compliance requirement in New York

1985In this matter, Special Term, relying on Matter of Jonas v Black ( 104 AD2d 466 , affd 63 NY2d 685 ), held that the strict compliance rule of Hargett (supra) did not apply to cover sheets which understated the total number of signatures contained in a designating petition, and consequently validated Alter’s petition.

1985In the instant matters, where the overstatements or understatements in the total in the number of signatures reported on the cover sheets are of a de minimis nature, we believe that the strict compliance standard, as set forth in Matter of Hargett v Jefferson (supra) and other Court of Appeals cases (see, e.g., Matter of Smith v Mahoney, 60 NY2d 596 ; Matter of Engert v McNab, 60 NY2d 607 ; Matter of Hutson v Bass, 54 NY2d 772 ; Matter of Ruiz v Sachs, 43 NY2d 894 ), was satisfied.

1948(Walden v. City of Jamestown, 178 N. Y. 213 .)’ ” The court then continued, at page 402: “ The requirement of the statute, however, as Judge Gray wrote, is not absolute and unyielding. * * * In this state the maxim that the law does not seek to compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform has been made the basis for the principle that physical and mental inability to comply with a statutory provision of the kind under consideration excuses the non-compliance. [Citing cases.]” The court distinguished between infants of tender years and those close to their majority, and held that im

1934(Walden v. City of Jamestown, 178 N. Y. 213 .) In this complaint, however, not only is there no allegation of compliance, but no excuse for the failure to present a claim is alleged.” The State has waived its immunity from liability in those cases only in which the statute has been complied with.

2013The principles of the law of commercial contracts and leases are the same for all businesses and institutions, whatever their size. . [2] Although substantial compliance generally suffices to satisfy a constructive condition precedent (see Oppenheimer & Co., 86 NY2d at 690 ), we deem the two-year safe harbor to be sufficiently generous to the landlord that the period need not be further extended by application of the doctrine of substantial compliance.

2013The principles of the law of commercial contracts and leases are the same for all businesses and institutions, whatever their size. . [2] Although substantial compliance generally suffices to satisfy a constructive condition precedent (see Oppenheimer & Co., 86 NY2d at 690 ), we deem the two-year safe harbor to be sufficiently generous to the landlord that the period need not be further extended by application of the doctrine of substantial compliance.

1985Under these circumstances, the strict compliance standard set forth in Matter of Hargett v Jefferson (supra) should be deemed satisfied (see, Matter of Staber v Fidler, 110 AD2d 38 ; Matter of Fromson v Lefever, 112 AD2d 1064 ).

1985Under these circumstances, the strict compliance standard set forth in Matter of Hargett v Jefferson (supra) must be deemed satisfied (see, Matter of Staber v Fidler, 110 AD2d 38 ; Matter of Fromson v Lefever, 112 AD2d 1064 ).

1985Under these circumstances, the strict compliance standard set forth in Matter of Hargett v Jefferson (supra) should be deemed satisfied (see, Matter of Staber v Fidler, 110 AD2d 38 ; Matter of Fromson v Lefever, 112 AD2d 1064 ).

1985Under these circumstances, the strict compliance standard set forth in Matter of Hargett v Jefferson (supra) must be deemed satisfied (see, Matter of Staber v Fidler, 110 AD2d 38 ; Matter of Fromson v Lefever, 112 AD2d 1064 ).

1970As was said in Matter of Dalton v. Darlington ( 123 App. Div. 855 , supra) the primary purpose of civil service laws and rules is- to promote the good of the public service, and that purpose is not to be frustrated by technical or narrow constructions.’ ” It is the opinion of the court that the notice herein was sufficient.

1958As was said in Matter of Dalton v. Darlington ( 123 App. Div. 855 , supra) “ the primary purpose of civil service laws and rules is to promote the good of the public service, and that purpose is not to be frustrated by technical or narrow constructions.” The order appealed from should be reversed and the petition dismissed.

1893These decisions are technical in the extreme, and hardly' in keeping with the rule that substantial compliance with the statute providing for the imposition of taxes in all matters of substance designed for the protection of the taxpayer is sufficient (Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349 ; Parish v. Golden, 35 Id. 462 ; Buffalo & State Line R.

1893These decisions are technical in the extreme, and hardly' in keeping with the rule that substantial compliance with the statute providing for the imposition of taxes in all matters of substance designed for the protection of the taxpayer is sufficient (Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349 ; Parish v. Golden, 35 Id. 462 ; Buffalo & State Line R.

