compliance requirement in Texas

2019Those admissions allegedly established facts supporting a valid return of the citation.4 We declined to do so, and wrote: “This court, however, has reconfirmed the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment, or any review of the whole record to establish proper service in an appeal by writ of error.” Id. at 261-62 , citing Whiskeman, 847 S.W.2d at 330 and Avila v. Avila, 843 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, no writ).

2003Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.1994); see also Verlander Enters., Inc. v. Graham, 932 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (reconfirming the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment or any review of the whole record to establish proper service).

2011See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974) ("It is well settled that the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes of this State will be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen.") For purposes of mechanic’s or materialman’s liens, an "original contractor" is a "person contracting with an owner either directly or through the owner's agent." § 53.001(7) (emphasis added).

2011See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974) ("It is well settled that the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes of this State will be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen.") For purposes of mechanic’s or materialman’s liens, an "original contractor" is a "person contracting with an owner either directly or through the owner's agent." § 53.001(7) (emphasis added).

2011Bank v. East End Glass Co., 773 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1989, no writ) ("For purposes of perfection, only substantial compliance is required in order to fulfill the requirements of the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes.") This substantial compliance standard is consistent with the liberal construction generally afforded to mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes.

2011Bank v. East End Glass Co., 773 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1989, no writ) ("For purposes of perfection, only substantial compliance is required in order to fulfill the requirements of the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes.") This substantial compliance standard is consistent with the liberal construction generally afforded to mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes.

2003Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.1994); see also Verlander Enters., Inc. v. Graham, 932 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (reconfirming the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment or any review of the whole record to establish proper service).

2003Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver , 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994); see also Verlander Enters., Inc. v. Graham , 932 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1996, no writ) (reconfirming the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment or any review of the whole record to establish proper service).

2019The end effect of our application of the strict compliance standard is an increased opportunity for trial on the merits. [T]his policy justifies what may at first blush seem a hyper- technical rule.” Benefit Planners, L.L.P. v. RenCare, Ltd., 81 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).

2003The end effect of our application of the strict compliance standard is an increased opportunity for trial on the merits.” Benefit Planners, L.L.P. 81 S.W.3d at 859 ; Verlander Enters., Inc. 932 S.W.2d at 262 . 3 .

2019Those admissions allegedly established facts supporting a valid return of the citation.4 We declined to do so, and wrote: “This court, however, has reconfirmed the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment, or any review of the whole record to establish proper service in an appeal by writ of error.” Id. at 261-62 , citing Whiskeman, 847 S.W.2d at 330 and Avila v. Avila, 843 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, no writ).

2016As stated in Whiskeman v. Lama, “Although this strict rule sometimes leads the courts to rather weird conclusions, preventing us from making even the most obvious and rational inferences, ... [t]he end effect of our application of the strict compliance standard is an increased opportunity for trial on die merits.” 847 S.W.2d 327 , 329 n. 1 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993 no pet.). .

2019Those admissions allegedly established facts supporting a valid return of the citation.4 We declined to do so, and wrote: “This court, however, has reconfirmed the strict compliance standard, eschewing any presumptions in favor of judgment, or any review of the whole record to establish proper service in an appeal by writ of error.” Id. at 261-62 , citing Whiskeman, 847 S.W.2d at 330 and Avila v. Avila, 843 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, no writ).

1996Whiskeman v. Lama, 847 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ); Avila v. Avila, 843 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no writ).

1985In McConnell v. Alamo Heights ISD, 576 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court applied the substantial compliance rule to the notice requirements of the Open Meetings Act as did that court in Santos v. Guerra, 570 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1985In McConnell v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, 576 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court, in an opinion written after the effective date of the 1975 amendment of Sec. 3A(h) of art. 6252-17, held, “The law appears settled that the notice provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act are subject to the substantial compliance rule.” The McConnell court cited Santos v. Guerra, 570 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), a prior case by that court, holding that the substantial compliance rule was applicable to meeting the requir

2022The courts of appeals have more broadly applied the “doctrine of substantial compliance” to excuse “exactitude in the performance of contractual duties . . . where any deviations or deficiencies do not seriously impair the purpose underlying the contractual provision.” In re G.D.H., 366 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); see also, e.g., Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

2022The courts of appeals have more broadly applied the “doctrine of substantial compliance” to excuse “exactitude in the performance of contractual duties . . . where any deviations or deficiencies do not seriously impair the purpose underlying the contractual provision.” In re G.D.H., 366 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); see also, e.g., Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

2022The courts of appeals have more broadly applied the “doctrine of substantial compliance” to excuse “exactitude in the performance of contractual duties . . . where any deviations or deficiencies do not seriously impair the purpose underlying the contractual provision.” In re G.D.H., 366 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); see also, e.g., Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

2022The courts of appeals have more broadly applied the “doctrine of substantial compliance” to excuse “exactitude in the performance of contractual duties . . . where any deviations or deficiencies do not seriously impair the purpose underlying the contractual provision.” In re G.D.H., 366 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); see also, e.g., Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

2022Co-op v. Dresser–Rand Co., 575 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Barbier and Texas Utilities to hold that under well-established Texas law, “the doctrine of substantial compliance [applies] to contractual notice provisions”).

2022Co-op v. Dresser–Rand Co., 575 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Barbier and Texas Utilities to hold that under well-established Texas law, “the doctrine of substantial compliance [applies] to contractual notice provisions”).

