71 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1870–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carr v. Town of Shubutagreen2 sentences2023Rouse v. Randall, 729 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Miss. 1998), the Court abandoned strict compliance and held that “[w]hen the simple requirements of the Act have been substantially complied with, jurisdiction will attach for the purposes of the Act.” The substantial compliance standard was clarified in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E. 2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989)), overruled by Stuart, 21 So. 3d 544 , in which the Court stated that substantial compliance “informs the [entity] of the claimant’s intent to make a claim and contains sufficient infor 2002Rouse v. Randall, 729 So.2d 1237 (Miss. 1998) and Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999), which relaxed the standard of strict compliance for notice under the MTCA and implemented a substantial compliance standard. | 10 | 32 |
Reaves Ex Rel. Rouse v. Randallgreen2 sentences2023Rouse v. Randall, 729 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Miss. 1998), the Court abandoned strict compliance and held that “[w]hen the simple requirements of the Act have been substantially complied with, jurisdiction will attach for the purposes of the Act.” The substantial compliance standard was clarified in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E. 2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989)), overruled by Stuart, 21 So. 3d 544 , in which the Court stated that substantial compliance “informs the [entity] of the claimant’s intent to make a claim and contains sufficient infor 2002Rouse v. Randall, 729 So.2d 1237 (Miss. 1998) and Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999), which relaxed the standard of strict compliance for notice under the MTCA and implemented a substantial compliance standard. | 6 | 19 |
City of Jackson v. Lumpkingreen2 sentences2023In City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So. 2d 1179 , 1181 n.1 (Miss. 1997), overruled by Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, 21 So. 3d 544 (Miss. 2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court removed the familiar substantial compliance standard applicable to statutory notice requirements and held that strict compliance with the notice provisions of Section 11-46-11 was a mandatory jurisdictional requirement. 1999Lattimore further admits that this Court has already specifically addressed the notice of claim requirements of Section 11-46-11, but request this Court to reconsider its strict interpretation in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1997), and apply a substantial compliance standard instead. ¶ 8. | 4 | 11 |
Carpenter v. Dawsongreen2 sentences1999Furthermore, in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999), this Court announced that the strict compliance standard found in Lumpkin as well as its progeny Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss.1997) and Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624 (Miss.1998)-was overruled. 1998Feb. 11, 1999), this Court announced that the strict compliance standard found in Lumpkin as well as its progeny--Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1997) and Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1998)-was overruled. | 3 | 10 |
Perry v. Andygreen2 sentences2022Furthermore, in Perry v. Andy, 858 So. 2d 143, 148 (¶¶21-22) (Miss. 2003), the Mississippi Supreme Court expressly held even when a defendant is given notice through delivery of the complaint, a pro se plaintiff “must be held to a strict compliance standard under [Rule] 4(h).” 4 Therefore, delivery of the petition to the BTA did not cure any defects in the service of process. ¶8. 2006Perry v. Andy, 858 So.2d 143, 148 (Miss. 2003) (even "pro se plaintiffs must be held to a strict compliance standard under Miss. | 3 | 3 |
Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howegreen2 sentences2019In Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe, 49 So. 3d 86 (Miss. 2010), the Mississippi Supreme Court enforced a strict compliance standard regarding the proper recipients of the statutory notice of claim required by the MTCA.2 Id. at 92 (¶17). 2019In Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe, 49 So. 3d 86 (Miss. 2010), the Mississippi Supreme Court enforced a strict compliance standard regarding the proper recipients of the statutory notice of claim required by the MTCA.2 Id. at 92 (¶17). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Palmer relied upon Jones v. State, 798 So.2d 592, 594 (Miss.Ct.App.2001), a DUI case involving authentication of certificates for the proposition "[w]here one of the safeguards is deficient the State bears the burden of showing that the deficiency did not affect the accuracy of the result." (citations omitted). 2002Palmer relied upon Jones v. State, 798 So.2d 592, 594 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Evans v. Boyle Flying Service, Inc.green2 sentences1997See Evans v. Boyle Flying Service, Inc., 680 So.2d 821, 830 (Miss. 1996) (in negligence action for spray-drift from aerial application, applying "substantial compliance" rule to notice-of-claim provision in Miss. 1995See Evans v. Boyle Flying Service, Inc., 680 So. 2d 821, 830 (Miss. 1996) (in negligence action for spray-drift from aerial application, applying "substantial compliance" rule to notice-of-claim provision in Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Malaer v. Flying Lion, Inc.green2 sentences1996App. 154 , 670 P.2d 214, 216-217 (1983) (holding that even while applying the substantial compliance rule, "failure to report the loss to the Department of Agriculture is fatal.") *830 CONCLUSION Today the Court has before it the opportunity to address a statute which has not yet been interpreted. 1993See Malaer v. Flying Lion, Inc., 670 P.2d 214, 216-217 (Or. 1983) (holding that even while applying the substantial compliance rule, "failure to report the loss to the Department of Agriculture is fatal.") CONCLUSION ¶27. | 2 | 2 |
University Medical Center v. Easterlinggreen2 sentences2008The Circuit Court of Hinds County granted summary judgment to UMMC based upon University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815, 819-20 (¶22) (Miss. 2006), in which the supreme court adopted a strict compliance standard for the ninety-day notice requirement. ¶ 3. 2007Additionally, I further contend that this Court's decision in Williams is totally irrelevant to the current issue before this Court as to whether Powell was authorized by law to serve as Rao's agent for purposes of service of process. [7] In University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling, this Court adopted a strict compliance standard regarding the ninety-day notice requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev.2002). 928 So.2d 815 (Miss.2006) [8] Rule 15(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "A party shall plead in response | 1 | 5 |