2026Corp . and have held that a contractor or tradesman possesses no right to compensation where it is not licensed to perform the work: Millington v Rapoport (98 AD2d 765 [dismissed complaint by unlicensed home improvement contractor to foreclose on mechanic's lien for performing carpentry, painting, and construction work at defendants' recently purchased home; that homeowner aware of absence of license or even that homeowner planned to take advantage of its absence creates no exception to statutory requirement]); Dwight Getting Heating & A.C. v Jeradco, Ltd. (255 AD2d 288, 289 [2d Dept 1998] [fa

2026Corp . and have held that a contractor or tradesman possesses no right to compensation where it is not licensed to perform the work: Millington v Rapoport ( 98 AD2d 765 [dismissed complaint by unlicensed home improvement contractor to foreclose on mechanic's lien for performing carpentry, painting, and construction work at defendants' recently purchased home; that homeowner aware of absence of license or even that homeowner planned to take advantage of its absence creates no exception to statutory requirement]); Dwight Getting Heating & A.C. v Jeradco, Ltd. ( 255 AD2d 288 , 289 [2d Dept 1998]

2026Corp . and have held that a contractor or tradesman possesses no right to compensation where it is not licensed to perform the work: Millington v Rapoport (98 AD2d 765 [dismissed complaint by unlicensed home improvement contractor to foreclose on mechanic's lien for performing carpentry, painting, and construction work at defendants' recently purchased home; that homeowner aware of absence of license or even that homeowner planned to take advantage of its absence creates no exception to statutory requirement]); Dwight Getting Heating & A.C. v Jeradco, Ltd. (255 AD2d 288, 289 [2d Dept 1998] [fa

2026Corp . and have held that a contractor or tradesman possesses no right to compensation where it is not licensed to perform the work: Millington v Rapoport ( 98 AD2d 765 [dismissed complaint by unlicensed home improvement contractor to foreclose on mechanic's lien for performing carpentry, painting, and construction work at defendants' recently purchased home; that homeowner aware of absence of license or even that homeowner planned to take advantage of its absence creates no exception to statutory requirement]); Dwight Getting Heating & A.C. v Jeradco, Ltd. ( 255 AD2d 288 , 289 [2d Dept 1998]

2026The Court of Appeals attempted to mitigate the harshness of the strict compliance doctrine barring recovery of compensation to contractors and tradesmen who lack the respective [*6]license, in Charlebois v Weller Assoc. (72 NY2d 587 [1988]).

2026The Court of Appeals attempted to mitigate the harshness of the strict compliance doctrine barring recovery of compensation to contractors and tradesmen who lack the respective [*6]license, in Charlebois v Weller Assoc. ( 72 NY2d 587 [1988]).

2024Rather, the strict compliance standard simply requires the Court to determine whether the 84 Croton Lake Road address was in fact Kennedy's legitimate '·place of residence" under the Election Law at the time the nominating petition was circulated and filed with the Board of Elections (see, Matter of Pilla v Karnsomtob, 142 AD3d 1116, 1119 [2016] , Iv denied 28 NY3d 904 ; Zobe l v New York State Bd. of Elections, 254 AD2d 520, 521 [ 1998]; Sheehan v Scaringe. 154 AD2d at 83 3 [ 1989], appeal denied 74 NY2d 615 [ 1989]).

2024Rather, the strict compliance standard simply requires the Court to determine whether the 84 Croton Lake Road address was in fact Kennedy's legitimate '·place of residence" under the Election Law at the time the nominating petition was circulated and filed with the Board of Elections (see, Matter of Pilla v Karnsomtob, 142 AD3d 1116, 1119 [2016] , Iv denied 28 NY3d 904 ; Zobe l v New York State Bd. of Elections, 254 AD2d 520, 521 [ 1998]; Sheehan v Scaringe. 154 AD2d at 83 3 [ 1989], appeal denied 74 NY2d 615 [ 1989]).

2022To the contrary, this Court's case law reflects that this Court has continued to apply a strict compliance standard with respect to the statutory requirement that a claim or a notice of intention to file a claim state the "time when . . . [the] claim arose" (Court of Claims Act § 11[b]; see Matter of DeMairo v State of New York , 172 AD3d at 857; Hargrove v State of New York , 138 AD3d at 778 ; cf. Rodriguez v State of New York , 8 AD3d at 648 ).

2022To the contrary, this Court's case law reflects that this Court has continued to apply a strict compliance standard with respect to the statutory requirement that a claim or a notice of intention to file a claim state the "time when . . . [the] claim arose" (Court of Claims Act § 11[b]; see Matter of DeMairo v State of New York , 172 AD3d at 857; Hargrove v State of New York , 138 AD3d at 778 ; cf. Rodriguez v State of New York , 8 AD3d at 648 ).

2021Accordingly, the substantial compliance doctrine does not apply ( see D'Ambra v Haynor , 293 AD2d 858, 859-860 [2002]; First Nationwide Bank v Pegasus Agency , 253 AD2d 536, 536 [1998]; Mortgagee Affiliates Corp. v Jerder Realty Servs. , 62 AD2d 591, 593-594 [1978], affd 47 NY2d 796 [1979]).