2021See In re Rogers, No. 12-12-00395-CV, 2012 WL 6707723 , at *2 (Tex. 7 The transcript of the March 10, 2021 hearing reflects the Court indicated during a January 20, 2021 “compliance” hearing that “it needed to have a show cause at that time,” and that it was scheduled for January 27, 2021, reset to February 3, 2021, and ultimately reset to March 10, 2021. 8 Allowing notice of a compliance hearing in a protective order to serve as legally sufficient, due-process-compliant notice of a contempt hearing for potential future violations of the order would enable trial courts to circumvent the notice

2007In re Rowe , 113 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex. App. C Austin 2003, orig. proceeding) (stating that an opportunity to defend against charges is A an alleged contemnor = s most fundamental due process right @ ); see Ex parte Gordon , 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding) (noting that constructive contemnor must be given opportunity to meet the charges of contempt by defense or explanation). [4] At the conclusion of the compliance hearing, the trial judge found relator was A not in compliance, @ but did not specify which contempt order was violated. [5] See Ex parte Swate , 922 S.W.2d at 124

2016Id.; Hernandez v. State, 176 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. Crim.

2013Hernandez v. State, 176 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); see Tex R Evid. 404(b).

2014We find that Dr. Garcia met the substantial compliance test and had “done all that he could reasonably have done to perfect the change.” Tips v. Security Life & Accident Company, 144 Tex. 461, 464 , 191 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1945).

2014We find that Dr. Garcia met the substantial compliance test and had “done all that he could reasonably have done to perfect the change.” Tips v. Security Life & Accident Company, 144 Tex. 461, 464 , 191 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1945).

2006Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Consolidated Capital Properties IV , 795 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (mandatory time requirement for paying property tax not reasonably susceptible to substantial-compliance review).

2006Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Consolidated Capital Properties IV, 795 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (mandatory time requirement for paying property tax not reasonably susceptible to substantial-compliance review).

2000While a court would apply the substantial compliance standard of review to assess the sufficiency of a particular notice under section 152.013(b) and to determine whether particular salary increases are invalid due to insufficient notice, a notice materially misstating the amount of the proposed increases is as a matter of law not in substantial compliance because it provides “less than full disclosure.” Cox Enters., 706 S.W.2d at 960 .

2000While a court would apply the substantial compliance standard of review to assess the sufficiency of a particular notice under section 152.013(b) and to determine whether particular salary increases are invalid due to insufficient notice, a notice materially misstating the amount of the proposed increases is as a matter of law not in substantial compliance because it provides "less than full disclosure." Cox Enters ., 706 S.W.2d at 960 .

2025See id. § 2260.051 As a result, “[BE&K] failed to meet the law’s unambiguous requirements, and the Legislature enacted an austere consequence for noncompliance.” See BankDirect, 519 S.W.3d at 86 .

2019CODE § 651.161(b). 19 519 S.W.3d at 79 . 20 Id. 21 Id. at 80. 22 Id. at 83. 23 Cf. Mekhail v. Duncan-Jackson Mortuary, Inc., 369 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (explaining that courts are justified in applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to Section 34.21 because “the statute acknowledges and provides for certain ambiguity in the amount that must be paid”, it “does not contain clear and precise requirements that would allow for a strict construction of its application”, and “certain matters in [it] are subjective and readily subject to dispute”). 7 inte

2024Although noting that modern technology has given police officers the means to assess a driver’s compliance with the requirement that he maintain proof of financial responsibility, the Gonzalez–Gilando court stated that 12 the information obtained by the officers “was hardly suggestive of anything other than the unknown.” Gonzalez–Gilando, 306 S.W.3d at 896 .

2015Although noting that modern technology has given police officers the means to assess a driver’s compliance with the requirement that he maintain proof of financial responsibility, the Gonzalez-Galindo court stated that the information 5 A deputy sheriff asked to assist the troopers received similar information that the vehicle’s insurance was “not available” or its status was “undocumented.” See Contraras v. State, 309 S.W.3d 168 , 171 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d); Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 306 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). 7 obtained by the officers “was

2015Cf. In re Zandi, 270 S.W.3d 76 , 78−79 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding (supp. op. on reh’g, per curiam) (reiterating holding that an obligor’s suspension cannot be revoked without prior notice that revocation will be sought, affording the 6 obligor an opportunity to prepare an defense to specific complaints, and relator was entitled to discharge because he did not receive written notice prior to the compliance hearing that the mother intended to seek revocation).

2010See In re Zandi , 270 S.W.3d 76, 77 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

2015Because I believe the affidavit is conclusory, I would hold the process server’s affidavit failed to meet the strict compliance requirement of Rule 106(b)., See Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836 ; accord In re Sloan, 214 S.W.3d at 222 .

2015See Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836 ; accord In re Sloan, 214 -4- Dissenting Opinion 04-14-00556-CV S.W.3d at 222.

2004Reese v. Duncan , 80 S.W.3d 650 , 657 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (quoting Kelly v. Scott , 733 S.W.2d 312 , 313-14 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1987, writ dism'd)).

2002If the statute is mandatory, whether there was substantial compliance is not relevant because “provisions deemed mandatory in nature permit no application of the substantial compliance rule.” Kelley v. Scott, 733 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1987, writ dism’d) “The general rule is that the performance of duties placed upon election officials is directory unless made mandatory by statute, while those placed upon the voters are mandatory.” Fuentes v. Howard, 423 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1967, writ dism’d) (emphasis added). *658 Our function is to interpret and apply the law