compliance violation in Georgia

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies (Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers (Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers (Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries (Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies (Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies ( Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers ( Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers ( Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries ( Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies ( Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies ( Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers ( Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers ( Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries ( Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies ( Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies ( Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers ( Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers ( Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries ( Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies ( Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1972It is uniformly held in this State, and elsewhere, that "where the license required by the statute is not imposed only for revenue purposes, but requires registration or licensing primarily for the purpose of protecting the public from acts mala in se, or detrimental to good morals, or from improper, incompetent, or irresponsible persons, as in the case of unregistered or unlicensed druggists or *577 physicians, their imposition amounts to a positive prohibition of a contract made without a compliance with and in violation of the statute, and by implication renders such a contract void and une

1972It is uniformly held in this State, and elsewhere, that "where the license required by the statute is not imposed only for revenue purposes, but requires registration or licensing primarily for the purpose of protecting the public from acts mala in se, or detrimental to good morals, or from improper, incompetent, or irresponsible persons, as in the case of unregistered or unlicensed druggists or *577 physicians, their imposition amounts to a positive prohibition of a contract made without a compliance with and in violation of the statute, and by implication renders such a contract void and une

1962Taliaferro v. Moffet, 54 Ga. 150, 153 ; Murray v. Williams, 121 Ga. 63 ; Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309, 311 [ 66 SE 815 ]; Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 (3), 533 [ 81 SE 596 ]; 37 Corpus Juris, 260; 17 R.C.L. 560.” Accord: Bernstein v. Peters, 68 Ga. App. 218 (1), 220 ( 22 SE2d 614 ).

1925Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150, 153 ; Murray v. Williams, 121 Ga. 63 ; Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309, 311 ; Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 (3), 533; 37 Corpus Juris, 260; 17 R.

2009See DeKalb County v. Buckler, 288 Ga. App. 346 ( 654 SE2d 193 ) (2007), cert. denied, Buckler v. DeKalb County, 288 Ga. App. 907 (2008); Buckler v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. App. 190 ( 659 SE2d 398 ) (2008), cert. denied, DeKalb County v. Buckler, 290 Ga. App. 905 (2008). 3 The developers subsequently amended their complaint to add a claim for damages. 4 The developers do not challenge the court’s dismissal of the mandamus claim. 5 See Hart v. Columbus, 125 Ga. App. 625, 631 (2), 634-635 (4), (5) ( 188 SE2d 422 ) (1972) (applying the substantial compliance standard when reviewing government offic

2009See DeKalb County v. Buckler, 288 Ga. App. 346 ( 654 SE2d 193 ) (2007), cert. denied, Buckler v. DeKalb County, 288 Ga. App. 907 (2008); Buckler v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. App. 190 ( 659 SE2d 398 ) (2008), cert. denied, DeKalb County v. Buckler, 290 Ga. App. 905 (2008). 3 The developers subsequently amended their complaint to add a claim for damages. 4 The developers do not challenge the court’s dismissal of the mandamus claim. 5 See Hart v. Columbus, 125 Ga. App. 625, 631 (2), 634-635 (4), (5) ( 188 SE2d 422 ) (1972) (applying the substantial compliance standard when reviewing government offic

2004We disagree. “[W]here the election is held in substantial compliance with the law, it should not be rendered void merely because of isolated failures to conform strictly with the law unless it appears that such failures changed the results of the election.” Gay v. Clements, 214 Ga. 136 (2) ( 103 SE2d 553 ) (1958).

2004We disagree. “[W]here the election is held in substantial compliance with the law, it should not be rendered void merely because of isolated failures to conform strictly with the law unless it appears that such failures changed the results of the election.” Gay v. Clements, 214 Ga. 136 (2) ( 103 SE2d 553 ) (1958).

2002“In our view the statute’s requirement that notice be sent by the ‘holder’ is a matter of substance to which the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply.” Id. at 453 .

1997Bank v. Odiorne, 780 SW2d 313 (Tex. *803 App. 1989). 3 The letter of credit itself does not require documentation of the exact amount of money owed.

1991However, Brim and the substantial compliance rule were expressly overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court in Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418 ( 383 SE2d 108 ) (1989).

1991However, Brim and the substantial compliance rule were expressly overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court in Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418 ( 383 SE2d 108 ) (1989).

1991Plaintiff’s argument on appeal is based on the substantial compliance rule of Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 321 ( 342 SE2d 690 ) (1986).

1991Plaintiff’s argument on appeal is based on the substantial compliance rule of Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 321 ( 342 SE2d 690 ) (1986).