Ferrer v. Jackson County Bd. of Sup'rsgreen1 sentence2019According to Dobbs, “The actions of Travelers [are] sufficient to estop the [city] from asserting lack of actual notice.” Dobbs relies on Ferrer v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors, 741 So. 2d 216, 217 (¶ 1) (Miss. 1999), which applies a substantial compliance standard to section 11-46-11’s notice provisions, in support of her position. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfportgreen1 sentence2017Rouse v. Randall, [ 729 So.2d 1237 (Miss. 1998)].” Lee, 999 So.2d at 1267 (¶ 13). | 1 | 1 |
South Cent. Regional Med. Center v. Guffygreen1 sentence2005Ctr. v. Guffy, 930 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Miss. 2006); Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael, 626 So.2d 127 -29 (Miss. 1993); City of 7 In University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling, this Court adopted a strict compliance standard regarding the ninety-day notice requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act under Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthriegreen1 sentence1997Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.1994); Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1989); Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Sprankle, 503 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1987); Barham v. Klumb Forest Products Center, Inc., 453 So. 2d 1300, 1304 (Miss. 1984)) and the supreme court's recent adoption of the substantial compliance standard with regard to the Tort Claims Act and parallel reference to the worker's compensation law, I believe that on these facts, McCrary was entitled to escape the very punitive result reached in this case. ¶15. | 1 | 1 |
Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Spranklegreen1 sentence1997Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.1994); Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1989); Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Sprankle, 503 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1987); Barham v. Klumb Forest Products Center, Inc., 453 So. 2d 1300, 1304 (Miss. 1984)) and the supreme court's recent adoption of the substantial compliance standard with regard to the Tort Claims Act and parallel reference to the worker's compensation law, I believe that on these facts, McCrary was entitled to escape the very punitive result reached in this case. ¶15. | 1 | 1 |
Barham v. Klumb Forest Products Center, Inc.green1 sentence1997Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.1994); Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1989); Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Sprankle, 503 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1987); Barham v. Klumb Forest Products Center, Inc., 453 So. 2d 1300, 1304 (Miss. 1984)) and the supreme court's recent adoption of the substantial compliance standard with regard to the Tort Claims Act and parallel reference to the worker's compensation law, I believe that on these facts, McCrary was entitled to escape the very punitive result reached in this case. ¶15. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warrengreen1 sentence1997Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.1994); Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So. 2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1989); Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Sprankle, 503 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1987); Barham v. Klumb Forest Products Center, Inc., 453 So. 2d 1300, 1304 (Miss. 1984)) and the supreme court's recent adoption of the substantial compliance standard with regard to the Tort Claims Act and parallel reference to the worker's compensation law, I believe that on these facts, McCrary was entitled to escape the very punitive result reached in this case. ¶15. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Jackson v. Lumpkingreen2 sentences2023In City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So. 2d 1179 , 1181 n.1 (Miss. 1997), overruled by Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, 21 So. 3d 544 (Miss. 2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court removed the familiar substantial compliance standard applicable to statutory notice requirements and held that strict compliance with the notice provisions of Section 11-46-11 was a mandatory jurisdictional requirement. 1999Lattimore further admits that this Court has already specifically addressed the notice of claim requirements of Section 11-46-11, but request this Court to reconsider its strict interpretation in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1997), and apply a substantial compliance standard instead. ¶ 8. | 1 | 11 |
Collier v. Pratergreen1 sentence2023Rouse v. Randall, 729 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Miss. 1998), the Court abandoned strict compliance and held that “[w]hen the simple requirements of the Act have been substantially complied with, jurisdiction will attach for the purposes of the Act.” The substantial compliance standard was clarified in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E. 2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989)), overruled by Stuart, 21 So. 3d 544 , in which the Court stated that substantial compliance “informs the [entity] of the claimant’s intent to make a claim and contains sufficient infor | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holmes v. Defer
green
2 sentences1999Furthermore, in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999), this Court announced that the strict compliance standard found in Lumpkin as well as its progeny Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss.1997) and Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624 (Miss.1998)-was overruled. 1998Feb. 11, 1999), this Court announced that the strict compliance standard found in Lumpkin as well as its progeny--Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1997) and Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1998)-was overruled. | 7 | 1996–1999 |
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
green
2 sentences2006Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." The majority's requirement of strict compliance with section 15-1-36(15) clearly denies, without due process of law, the plaintiff's right to pursue her claim. 2006Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." The majority's requirement of strict compliance with section 15-1-36(15) clearly denies, without due process of law, the plaintiff's right to pursue her claim. | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Overstreet v. George County School Dist.
