categorical rule in Florida

2025Further, we have repeatedly held that “the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain damage.” Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (quoting Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 100 (Fla. 2023)); see also Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037 , at *6 (Fla. Apr. 25) (rejecting claim that Atkins should be extended to individuals with certain neurocognitive disorders), cert. denied, No. 24-7087, 2025 WL 1261217 (U.S. May 1, 2025); Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (rejecting claim Atkins

2023As we have very recently reiterated, “the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain damage.” Id.; see also Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless, claim that the protections of Atkins and Roper should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a result of mental illness); Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (holding claim that persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with intellectual disabilit

2025Further, we have repeatedly held that “the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain damage.” Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (quoting Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 100 (Fla. 2023)); see also Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037 , at *6 (Fla. Apr. 25) (rejecting claim that Atkins should be extended to individuals with certain neurocognitive disorders), cert. denied, No. 24-7087, 2025 WL 1261217 (U.S. May 1, 2025); Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (rejecting claim Atkins

2023As we have very recently reiterated, “the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain damage.” Id.; see also Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless, claim that the protections of Atkins and Roper should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a result of mental illness); Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (holding claim that persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with intellectual disabilit

2016M. at 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (“The present case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.”).

2015In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment compels a categorical rule against sentencing a juvenile offender “to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime.” In the decision on review, the Third District read Graham as creating a homicide-case exception to this categorical rule, which would permit a juvenile to be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide offense if the juvenile also committed a homicide in the same criminal episode.

2017“Because [our] holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument- that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles ..,. ” Id. at 479 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 .

2017“Because [our] holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument- that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles ..,. ” Id. at 479 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 .

2025First, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value[.]” 535 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).

2004The Court explained that its decisions in Lucas and in First English did not support such a categorical rule and implicitly rejected a categorical rule in the regulatory taking context. 535 U.S. at 321 , 122 S.Ct. 1465 .

2026See, e.g., Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973 , 979 (Fla.) (rejecting claim that the protections of Roper should be extended to Ford, who was thirty-six at the time of his capital crimes, because he had a mental and developmental age below eighteen), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025); Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claim that Roper should extend to Barwick, who was nineteen when he committed the capital crime, because his mental age was less than eighteen); Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim that Roper and the Eighth Amendment barred e

2026See, e.g., Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973 , 979 (Fla.) (rejecting claim that the protections of Roper should be extended to Ford, who was thirty-six at the time of his capital crimes, because he had a mental and developmental age below eighteen), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025); Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claim that Roper should extend to Barwick, who was nineteen when he committed the capital crime, because his mental age was less than eighteen); Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim that Roper and the Eighth Amendment barred e

2026See Lee, 258 So. 3d at 1299 .

2026See, e.g., Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973 , 979 (Fla.) (rejecting claim that the protections of Roper should be extended to Ford, who was thirty-six at the time of his capital crimes, because he had a mental and developmental age below eighteen), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025); Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claim that Roper should extend to Barwick, who was nineteen when he committed the capital crime, because his mental age was less than eighteen); Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim that Roper and the Eighth Amendment barred e

2026The majority cites the Fourth District's Valcarcel decision for the proposition that "[w]hen a trial court considers a defendant's request for continuance to retain counsel of choice, the trial court must conduct 'an adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances' and make 'proper findings to show that the defendant's constitutional right is not being arbitrarily denied.' " See Valcarcel v. State, 201 So. 3d 795 , 797–98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Deal v. State, 145 So. 3d 212, 214 (Fla 4th DCA 2014)).

2025Bd., 958 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that a privilege claim was not waived, despite the absence of a log, because the party consistently asserted the claim as “to all findings and opinions of an expert retained by counsel in anticipation of litigation and who is not going to testify at trial,” which “clearly [was] a categorical claim of privilege, [] the category referenced [] undeniably protected by work-product immunity” based on “the very nature of the individual who prepared the findings, documents, reports, and 12 opinions”).

2024Id. at 13 (“[I]f an accused invokes his or her Miranda rights but later reinitiates communication, an accused must be reminded of his or her Miranda rights pursuant to this Court’s holding in Welch.”); id. (“Welch - 11 - expands the requirements . . . by specifically including a requirement that the accused be specifically given his or her Miranda rights after an alleged reinitiation.”).

2024Id. at 13 (“[I]f an accused invokes his or her Miranda rights but later reinitiates communication, an accused must be reminded of his or her Miranda rights pursuant to this Court’s holding in Welch.”); id. (“Welch - 11 - expands the requirements . . . by specifically including a requirement that the accused be specifically given his or her Miranda rights after an alleged reinitiation.”).

2023See Ganson, 222 So. 3d at 22–23 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (“Although the Beyers brought a Lucas-type challenge alleging the deprivation of all economic use of their land, Beyer I went to great lengths to transform the Beyers’ categorical challenge into one controlled by the ad hoc, factual inquiry set forth Penn Central. . . .

2023Unfortunately, despite the unmistakable parallels between the economic impact in Lucas and the economic impact on the Beyers’ property, the Beyers’ challenge was never considered under Lucas’s total regulatory takings framework.”). 15 characterized as a total facial claim, arises where “the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494 (1987).

2022McCoy v. State, 132 So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2013).

2020A categorical rule may be “especially inequitable in the ever increasing number of cases in which the attorney’s fees far exceed the claims for damages arising from the contract.” KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Invs., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

2019In doing so, we recede from Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 602 (Fla. 2009), and McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146, 1157 (Fla. 2017), to the extent that those decisions state a categorical rule that a trial court conducting a Faretta colloquy “must inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.” McGirth, 209 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting Aguirre- Jarquin, 9 So. 3d at 602 ).

2019In doing so, we recede from Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 602 (Fla. 2009), and McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146, 1157 (Fla. 2017), to the extent that those decisions state a categorical rule that a trial court conducting a Faretta colloquy “must inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.” McGirth, 209 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting Aguirre- Jarquin, 9 So. 3d at 602 ).

2019In doing so, we recede from Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 602 (Fla. 2009), and McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146, 1157 (Fla. 2017), to the extent that those decisions state a categorical rule that a trial court conducting a Faretta colloquy “must inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.” McGirth, 209 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting Aguirre- Jarquin, 9 So. 3d at 602 ).

2019In doing so, we recede from Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 602 (Fla. 2009), and McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146, 1157 (Fla. 2017), to the extent that those decisions state a categorical rule that a trial court conducting a Faretta colloquy “must inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.” McGirth, 209 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting Aguirre- Jarquin, 9 So. 3d at 602 ).