compliance test in Connecticut

27 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1926–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Domiangreen conn · 1996 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2008 2 sentences 2008A problematic aspect of the Ocasio case is its adoption of a substantial compliance test similar to the one set forth in State v. Domian, supra, 235 Conn. at 688 , 668 A.2d 1333 , a case in which the defendant's challenge to the trial court's noncompliance with Practice Book § 39-19 was not preserved properly before the trial court. 2008A problematic aspect of the Ocasio case is its adoption of a substantial compliance test similar to the one set forth in State v. Domian, supra, 235 Conn. at 688 , 668 A.2d 1333 , a case in which the defendant's challenge to the trial court's noncompliance with Practice Book § 39-19 was not preserved properly before the trial court.	1	2
Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospitalgreen conn · 1989 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–1994 2 sentences 1994In Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 59, 62 , 557 A.2d 1249 (1989), we held that although the medical staff bylaws of the Norwalk Hospital did not constitute an enforceable contract per se between the hospital and the plaintiff as a member of the hospital medical staff, administrative decisions by the hospital affecting the plaintiffs rights as a medical staff mem ber under the bylaws were nevertheless subject to judicial review. 25 In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the hospital, a private nonprofit corporation, 26 was bound by its own bylaws in deciding to revoke 1994In Gianetti v. Norwalk Hospital, 211 Conn. 51, 59, 62 , 557 A.2d 1249 (1989), we held that although the medical staff bylaws of the Norwalk Hospital did not constitute an enforceable contract per se between the hospital and the plaintiff as a member of the hospital medical staff, administrative decisions by the hospital affecting the plaintiffs rights as a medical staff mem ber under the bylaws were nevertheless subject to judicial review. 25 In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the hospital, a private nonprofit corporation, 26 was bound by its own bylaws in deciding to revoke	1	2
State v. Iralagreen connappct · 2002 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009See State v. Irala, supra, at 512 , 792 A.2d 109 .	1	1
State v. Ocasiogreen conn · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008See State v. Ocasio, supra, 253 Conn. at 380-81 , 751 A.2d 825 . 2008See State v. Ocasio, supra, 253 Conn. at 380-81 , 751 A.2d 825 .	1	1
American Masons' Supply Co. v. F. W. Brown Co.green conn · 1978 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000(Emphasis added.) Once again, relying on federal precedent construing the federal Miller Act, our Supreme Court has adopted a "substantial performance rather than a strict compliance test when construing statutory notice requirements CT Page 15917 dealing with the service of notice and with the contents of notice." Okee Industries v. National Grain Mutual Insurance Co. , supra at 375.	1	1
Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen conn · 1968 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998See Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 544 , 244 A.2d 391 [1968]”; State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 560 , 353 A.2d 750 (1974); we must consider whether a substantial compliance standard applies to Practice Book § 712, now § 39-20. 1998See Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 544 , 244 A.2d 391 [1968]”; State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 560 , 353 A.2d 750 (1974); we must consider whether a substantial compliance standard applies to Practice Book § 712, now § 39-20.	1	1
Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp.green conn · 1992 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993We have used a substantial compliance test to assess the sufficiency of the contents of a statutory notice under other remedial statutes, such as our Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-294; see, e.g., Dubois v. General Dynamics Corporation, 222 Conn. 62, 67 , 607 A.2d 431 (1992). 1993We have used a substantial compliance test to assess the sufficiency of the contents of a statutory notice under other remedial statutes, such as our Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-294; see, e.g., Dubois v. General Dynamics Corporation, 222 Conn. 62, 67 , 607 A.2d 431 (1992).	1	1
Hine v. McNerneygreen conn · 1922 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1926–1926	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (31)

Case	Cited	Years