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 970 . 2002Id. at 970 . | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Trosclair v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp.
green
2 sentences2003On appeal, this Court found the circuit court failed to apply the substantial compliance test set out in Reaves. 757 So.2d at 180-81 . 2002On appeal, this Court found the circuit court failed to apply the substantial compliance test set out in Reaves. 757 So. 2d at 180-81 . | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Williams v. Toliver
green
2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2002). [2] This letter was sent after Williams filed the instant lawsuit. [3] The exact dates of mailing and receipt are not known. [4] Since this Court adopted the substantial compliance requirement, we have found substantial compliance in Williams v. Toliver, 759 So.2d 1195 (Miss.2000) (plaintiff placed wrong name under "the name of a person known to be involved."); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So.2d 999 (Miss.1999) (original notice letter contained all statutorily required information except plaintiff's residence address); Alexander v. M 2002Their precedential effect on this issue is limited as their analysis was based on a strict interpretation of the Act.4 4 Since this Court adopted the substantial compliance requirement, we have found substantial compliance in Williams v. Toliver, 759 So. 2d 1195 (Miss. 2000) (plaintiff placed wrong name under "the name of a person known to be involved."); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1999) (original notice letter contained all statutorily required information except plaintiff's residence address); Alexander v. Miss. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Alexander v. Mississippi Gaming Com'n
green
2 sentences2003Gaming Comm'n, 735 So.2d 360 (Miss.1999) (all the information required for a statutory notice of claim, except for information regarding the extent of the injury); Carr, 733 So.2d 261 (all requirements of notice provision given except the amount of damages sought, and the plaintiff's injuries were described generally). [5] For purposes of this discussion we apply the 120-day provision since the present case concerns a county. 2002Gaming Comm'n, 735 So. 2d 360 (Miss. 1999) (all the information required for a statutory notice of claim, except for information regarding the extent of the injury); Carr, 733 So. 2d 261 (all requirements of notice provision given except the amount of damages sought, and the 6 ¶15. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Powell v. City of Pascagoula
green
2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2002). [2] This letter was sent after Williams filed the instant lawsuit. [3] The exact dates of mailing and receipt are not known. [4] Since this Court adopted the substantial compliance requirement, we have found substantial compliance in Williams v. Toliver, 759 So.2d 1195 (Miss.2000) (plaintiff placed wrong name under "the name of a person known to be involved."); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So.2d 999 (Miss.1999) (original notice letter contained all statutorily required information except plaintiff's residence address); Alexander v. M 2002Their precedential effect on this issue is limited as their analysis was based on a strict interpretation of the Act.4 4 Since this Court adopted the substantial compliance requirement, we have found substantial compliance in Williams v. Toliver, 759 So. 2d 1195 (Miss. 2000) (plaintiff placed wrong name under "the name of a person known to be involved."); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1999) (original notice letter contained all statutorily required information except plaintiff's residence address); Alexander v. Miss. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center
green
2 sentences2023In City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So. 2d 1179 , 1181 n.1 (Miss. 1997), overruled by Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, 21 So. 3d 544 (Miss. 2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court removed the familiar substantial compliance standard applicable to statutory notice requirements and held that strict compliance with the notice provisions of Section 11-46-11 was a mandatory jurisdictional requirement. 2023Rouse v. Randall, 729 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Miss. 1998), the Court abandoned strict compliance and held that “[w]hen the simple requirements of the Act have been substantially complied with, jurisdiction will attach for the purposes of the Act.” The substantial compliance standard was clarified in Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E. 2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989)), overruled by Stuart, 21 So. 3d 544 , in which the Court stated that substantial compliance “informs the [entity] of the claimant’s intent to make a claim and contains sufficient infor | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael
green
1 sentence2005Ctr. v. Guffy, 930 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Miss. 2006); Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael, 626 So.2d 127 -29 (Miss. 1993); City of 7 In University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling, this Court adopted a strict compliance standard regarding the ninety-day notice requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act under Miss. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Patton
green
1 sentence1991Irby Company v. Patton, Administrator, 301 So.2d 845 (Miss. 1974). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Vaughn v. Baker
green
1 sentence1990Based on the facts and the Kentucky case of Vaughn v. Baker, 438 S.W.2d 517 , 518 (Ky. 1969), the Chancellor held that she did. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Agee v. State
green
1 sentence1980Thus, the giving of Miranda warnings, Smith's waiver, and the State's compliance with the rule in Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss. 1966), plus the conflicting testimony, created an issue for the court's resolution. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Richmond v. Conservative Credit System neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Atta v. Bergin green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Family Finance Corp. v. Miick neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance v. Kearney green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Kibbe v. Benson green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Foster v. Simmons neutral | 1 | 1870–1870 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.