compliance standard in Iowa

2025To determine whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) were met, “[w]e employ a substantial compliance standard.” Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 681 (citation omitted).

2024To determine whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) were met, we employ “a substantial compliance standard.” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa 2016).

2017“We employ a substantial compliance standard in determining whether a trial court has discharged its duty under rule 2.8(2)(d).” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa 2016) (citing State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 2006)).

2016“We employ a substantial compliance standard in determining whether a trial court has discharged its duty under rule 2.8(2)(d).” Id.

2021P. 2.8(2)(b)(1). 10 note that Faulkner told the court he reviewed the minutes of testimony with plea counsel and agreed the minutes supplied evidence sufficient to support his guilty plea. “[W]e apply a substantial compliance standard in assessing whether the trial court has adequately informed the defendant of the items listed in the rule.” Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151 . “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” Id. (citation omitted).

2021P. 2.8(2)(b)(1). 10 note that Faulkner told the court he reviewed the minutes of testimony with plea counsel and agreed the minutes supplied evidence sufficient to support his guilty plea. “[W]e apply a substantial compliance standard in assessing whether the trial court has adequately informed the defendant of the items listed in the rule.” Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151 . “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” Id. (citation omitted).

2018See State v. Myers , 653 N.W.2d 574 , 578 (Iowa 2002) ("Under the substantial-compliance standard, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of his rights using the precise language of the rule; it is sufficient that the defendant be informed of his rights in such a way that he is made aware of them."); see, e.g. , State v. Aherns , No. 13-1026, 2016 WL 351235 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016) (holding that telling a defendant he "could cross-examine the State's witness" met the substantial compliance standard concerning rights to cross-examine and confrontation); State v. Taylor

2017The substantial compliance standard provides “a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of his rights using the precise language of the rule; it is sufficient that the defendant be informed of his rights in such a way that he is made aware of them.” State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002).

2017See Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 542 (“In this case, the substantial compliance standard was not satisfied.

2017See Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 542 (“In this case, the substantial compliance standard was not satisfied.

2021See Sims, 759 N.W.2d at 338 .

2021In Sims v. NCI Holding Corp., we held that section 730.5(7) is subject to a substantial compliance standard. 759 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2009).

2016See id. at 103-04 .

2016See id. at 103–04.

2018Id. (citing State v. White , 587 N.W.2d 240 , 242 (Iowa 1998) )." At the March 30, 2017 plea hearing, the district court stated: THE COURT: All right.

2016See State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1998).

2023See Iowa Code § 147.140 (6) (requiring dismissal on motion when the plaintiff fails to “substantially comply” with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement); Hantsbarger v. Coffin, 501 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) (recognizing a substantial compliance exception to the requirements of section 668.11).

2023See Iowa Code § 147.140 (6) (requiring dismissal on motion when the plaintiff fails to “substantially comply” with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement); Hantsbarger v. Coffin, 501 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) (recognizing a substantial compliance exception to the requirements of section 668.11).

2021“In applying this standard to the requirement that the defendant know and understand the nature of the charges against him, we have held the court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is ‘apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature of the charge.’” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Iowa 1981)).

2019“In determining whether a plea meets the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b)([1]), we apply the substantial compliance standard.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397 , 406 (Iowa 2017). “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001)). “[T]he court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is ‘apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature 2 Justice Waterman’s dissent in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.

2016See State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa 2016) (“We employ a substantial compliance standard in determining whether a trial court has discharged it duty under rule 4 2.8(2)(d).”); State v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 692-93 (Iowa 1981) (finding substantial compliance when the court informed a defendant his “right to question the legality of his plea of guilty” would be “gone” if he requested immediate sentencing).

2003Old-ham, 515 N.W.2d at 46 ; State v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1981).

2020Ortiz holds that, in spite of the word “mail” used in the statute, the notice requirements of section 17A.19(2) are satisfied via the substantial compliance doctrine when a lawyer emails a copy of the petition to opposing counsel. 928 N.W.2d at 655 .

2019While Ortiz addressed changes in communication (mailing) due to technology and the substantial compliance doctrine, such doctrine “cannot be applied to change the jurisdictional requirement.” Id. at 653–54.

2024Smith, 924 N.W.2d at 851 .

2020See Smith, 924 N.W.2d at 851 (evaluating a district court’s compliance with the notice requirement under a substantial compliance standard).

