compliance doctrine in Pennsylvania

2018Even if this Court had applied the doctrine of substantial compliance, there is no evidence that Ms. Clark -Dougherty ever received notice "sufficiently definite to enable the owner to ascertain the amount of the lien claimed, its date and the nature and amount of the labor and material out of which it arises." Tesauro, 335 A.2d at 795 . 3.

2015Terra Technical’s Brief at 9-10 citing Pa.R.C.P. 126. 13 As such, Terra Technical reasons that even were the Mechanics’ Lien Law to be strictly construed, the trial court should have viewed the complaints to enforce the lien claims in light of the longstanding doctrine of substantial compliance as it had been applied in Tesauro v. Baird, 232 Pa.Super. 185 , 335 A.2d 792 (1975). 14 Specifically, Terra Technical stresses that the primary objectives of the Mechanics’ Lien Law were fulfilled herein in that the filed complaints contained sufficient information to inform River Station about the enfo

1958When the act of assembly directs specifically that a particular thing shall be done in order to establish a claim, substantial conformity will not answer; there must be a compliance with the requirement: Westmoreland Guarantee Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Connor, 216 Pa. 543, 549 .

1957When the act of assembly directs specifically that a particular thing shall be done in order to establish a claim, substantial conformity will not answer; there must be a compliance with the requirement: Westmore- land Guarantee Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Connor, 216 Pa. 543, 549 .” The principle of strict construction announced in the O’Kane case has been consistently 1 applied in a large number of cases in which the failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 21 has resulted in the lien being stricken from the record. 2 It is apparent, therefore, that if claimant in the present cas

1958The notice directed to be given by this section of the statute is equally as important as the notice of an intention to file the lien required by Section 8 of the act, and in the recent case of Merrit v. Poli, 231 Pa. 611, 617 , we held that ‘service of this notice must be made in the manner prescribed by the statute, and failure to do so defeats the right to recover upon the claim filed.’ Where service of the scire facias on the claim and to revive the judgment on the claim cannot be made personally, the act provides specifically the manner in which it may be otherwise made.

1950The notice directed to be given by this section of the statute is equally as important as the notice,of an intention to file the lien required by Section 8 of the act, and in the recent case of Merritt v. Poli, 231 Pa. 611, 617 , we held that ‘service of this notice must be made in the manner prescribed by the statute, and failure to do so defeats the right to recover upon the claim filed’.” It will be noticed that section 21 of the Mechanic’s Lien Act, as amended by the Act of April 5,1917, P. L. 42, sec. 21, 49 PS §131, in the last sentence thereof states: “failure to serve such notice . . .

1908In Urias v. Railroad Co., 152 Pa. 326 , it was said: “But where there is no such doubt; where the deceased stopped at a point where he could not see, it is for the court to determine whether it was a proper place.” And again: “If he stopped behind the icehouse at a point where he admittedly could not see, it was not a compliance with the rule laid down in Railroad Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504 .” This cáse does not materially differ from Keller v. Phila. & Reading Ry.

1893On the other hand, if he stopped behind the ice house at a point where he admittedly could not see, it was not a compliance with the rule laid down in Railroad Company v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504 .

2025Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Hess, the court held that an appellant should not be penalized for failing to comply when he did not receive notice of the order, as applying the strict compliance standard from Lord would act as a “trap” to defeat appellate review. 810 A.2d 1249 , 1255 n.9 (Pa. 2002).

2022“Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the trial court may ‘overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice a party’s rights.’” Id. at 1272 (quoting Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 276 (Pa. 2006)); accord Pa.R.C.P. 126. “[P]rocedural rules are not ends in themselves, and . . . rigid application of [the Rules] does not always serve the interest of fairness and justice.” Green Acres, 113 A.3d at 1272 . (quoting Womer, 908 A.2d at 276 ) (alteration in original).

2021Seriousness of the Violation The Center argues that the ALJ erred because DHS’s revocation of the Center’s provisional certificate is proper only where the “violation is so serious that the children were threatened with harm.” (Center’s Brief at 8.) The Center argues that DHS’s revocation of its provisional certificate is not appropriate because “no harm came to any child.” (C.R. at 78-80, 237, 253.) The Center solely relies on our decision in Gibbs v. Department of Public Welfare, 947 A.2d 233 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied, 966 A.2d 572 (Pa. 2009), to support its argument.

2019“Where, as here, a challenge is filed within 30 days of the ordinance’s effective date, a challenger must only prove the municipality failed to strictly comply with statutory procedures.” Davis-Haas, 166 A.3d at 547 .

2017Id. ■ Thus, while Objectors contend Landowner did not prove prejudice stemming from its purported lack of notice, the fact remains that Landowner filed its procedural validity challenge within 30 days of the new ordinance’s effective date.

2015Regency Investments, 855 A.2d at 77 . - 10 - J-A13016-15 J-A13017-15 Nor are we persuaded by Oakdale’s reliance on the doctrine of substantial compliance.

2015Id. at 19 .

2013Moreover, said certificates are in accordance with the court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Butler, 901 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. 2006) and Worner v. Hilliker, (3) The court erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike petitioner’s certificates by ruling inconsistently with existing Pennsylvania legal authority, since, in accordance with the court’s ruling in Grossman v. Barke, 2005 Pa. Super. 45 ; 888 A.2d 561 ; 2005 Pa.Super.

2013Moreover, said certificates are in accordance with the court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Butler, 901 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. 2006) and Worner v. Hilliker, (3) The court erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike petitioner’s certificates by ruling inconsistently with existing Pennsylvania legal authority, since, in accordance with the court’s ruling in Grossman v. Barke, 2005 Pa. Super. 45 ; 888 A.2d 561 ; 2005 Pa.Super.

2011Knoebel Sons, 566 Pa. 593 , 782 A.2d 996 , 1001 *925 (2001) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

2011Knoebel Sons, 566 Pa. 593 , 782 A.2d 996 , 1001 *925 (2001) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

2010Rather, and despite “the equitable appeal of granting relief in [any] case,” Schofield, 888 A.2d at 774 , 3 our coneentra tion has recently been upon a litigant’s compliance with the rule, and nothing else: “failure to comply with the minimal requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.” Id.

2010Rather, and despite “the equitable appeal of granting relief in [any] case,” Schofield, 888 A.2d at 774 , 3 our coneentra tion has recently been upon a litigant’s compliance with the rule, and nothing else: “failure to comply with the minimal requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.” Id.

2006It should also be noted that the Commonwealth Court in [City of Allentown v.] Kauth [, 874 A.2d 164 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005)] held that “the two statutes are very similar and operate concurrently with one another ... ”.