the § 23-110 motion, the government filed an affidavit from the New York prison official denying that Fields wrote her on June l'i, and affidavits from the officials here in the District responsible for processing IAD inquests denying receipt of any such requfv' made by Fields. 5 In Fex v. Michigan, 560 U.S. 43, 47-48 , 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1088-89 , 192 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the Supreme Court r - jected the very contention pressed here, namely that “a prisoner’s transmittal of an IAD request to the prison authorities commences the 180-day period even if the '.request gets lost i

11997–1997
Kastigar v. United States green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1984In order to assure that a witness who testifies under an immunity grant — and is subsequently to be prosecuted for an offense about which the witness testified — stands in the same position as if he or she had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court envisioned a procedure that would serve as a "comprehensive safeguard barring the use of compelled testimony." Id. at 460 , 92 S.Ct. at 1664 . [5] Once the government initiates prosecution against that individual on charges related to the subject matter of the testimony, a pretrial hearing is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the gov

1984In order to assure that a witness who testifies under an immunity grant — and is subsequently to be prosecuted for an offense about which the witness testified — stands in the same position as if he or she had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court envisioned a procedure that would serve as a "comprehensive safeguard barring the use of compelled testimony." Id. at 460 , 92 S.Ct. at 1664 . [5] Once the government initiates prosecution against that individual on charges related to the subject matter of the testimony, a pretrial hearing is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the gov

11984–1984
Baker v. Pollution Control Board green
illappct · 1975
2 sentences

1978When the Illinois intermediate appellate court, in Baker v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 32 Ill.App.3d 660 , 336 N.E.2d 325 (1975), considered findings that the Board made prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Incinerator, the lower court implicitly employed the same substantial compliance standard that the Supreme Court employed in Incinerator, 32 Ill.App.3d at 662 , 336 N.E.2d at 327 .

1978When the Illinois intermediate appellate court, in Baker v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 32 Ill.App.3d 660 , 336 N.E.2d 325 (1975), considered findings that the Board made prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Incinerator, the lower court implicitly employed the same substantial compliance standard that the Supreme Court employed in Incinerator, 32 Ill.App.3d at 662 , 336 N.E.2d at 327 .

11978–1978
Boykin v. Huff green
cadc · 1941
2 sentences

1948Cf. Boykin v. Huff, 73 App.D.C. 378 , 121 F.2d 865 .

1948Cf. Boykin v. Huff, 73 App.D.C. 378 , 121 F.2d 865 .

11948–1948

Where else courts name it

CA 186 (1892–2026) OH 184 (1896–2026) TX 123 (1878–2026) WA 110 (1931–2026) IL 109 (1874–2026) NJ 87 (1924–2026) IA 79 (1885–2025) NY 73 (1845–2026) MS 71 (1870–2026) MI 60 (1887–2025) KY 52 (1921–2026) PA 52 (1859–2025) MO 49 (1890–2018) UT 49 (1988–2024) CO 36 (1890–2026) GA 36 (1898–2025) IN 31 (1870–2020) KS 31 (1890–2025) MD 29 (1909–2019) CT 27 (1926–2024) LA 26 (1916–2024) AL 26 (1909–1995) FL 26 (1893–2024) TN 26 (1967–2026) OK 21 (1911–2024) AR 19 (1906–2021) MN 19 (1892–2016) AZ 17 (1934–2026) WI 14 (1958–2026) NV 13 (1923–2023) VA 13 (1891–2025) DC 13 (1948–2024) MT 12 (1907–2025) NE 12 (1898–2020) NM 12 (1987–2019) SD 11 (1996–2024) OR 10 (1909–2026) NC 10 (1896–2020) HI 9 (1912–2006) ME 7 (1982–2016) MA 7 (1915–2023) WV 7 (1921–1999) VT 6 (1908–2018) WY 6 (1921–2005) ND 5 (1898–1995) AK 5 (1977–2021) SC 5 (1929–2007) DE 4 (1971–2015) ID 4 (1931–2023) NH 3 (1989–2020) PR 2 (1929–1930) VI 2 (2000–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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