1988The substantial compliance exception set forth in Brim is applicable only when the defendant has received actual notice after service upon a person who was present at the defendant’s place of abode, even though the person who received service was not “residing therein.” See Sanders v. Johnson, 181 Ga. App. 39 (1) ( 351 SE2d 216 ) (1986); see also Roberts v. Bienert, 183 Ga. App. 751 (1) ( 360 SE2d 25 ) (1987); Adams v. Gluckman, supra. Service upon a relative of the defendant at a place other than defendant’s residence or usual place of abode is insufficient.

1988The substantial compliance exception set forth in Brim is applicable only when the defendant has received actual notice after service upon a person who was present at the defendant’s place of abode, even though the person who received service was not “residing therein.” See Sanders v. Johnson, 181 Ga. App. 39 (1) ( 351 SE2d 216 ) (1986); see also Roberts v. Bienert, 183 Ga. App. 751 (1) ( 360 SE2d 25 ) (1987); Adams v. Gluckman, supra. Service upon a relative of the defendant at a place other than defendant’s residence or usual place of abode is insufficient.

1988Freeman v. Nodvin, 181 Ga. App. 663 ( 353 SE2d 546 ) (1987).

1988Freeman v. Nodvin, 181 Ga. App. 663 ( 353 SE2d 546 ) (1987).

1984Co., 251 Ga. 744 (2) ( 309 SE2d 617 ) (1983) (testimony of oral communications between insured *101 and agent concerning optional no-fault coverages properly excluded from consideration on question of insurer's good faith.) We decline to depart from the method of conflict resolution outlined in Flewellen , especially in view of our application of the substantial compliance rule to OCGA § 33-34-5 (b), and hold that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Tolison's motion for partial summary judgment.

1984Co., 251 Ga. 744 (2) ( 309 SE2d 617 ) (1983) (testimony of oral communications between insured *101 and agent concerning optional no-fault coverages properly excluded from consideration on question of insurer's good faith.) We decline to depart from the method of conflict resolution outlined in Flewellen , especially in view of our application of the substantial compliance rule to OCGA § 33-34-5 (b), and hold that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Tolison's motion for partial summary judgment.

1984“Statutory notice for the purpose of fixing liability for attorney’s fees should disclose who is holder of the note, and who it is that intends to bring suit, and to whom the payment should be made; and if notice is so worded as to mislead or as to be likely to mislead the defendant in material respects as to these features, it is inadequate.” Gelders v. Kennedy, 9 Ga. App. 389, 390 ( 71 SE 503 ) (1911).

1981In Edmondson v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 263 (1) ( 180 SE2d 589 ) (1971), the Court of Appeals held: “Where, on default in installment payments, property subject to a security interest is repossessed by the seller, if the seller thereafter wishes to dispose of such collateral at public or private sale and, on its failure to bring an amount sufficient to pay the balance due on the debt, secure a deficiency judgment against the purchaser for the balance, he must follow Code Ann. § 109A-9 — 504 (3), so that if the property is sold at private sale, ‘reasonable notification of the time after w

1981In Edmondson v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 263 (1) ( 180 SE2d 589 ) (1971), the Court of Appeals held: “Where, on default in installment payments, property subject to a security interest is repossessed by the seller, if the seller thereafter wishes to dispose of such collateral at public or private sale and, on its failure to bring an amount sufficient to pay the balance due on the debt, secure a deficiency judgment against the purchaser for the balance, he must follow Code Ann. § 109A-9 — 504 (3), so that if the property is sold at private sale, ‘reasonable notification of the time after w

1979That issue is not addressed in Brooks, supra, and we believe that the present case is controlled by Franco v. Bank of Forest Park, 118 Ga. App. 700 ( 165 SE2d 593 ) (1968).

1979That issue is not addressed in Brooks, supra, and we believe that the present case is controlled by Franco v. Bank of Forest Park, 118 Ga. App. 700 ( 165 SE2d 593 ) (1968).

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies ( Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers ( Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers ( Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries ( Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies ( Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1972While the McLamb case dealt with a wage broker, in this State the rule also has been applied to industrial loan companies ( Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga. App. 27 (2, 3) ( 150 SE2d 311 )); real estate brokers ( Webster Cason & Associates v. Lackie, 114 Ga. App. 102, 107 ( 150 SE2d 321 )); peddlers ( Singleton v. State, 14 Ga. App. 527 ( 81 SE 596 )); apothecaries ( Taliaferro v. Moffett, 54 Ga. 150 ); and insurance companies ( Jalonick v. Greene County Oil Co., 7 Ga. App. 309 ( 66 SE 815 )).

1962Campbell v. Gormley, 185 Ga. 65 ( 194 SE 177 ).

1962Campbell v. Gormley, 185 Ga. 65 ( 194 SE 177 ).