25 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilkersongreen2 sentences2010Id. at 327-28, 559 S.E.2d at 16 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 2008Id., 148 N.C. | 2 | 4 |
State ex rel. McCrory v. Bergergreen2 sentences2018In view of the fact that “each statutory scheme” is different, “[w]e cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge” and “must resolve each challenge by carefully examining its specific factual and legal context.” Id. at 646-47 , 781 S.E.2d at 257 . 2018In view of the fact that "each statutory scheme" is different, "[w]e cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge" and "must resolve each challenge by carefully examining its specific factual and legal context." Id . at 646-47, 781 S.E.2d at 257 . | 2 | 3 |
Estate of Tryningreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 871 (1989) (explaining that an outright prohibition on awarding fee-litigation fees for representatives of decedents’ estates would “ultimately be deleterious to [the estates] because attorneys would be reluctant to perform [necessary] services . . . if the compensation awarded for their services could be effectively diluted or dissipated by the expense of defending unjustified objections to their fee claims”); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012) (declining to impose a categorical rule against authorizing fee-li 2021See, e.g., In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 871 (1989) (explaining that an outright prohibition on awarding fee-litigation fees for representatives of decedents’ estates would “ultimately be deleterious to [the estates] because attorneys would be reluctant to perform [necessary] services . . . if the compensation awarded for their services could be effectively diluted or dissipated by the expense of defending unjustified objections to their fee claims”); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012) (declining to impose a categorical rule against authorizing fee-li | 2 | 2 |
In the Matter of the Estate of Loren S. Bockwoldt, Dale Richard Willows, Conservator for Brandie Renee Bockwoldt, Minor Child of the Decedent v. The Estate of Loren S. Bockwoldtgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 871 (1989) (explaining that an outright prohibition on awarding fee-litigation fees for representatives of decedents’ estates would “ultimately be deleterious to [the estates] because attorneys would be reluctant to perform [necessary] services . . . if the compensation awarded for their services could be effectively diluted or dissipated by the expense of defending unjustified objections to their fee claims”); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012) (declining to impose a categorical rule against authorizing fee-li 2021See, e.g., In re Estate of Trynin, 49 Cal. 3d 868, 871 (1989) (explaining that an outright prohibition on awarding fee-litigation fees for representatives of decedents’ estates would “ultimately be deleterious to [the estates] because attorneys would be reluctant to perform [necessary] services . . . if the compensation awarded for their services could be effectively diluted or dissipated by the expense of defending unjustified objections to their fee claims”); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012) (declining to impose a categorical rule against authorizing fee-li | 2 | 2 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2022Instead, the Court’s conclusion required that trial courts have discretionary sentencing authority so they may examine a juvenile’s age when determining his sentence. ¶ 109 Thereafter, the Court again considered a juvenile sentencing case to decide the narrow issue of “whether [the holding in Miller] is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 194, 136 S. Ct. at 725 . 2022Instead, the Court’s conclusion required that trial courts have discretionary sentencing authority so they may examine a juvenile’s age when determining his sentence. ¶ 109 Thereafter, the Court again considered a juvenile sentencing case to decide the narrow issue of “whether [the holding in Miller] is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 194 , 136 S. Ct. at 725 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Canadygreen2 sentences2018In that case, we considered the purpose of Rule 10(a)(1) : "to require a party to call the court's attention to a matter upon which he or she wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter on appeal." Canady , 330 N.C. at 401 , 410 S.E.2d at 878 . 2018In that case, we considered the purpose of Rule 10(a)(1) : "to require a party to call the court's attention to a matter upon which he or she wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter on appeal." Canady , 330 N.C. at 401 , 410 S.E.2d at 878 . | 1 | 1 |
Hutchison v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g. , Hutchison v. Thomas , 789 F.2d 392 (6 th Cir. 1986) ; Kavanagh v. Zwilling , 997 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ; Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey , 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999) ; Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop , 683 A.2d 808 (Md. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tisongreen2 sentences1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). 1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Cabana v. Bullockgreen2 sentences1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). 1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Tison v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). 1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Tison v. Arizona, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P. 2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1010 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 299 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Mississippigreen2 sentences1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 , ___ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P.2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1182 , 89 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). 1987Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 704, 716 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Tison v. Arizona, 142 Ariz. 454 , 690 P. 2d 755 (1984), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1010 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 299 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2022Id. ¶ 23 Here, Defendant asserts a categorical challenge to the sentencing practice of using juvenile convictions as a predicate offense for violent habitual felon status. 