Butts v. Bysiewicz green conn · 2010 2 sentences 2024In Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665 , 5 A.3d 932 (2010), for example, we defined the scope of the doctrine quite narrowly, stating: ‘‘There are only two election cases in which this court has stated that a mandatory require- ment of an election law could be satisfied by substantial compliance. 2024In Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665 , 5 A.3d 932 (2010), for example, we defined the scope of the doctrine quite narrowly, stating: ‘‘There are only two election cases in which this court has stated that a mandatory require- ment of an election law could be satisfied by substantial compliance.	2	2024–2024
Engelman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance green conn · 1997 2 sentences 2021Co., 240 Conn. 287, 298 , 690 A.2d 882 (1997) (‘‘under the substantial compliance doctrine . . . the owner of a life insurance policy will have effec- tively changed the beneficiary if the following is proven: (1) the owner clearly intended to change the beneficiary and to designate the new beneficiary; and (2) the owner has taken substantial affirmative action to effectuate the change in the beneficiary’’ (emphasis in original)). 2021Co., 240 Conn. 287, 298 , 690 A.2d 882 (1997) (‘‘under the substantial compliance doctrine . . . the owner of a life insurance policy will have effec- tively changed the beneficiary if the following is proven: (1) the owner clearly intended to change the beneficiary and to designate the new beneficiary; and (2) the owner has taken substantial affirmative action to effectuate the change in the beneficiary’’ (emphasis in original)).	2	2017–2021
Owens v. New Britain General Hospital green conn · 1994 2 sentences 2012In Owens , we considered the proper test for determining whether a hospital had complied with its bylaws in terminating a physician's medical staff privileges; id., at 593 , 643 A.2d 233 ; and concluded that "a substantial compliance test . . . is the proper test by which to measure whether a hospital has sufficiently complied with its bylaws in terminating a physician's medical staff privileges" because of the "overarching function that medical staff bylaws are designed to servethe provision of quality medical care to the surrounding public community. . . . 2012In Owens , we considered the proper test for determining whether a hospital had complied with its bylaws in terminating a physician's medical staff privileges; id., at 593 , 643 A.2d 233 ; and concluded that "a substantial compliance test . . . is the proper test by which to measure whether a hospital has sufficiently complied with its bylaws in terminating a physician's medical staff privileges" because of the "overarching function that medical staff bylaws are designed to servethe provision of quality medical care to the surrounding public community. . . .	2	2004–2012
State v. Nelson green connappct · 2001 2 sentences 2009In State v. Nelson, 67 Conn. App. 168 , 786 A.2d 1171 (2001), a case sharing a similar factual predicate with the present appeal, we applied the substantial compliance test set forth in Ocasio , and the resulting analysis is instructive. 2009In State v. Nelson, 67 Conn. App. 168 , 786 A.2d 1171 (2001), a case sharing a similar factual predicate with the present appeal, we applied the substantial compliance test set forth in Ocasio , and the resulting analysis is instructive.	2	2008–2009
21st Century North American Ins. Co. v. Perez neutral connappct · 2017 2 sentences 2018Co. v. Perez , 177 Conn. App. 802 , 815, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). "[T]he proper application of the doctrine of substantial performance requires a determination as to whether the contractual breach is material in nature.... [T]he doctrine of substantial performance applies only where performance of a nonessential condition is lacking, so that the benefits received by a party are far greater than the injury done to him by the breach of the other party." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 2018Co. v. Perez , 177 Conn. App. 802 , 815, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). "[T]he proper application of the doctrine of substantial performance requires a determination as to whether the contractual breach is material in nature.... [T]he doctrine of substantial performance applies only where performance of a nonessential condition is lacking, so that the benefits received by a party are far greater than the injury done to him by the breach of the other party." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.	1	2018–2018
21st Century N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Perez neutral conn · 2018 2 sentences 2018Co. v. Perez , 177 Conn. App. 802 , 815, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). "[T]he proper application of the doctrine of substantial performance requires a determination as to whether the contractual breach is material in nature.... [T]he doctrine of substantial performance applies only where performance of a nonessential condition is lacking, so that the benefits received by a party are far greater than the injury done to him by the breach of the other party." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 2018Co. v. Perez , 177 Conn. App. 802 , 815, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). "[T]he proper application of the doctrine of substantial performance requires a determination as to whether the contractual breach is material in nature.... [T]he doctrine of substantial performance applies only where performance of a nonessential condition is lacking, so that the benefits received by a party are far greater than the injury done to him by the breach of the other party." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.	1	2018–2018
