categorical rule in Arkansas

2017In support of Ms contention, Wilson cites to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d

2017In support of Ms contention, Wilson cites to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d

2026Indeed, at most, Hogue’s argument merely underscores why legislatures are better equipped 2 S.W.3d 579 , 581 (rejecting claim to extend Miller); Benton v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 237, at 3 , 602 S.W.3d 96 , 98 (same); Burgie v. State, 2019 Ark. 185, at 3 , 575 S.W.3d 127, 128 (same).

2026So that data is not a basis for extending Miller’s holding, and we reaffirm our previous refusal to extend Miller.1 See Gibbs v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 29, at 1 , 660 1 Rather than compelling an expanded categorical rule, the data Hogue references suggest Miller should not have set a categorical rule prohibiting mandatory life sentences at all—arbitrarily shielding “young killers, giving them a greater chance to reform themselves at the risk that they will kill again.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

2025See id. (citing Robinson, 269 Ark. 90 , 598 S.W.2d 421 ; Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 254 , 608 S.W.2d 363 (1980)).

2025See id. (citing Robinson, 269 Ark. 90 , 598 S.W.2d 421 ; Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 254 , 608 S.W.2d 363 (1980)).

2025In so holding, the supreme court “decline[d] to apply a categorical rule but rather evaluate[d] the facts bearing on whether the worker was paid to assume the risk in question.” Id. at 6, 430 S.W.3d at 769 .

2017In support of Ms contention, Wilson cites to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d

2017In support of Ms contention, Wilson cites to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d

2006But also, it said “[t]he reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penalty.” Id. at 320 , 122 S. Ct. 2242 .

2006But also, it said “[t]he reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penalty.” Id. at 320 , 122 S. Ct. 2242 .

2006In effect, the court in each instance concluded that the public welfare warranted excluding from licensure any pardoned offender who fell within the scope of the proscription (although the statute at issue in Prichard did provide for the restoration of the license upon the posting of a significant bond to protect the public, 17 S.E.2d at 394 -95 ), just as the proscription set forth in Ark.

2001In Evans, the Supreme Court cited its decision in Leon, supra, holding: [W]here the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.