2022KELLIHER 2022-NCSC-77 Opinion of the Court ¶ 26 Notably, the Supreme Court refused to “consider [the juvenile offenders’] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.” Id. | 6 | 2017–2022 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2022Instead, the Court’s conclusion required that trial courts have discretionary sentencing authority so they may examine a juvenile’s age when determining his sentence. ¶ 109 Thereafter, the Court again considered a juvenile sentencing case to decide the narrow issue of “whether [the holding in Miller] is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 194, 136 S. Ct. at 725 . 2022Instead, the Court’s conclusion required that trial courts have discretionary sentencing authority so they may examine a juvenile’s age when determining his sentence. ¶ 109 Thereafter, the Court again considered a juvenile sentencing case to decide the narrow issue of “whether [the holding in Miller] is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 194 , 136 S. Ct. at 725 . | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2020Id. 2020Id. | 3 | 2016–2020 |
State Ex Rel. Wallace v. Bone
green
2 sentences2026Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591 , 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982), the Supreme Court in McCrory did not create a bright line rule: We cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge to the legislative appointment of executive officers. 2026Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591 , 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982), the Supreme Court in McCrory did not create a bright line rule: We cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge to the legislative appointment of executive officers. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bacon v. Lee
green
2 sentences2018When the challenge involves the Governor's constitutional authority, we must ask "whether the actions of a coordinate branch 'unreasonably disrupt a core power of the executive.' " Id. at 645 , 781 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Bacon v. Lee , 353 N.C. 696 , 717, 549 S.E.2d 840 , 854 (2001) ). 2018When the challenge involves the Governor's constitutional authority, we must ask "whether the actions of a coordinate branch 'unreasonably disrupt a core power of the executive.' " Id. at 645 , 781 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Bacon v. Lee , 353 N.C. 696 , 717, 549 S.E.2d 840 , 854 (2001) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Michigan v. Summers
green
2 sentences2018In its argument to this Court, the State asks us to apply the categorical rule from Michigan v. Summers to the facts of this case. 1 In **923 Summers , the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, ... a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Summers , 452 U.S. at 705 , 101 S.Ct. at 2595 . 2018In its argument to this Court, the State asks us to apply the categorical rule from Michigan v. Summers to the facts of this case. 1 In **923 Summers , the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, ... a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Summers , 452 U.S. at 705 , 101 S.Ct. at 2595 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kavanagh v. Zwilling
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g. , Hutchison v. Thomas , 789 F.2d 392 (6 th Cir. 1986) ; Kavanagh v. Zwilling , 997 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ; Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey , 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999) ; Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop , 683 A.2d 808 (Md. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Downs v. ROMAN CATH. ARCHBISHOP OF BALT.
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g. , Hutchison v. Thomas , 789 F.2d 392 (6 th Cir. 1986) ; Kavanagh v. Zwilling , 997 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ; Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey , 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999) ; Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop , 683 A.2d 808 (Md. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g. , Hutchison v. Thomas , 789 F.2d 392 (6 th Cir. 1986) ; Kavanagh v. Zwilling , 997 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ; Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey , 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999) ; Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop , 683 A.2d 808 (Md. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bynum v. Wilson County
green
2 sentences2015We hereby deny the petition. 3 Justice (now Chief Justice) Martin authored a separate concurrence in Bynum , in which he noted that the reasoning of the majority "would seem to create a categorical rule barring any premises liability claims against counties or municipalities for harms that occur on government property." Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355 , 361, 758 S.E.2d 643 , 647 (2014) (Martin, J., concurring in result). 2015We hereby deny the petition. 3 Justice (now Chief Justice) Martin authored a separate concurrence in Bynum , in which he noted that the reasoning of the majority "would seem to create a categorical rule barring any premises liability claims against counties or municipalities for harms that occur on government property." Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355 , 361, 758 S.E.2d 643 , 647 (2014) (Martin, J., concurring in result). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Lotharp
green
1 sentence2004Further, the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Wilkerson expressly states, "the fact of a defendant's prior conviction, except in cases where our courts have recognized a categorical exception to the general rule ( e.g. admitting prior sexual offenses in select sexual offense cases, and admitting prior traffic-related convictions to prove malice in second-degree murder cases ), violates rule 404(b) . . . ." Wilkerson, 356 N.C. 418 , 571 S.E.2d 583 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Wilkerson
green
1 sentence2004Further, the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Wilkerson expressly states, "the fact of a defendant's prior conviction, except in cases where our courts have recognized a categorical exception to the general rule ( e.g. admitting prior sexual offenses in select sexual offense cases, and admitting prior traffic-related convictions to prove malice in second-degree murder cases ), violates rule 404(b) . . . ." Wilkerson, 356 N.C. 418 , 571 S.E.2d 583 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.