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. West Virginia neutral scotus · 2002 1 sentence 2017Baltimore v. West Virginia , 537 U.S. 880 , 123 S.Ct. 90 , 154 L.Ed.2d 137 (2002) ; that has been applied in limited circumstances in this state.	1	2017–2017
Stew Leonard's v. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture green scotus · 2002 1 sentence 2017Baltimore v. West Virginia , 537 U.S. 880 , 123 S.Ct. 90 , 154 L.Ed.2d 137 (2002) ; that has been applied in limited circumstances in this state.	1	2017–2017
Mayor of Baltimore v. West Virginia neutral scotus · 2002 1 sentence 2017Baltimore v. West Virginia , 537 U.S. 880 , 123 S.Ct. 90 , 154 L.Ed.2d 137 (2002) ; that has been applied in limited circumstances in this state.	1	2017–2017
cluster 777112 green ca6 · 2002 1 sentence 2017"The substantial compliance rule is an equitable doctrine"; 8 In re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. , 285 F.3d 522 , 529 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.	1	2017–2017
State v. Hall green conn · 2012 2 sentences 2017In reaching our determination, we rejected Hall's contention "that [a 2003] amendment to § 54-1j(a) subsequent to our decision in Malcolm require[d] us to revisit the substantial compliance standard." State v. Hall , supra, 303 Conn. at 534 , 35 A.3d 237 . 2017In reaching our determination, we rejected Hall's contention "that [a 2003] amendment to § 54-1j(a) subsequent to our decision in Malcolm require[d] us to revisit the substantial compliance standard." State v. Hall , supra, 303 Conn. at 534 , 35 A.3d 237 .	1	2017–2017
Pear v. Davenport green massappct · 2006 1 sentence 2014We need not address this issue, however, because the present case does not involve a material breach of the terms of the parties’ agreements. 11 The Appellate Court also relied on Pear v. Davenport, 67 Mass. App. 239, 244–45, 853 N.E.2d 206 (2006), for the proposition that a strict compliance standard applied to the plaintiff’s performance under the agreements.	1	2014–2014
Pack 2000, Inc. v. Cushman green connappct · 2011 1 sentence 2011The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 126 Conn. App. 339 (AC 30540), is granted, limited to the following issues: “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that lease/option agreements are subject to a strict compliance standard?	1	2011–2011
Wrinn v. Dunleavy green conn · 1982 2 sentences 2010In Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 147-50 , 440 A.2d 261 (1982), the court acknowledged the substantial compliance standard, but in effect applied strict compliance by concluding that, because the absentee ballot had not been mailed by any of the enumerated persons authorized by statute to do so, the ballots could not be counted. 2010In Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 147-50 , 440 A.2d 261 (1982), the court acknowledged the substantial compliance standard, but in effect applied strict compliance by concluding that, because the absentee ballot had not been mailed by any of the enumerated persons authorized by statute to do so, the ballots could not be counted.	1	2010–2010
Banker v. Ward, No. 122435 (Oct. 17, 1995) neutral connsuperct · 1995 1 sentence 1999The first Superior Court decision to apply § 20-325a (c) is Coldwell Banker v. Ward , Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 122435 (October 17, 1995, McDonald, J) ( 15 Conn. L.	1	1999–1999
State v. DellaCamera green conn · 1974 2 sentences 1998See Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 544 , 244 A.2d 391 [1968]”; State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 560 , 353 A.2d 750 (1974); we must consider whether a substantial compliance standard applies to Practice Book § 712, now § 39-20. 1998See Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 544 , 244 A.2d 391 [1968]”; State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 560 , 353 A.2d 750 (1974); we must consider whether a substantial compliance standard applies to Practice Book § 712, now § 39-20.	1	1998–1998
Bachrach v. Herrup green conn · 1941 2 sentences 1997In Bachrach v. Herrup, 128 Conn. 74, 76 , 20 A.2d 395 (1941), this court stated that “[t]he general rule is that a change of beneficiary can only be effected by following the mode prescribed by the policy, however clear the intention to make the change may be. 1997In Bachrach v. Herrup, 128 Conn. 74, 76 , 20 A.2d 395 (1941), this court stated that “[t]he general rule is that a change of beneficiary can only be effected by following the mode prescribed by the policy, however clear the intention to make the change may be.	1	1997–1997
Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee green conn · 1990 2 sentences 1994In the interest of justice, this court finds that general principles of administrative law would allow the present appeal which was timely filed subsequent to reconsideration. "[W]e see no reason why the right of an attorney to judicial review in a disciplinary matter should be any different than the process accorded other professionals in disciplinary matters before licensing and/or disciplinary boards." Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228 , 235 , 578 A.2d 1075 (1990). 1994In the interest of justice, this court finds that general principles of administrative law would allow the present appeal which was timely filed subsequent to reconsideration. "[W]e see no reason why the right of an attorney to judicial review in a disciplinary matter should be any different than the process accorded other professionals in disciplinary matters before licensing and/or disciplinary boards." Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228 , 235 , 578 A.2d 1075 (1990).	1	1994–1994
Asdourian v. Araj green cal · 1985 1 sentence 1991The California courts have applied the substantial compliance doctrine allowing recovery to unlicensed plaintiffs, where a contractor's license expired before completion of a job, Lattipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 411 P.2d 564 (1966); where the license was not obtained until after the contract was executed, Gaines v. Eastern Pacific, 186 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1982); and where the entity performing the contract was different from the entity named on the contract, Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (1946); Asdourian v. Araj, supra. When the California courts found that the substantial	1	1991–1991
Gaines v. Eastern Pacific green calctapp · 1982 1 sentence 1991The California courts have applied the substantial compliance doctrine allowing recovery to unlicensed plaintiffs, where a contractor's license expired before completion of a job, Lattipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 411 P.2d 564 (1966); where the license was not obtained until after the contract was executed, Gaines v. Eastern Pacific, 186 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1982); and where the entity performing the contract was different from the entity named on the contract, Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (1946); Asdourian v. Araj, supra. When the California courts found that the substantial	1	1991–1991
Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc. green cal · 1946 1 sentence 1991The California courts have applied the substantial compliance doctrine allowing recovery to unlicensed plaintiffs, where a contractor's license expired before completion of a job, Lattipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 411 P.2d 564 (1966); where the license was not obtained until after the contract was executed, Gaines v. Eastern Pacific, 186 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1982); and where the entity performing the contract was different from the entity named on the contract, Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (1946); Asdourian v. Araj, supra. When the California courts found that the substantial	1	1991–1991
Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin County green cal · 1966 1 sentence 1991The California courts have applied the substantial compliance doctrine allowing recovery to unlicensed plaintiffs, where a contractor's license expired before completion of a job, Lattipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 411 P.2d 564 (1966); where the license was not obtained until after the contract was executed, Gaines v. Eastern Pacific, 186 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1982); and where the entity performing the contract was different from the entity named on the contract, Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (1946); Asdourian v. Araj, supra. When the California courts found that the substantial	1	1991–1991
Manafort Bros., Inc. v. Kerrigan green conn · 1966	1	1967–1967
Benz v. Walker green conn · 1966 2 sentences 1967Manafort Bros., Inc. v. Kerrigan, 154 Conn. 112, 114 , 222 A.2d 218 ; Benz v. Walker, 154 Conn. 74, 79 , 221 A.2d 841 . 1967Manafort Bros., Inc. v. Kerrigan, 154 Conn. 112, 114 , 222 A.2d 218 ; Benz v. Walker, 154 Conn. 74, 79 , 221 A.2d 841 .	1	1967–1967
Brunswick School v. Town & Borough of Greenwich green conn · 1914	1	1930–1930
Pomfret School v. Town of Pomfret green conn · 1927	1	1930–1930
Female Academy v. Town of Darien neutral conn · 1928	1	1930–1930
Harper MacHinery Co. v. Ryan-Unmack Co. green conn · 1912	1	1926–1926
Farrell v. Eastern MacHinery Co. green · 1905	1	1926–1926
Temple v. Bush neutral conn · 1903	1	1926–1926
Fagerholm v. Nielson neutral conn · 1919	1	1926–1926

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

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Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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