1975Since the trial court’s ruling on May 2, 1973, this court has considered and analyzed the provisions of section 279.13 in Ramey, Flanders and Barrett , all supra. In Barrett, 221 N.W.2d at 783 , the court noted: “It is now clearly established the substantial compliance rule is not applicable to time specifications of section 279.13.” It is our conclusion since strict compliance with the time specifications of section 279.13 is ordinarily required, there is no logical reason in view of the purpose of section 279.13 as announced in the three cases just cited why strict compliance with the proced

1975See also Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College District, 221 N.W.2d at 783 . *632 Since the trial court's ruling on May 2, 1973, this court has considered and analyzed the provisions of section 279.13 in Ramey, Flanders and Barrett , all supra. In Barrett, 221 N.W.2d at 783 , the court noted: "It is now clearly established the substantial compliance rule is not applicable to time specifications of section 279.13." It is our conclusion since strict compliance with the time specifications of section 279.13 is ordinarily required, there is no logical reason in view of the purpose of section 2

2025See Schoborg v. Anderson, 548 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (holding that policy provision that “the city should apply sufficient sand and salt to curves so they ‘can be safely negotiated’ . . . is a goal, not a standard of care,” and reasoning that a contrary holding “would eviscerate the statutory immunity allowed municipalities”). 9 And indeed, the City did comply with the rest of its snow-and-ice-removal policy.

2024Bd. of Elections, 757 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he settled rule is that election laws are mandatory and require strict compliance, and that substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election statute expressly permits it.”).3 Iowa has many laws prescribing a substantial compliance standard; section 43.94 is not one of them.

2021“Substantial compliance is said to be compliance in respect to essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.” Id. (quoting Superior/Ideal, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., 419 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1988)).

2019“The extent of the trial judge’s explanation and inquiry into defendant’s understanding varies with the circumstances of each case.” State v. Dryer, 342 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).

2019“In determining whether a plea meets the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b)([1]), we apply the substantial compliance standard.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397 , 406 (Iowa 2017). “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001)). “[T]he court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is ‘apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature 2 Justice Waterman’s dissent in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.

2019“In determining whether a plea meets the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b)([1]), we apply the substantial compliance standard.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397 , 406 (Iowa 2017). “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001)). “[T]he court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is ‘apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature 2 Justice Waterman’s dissent in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.

2019“In determining whether a plea meets the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b)([1]), we apply the substantial compliance standard.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397 , 406 (Iowa 2017). “‘Substantial compliance’ requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001)). “[T]he court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is ‘apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature 2 Justice Waterman’s dissent in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.

2017It requires “the essence of each requirement of the rule be expressed.” Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 544.

2016See id. at 408-09 , 19 N.W.2d at 211 ; accord Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 612 , 138 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1965) (concluding “[ajctionable negligence may exist even though” a defendant complies with an industry standard or private safety code), I conclude Alcala adequately presented the ASTM and ANSI standards at issue in this case in the district court so that the court could determine whether they were relevant to the existence of Marriott’s duty of care.

2016See id. at 408-09 , 19 N.W.2d at 211 ; accord Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 612 , 138 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1965) (concluding “[ajctionable negligence may exist even though” a defendant complies with an industry standard or private safety code), I conclude Alcala adequately presented the ASTM and ANSI standards at issue in this case in the district court so that the court could determine whether they were relevant to the existence of Marriott’s duty of care.

2016Id. at 952-53 .

2016See generally Sun Life, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 951-53 . 5 The substantial compliance doctrine remains good law.

2016See id. at 408-09 , 19 N.W.2d at 211 ; accord Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 612 , 138 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1965) (concluding “[ajctionable negligence may exist even though” a defendant complies with an industry standard or private safety code), I conclude Alcala adequately presented the ASTM and ANSI standards at issue in this case in the district court so that the court could determine whether they were relevant to the existence of Marriott’s duty of care.

2016See id. at 408-09 , 19 N.W.2d at 211 ; accord Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 612 , 138 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1965) (concluding “[ajctionable negligence may exist even though” a defendant complies with an industry standard or private safety code), I conclude Alcala adequately presented the ASTM and ANSI standards at issue in this case in the district court so that the court could determine whether they were relevant to the existence of Marriott’s duty of care.

2016See State v. Sutton, 853 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (discussing Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151 ).

2015See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Iowa 2006). 1 See State v. Freeman, 404 N.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (citing statute and stating “[t]he State had the burden of proving each and every element”). 4 We are left with Nabors’s challenge to one of his prison sentences.

2014The court must ensure the defendant understands the necessity of filing a motion to challenge a guilty plea and the consequences of failing to do so.” (citations omitted)); State v. Howell, No. 07-1179, 2008 WL 783760, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008) (“We are aware of no rule that 5 requires the defendant to be informed of the time limit for filing a motion in arrest of judgment.