compliance standard in Arizona

2015But, we noted, consistent with the strong public policy in this state that favors facilitating the referendum process, “our courts have held that, unless the failure to comply strictly with a statutory requirement is expressly made fatal, that failure ‘does not make the signatures appearing on the petitions null and void, but merely destroys their presumption of validity.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 14, 21, quoting Direct Sellers, 109 Ariz. at 5 , 503 P.2d at 953 .

2015But, we noted, consistent with the strong public policy in this state that favors facilitating the referendum process, “our courts have held that, unless the failure to comply strictly with a statutory requirement is expressly made fatal, that failure ‘does not make the signatures appearing on the petitions null and void, but merely destroys their presumption of validity.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 14, 21, quoting Direct Sellers, 109 Ariz. at 5 , 503 P.2d at 953 .

2015In Harris, we acknowledged that referenda are subject to a strict compliance standard. 219 Ariz. 36, ¶ 13 , 192 P.3d at 166 .

2015In Harris, we acknowledged that referenda are subject to a strict compliance standard. 219 Ariz. 36, ¶ 13 , 192 P.3d at 166 .

2011In so holding, the court recognized substantial compliance satisfied the purpose of the statute, which was not to punish licensees who had failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements, but “to protect the public from unscrupulous, unqualified, and financially irresponsible contractors.” Id. at 77-78 , 900 P.2d at 1213-14 ; see Bentivegna v. Powers Steel & Wire Prods., Inc., 206 Ariz. 581, 587, ¶ 23 , 81 P.3d 1040, 1046 (App.2003) (under substantial compliance doctrine, “even unlicensed contractors are not automatically barred from bringing an action for amounts due”); Davidson, 95

2011In so holding, the court recognized substantial compliance satisfied the purpose of the statute, which was not to punish licensees who had failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements, but “to protect the public from unscrupulous, unqualified, and financially irresponsible contractors.” Id. at 77-78 , 900 P.2d at 1213-14 ; see Bentivegna v. Powers Steel & Wire Prods., Inc., 206 Ariz. 581, 587, ¶ 23 , 81 P.3d 1040, 1046 (App.2003) (under substantial compliance doctrine, “even unlicensed contractors are not automatically barred from bringing an action for amounts due”); Davidson, 95

1947Federico v. Hancock, 1 Ariz. 511 , 25 P. 650 ; Daggs v. Phœnix Nat.

1934Federico v. Hancock, 1 Ariz. 511 , 25 Pac. 650 ; Daggs v. Phoenix Nat.

2026This strict compliance standard “requires nearly perfect compliance with constitutional and statutory referendum requirements.” Comm. for Pres. of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247 , 249 ¶ 6 (App. 2006). ¶31 Courts are ill equipped to decide whether statutory requirements for referendum are good policy.

2020This Court evaluates nomination documents from challenges under a substantial compliance analysis unless there is “a clear statement that the legislature intended a particular form requirement to be indispensable.” Id.

2020“A person who does not file a timely nomination paper that complies with [§ 16-311(A)] is not eligible to have the person’s name printed on the official ballot for that office.” § 16-311(I). ¶10 Bolick did not strictly comply with the requirements of § 16- 311(A) because by listing a private mailbox located at a UPS store, and not her physical residence, Bolick failed to give her “actual residence address or description of place of residence and post office address.” However, Bolick substantially complied with the statutory nomination paper requirement. ¶11 The substantial compliance analysis

2020“A person who does not file a timely nomination paper that complies with [§ 16-311(A)] is not eligible to have the person’s name printed on the official ballot for that office.” § 16-311(I). ¶10 Bolick did not strictly comply with the requirements of § 16- 311(A) because by listing a private mailbox located at a UPS store, and not her physical residence, Bolick failed to give her “actual residence address or description of place of residence and post office address.” However, Bolick substantially complied with the statutory nomination paper requirement. ¶11 The substantial compliance analysis

2018MH2010-002348, 228 Ariz. at 447 ¶ 19. ¶9 The appellant in MH2010-002348 had been adjudicated GEI and then challenged a subsequent order for involuntary treatment. 228 Ariz. at 443 ¶ 1.

2018MH2010-002348, 228 Ariz. at 447 ¶ 19. ¶9 The appellant in MH2010-002348 had been adjudicated GEI and then challenged a subsequent order for involuntary treatment. 228 Ariz. at 443 ¶ 1.

2012For this proposition, he cites Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930 , 142 P.3d 339 (2006), and the dissent in Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986 , 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 , 128 P.3d 675 (2006). *559 ¶ 12 We decline to change our longstanding test based on these cases.

2012For this proposition, he cites Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930 , 142 P.3d 339 (2006), and the dissent in Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986 , 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 , 128 P.3d 675 (2006). *559 ¶ 12 We decline to change our longstanding test based on these cases.

2012For this proposition, he cites Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930 , 142 P.3d 339 (2006), and the dissent in Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986 , 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 , 128 P.3d 675 (2006). *559 ¶ 12 We decline to change our longstanding test based on these cases.

2012For this proposition, he cites Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930 , 142 P.3d 339 (2006), and the dissent in Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986 , 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 470 , 128 P.3d 675 (2006). *559 ¶ 12 We decline to change our longstanding test based on these cases.

2010Deer Valley Unified School District v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 298-99, ¶¶ 19-21 , 152 P.3d 490 , 495-96 (2007) rejected the substantial compliance standard in Hollingsworth.

2006This court, in City of Phoenix, 184 Ariz. at 438 , 909 P.2d at 505 , concluded that the doctrine of substantial compliance may apply to the statute at issue in this case, A.R.S. § 32-1151.

2006This court, in City of Phoenix, 184 Ariz. at 438 , 909 P.2d at 505 , concluded that the doctrine of substantial compliance may apply to the statute at issue in this case, A.R.S. § 32-1151.

2005Id. at 428-29 , 814 P.2d at 769-70 . ¶ 20 Second, the language used in the cir-culator affidavit in Devcor did not track the language of the constitution. 168 Ariz. at 429-32, 814 P.2d at 770-73 .

2005Id. at 428-29 , 814 P.2d at 769-70 . ¶ 20 Second, the language used in the cir-culator affidavit in Devcor did not track the language of the constitution. 168 Ariz. at 429-32, 814 P.2d at 770-73 .

1952Kos v. Adamson, 226 Minn. 177 , 32 N.W.2d 281, 284 , the court said: “The doctrine of substantial compliance has no -application to the performance of duty by those entrusted with the administration of the civil service law.

1952Kos v. Adamson, 226 Minn. 177 , 32 N.W.2d 281, 284 , the court said: “The doctrine of substantial compliance has no -application to the performance of duty by those entrusted with the administration of the civil service law.

1938The most that has been done was on November 23, 1936, the court made an order which, under the Uniform Buies for the Superior Courts and the decision of this court in Moulton v. Smith, 23 Ariz. 319 , 203 Pac. 562 , could amount to nothing at the most except a notice to counsel that, upon the compliance with rule YII of the Uniform Buies, judgment would be properly rendered.

1938The most that has been done was on November 23, 1936, the court made an order which, under the Uniform Buies for the Superior Courts and the decision of this court in Moulton v. Smith, 23 Ariz. 319 , 203 Pac. 562 , could amount to nothing at the most except a notice to counsel that, upon the compliance with rule YII of the Uniform Buies, judgment would be properly rendered.