categorical rule in Utah

2025In this case, both parties agree that the duty question is governed by Yazd and similar cases, and no party asks us to apply the categorical test articulated in Jeffs. 20230278-CA 10 2025 UT App 64 Miner v. Miner romantic relationship was very important to the settlement negotiations, given that one of the major items on the negotiating table was John’s ongoing alimony obligation that could terminate upon Lisa’s remarriage.

2025The court held “that a post-valuation- date sale or other development is potentially relevant evidence, and not subject to a categorical bar under the code,” id. ¶ 23, and that the admissibility of such evidence is governed by the Utah Rules 20220875-CA 3 2025 UT App 58 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Co. of Evidence, including rule 403, id. ¶¶ 18, 25.

2025To the contrary, the nurse testified that SANEs do the “same things” that an emergency doctor would do when examining an alleged victim of sexual assault and that some of the information on the form would be noted “with any chart.” The very circumstances that make SANE exams “more formal are those that also lend credence to the medical purpose—the taking and recording of a medical history __________________________________________________________ 12 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivabl

2024As Schnibbe acknowledges, we have said that acceptance “typically requires an affirmative act.” Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 18 , 379 P.3d 1186 (emphasis added).

2024In re D.S., 2023 UT App 98, ¶ 18 , 535 P.3d 843 (cleaned up), cert. granted, Jan. 25, 2024 (No. 20230877).

2024Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330 ; Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 . ¶34 But we have not established a categorical rule that only affirmative actions will suffice to show acceptance.

2024Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330 ; Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 . ¶34 But we have not established a categorical rule that only affirmative actions will suffice to show acceptance.

2024As Schnibbe acknowledges, we have said that acceptance “typically requires an affirmative act.” Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 18 , 379 P.3d 1186 (emphasis added).

2024And it’s true that a pretext call will by definition involve at least some deception—after all, it’s the misrepresentation about the call’s purpose that turns an 20200255-CA 15 2024 UT App 9 State v. Florreich ordinary call into a pretext call. 8 But still, it’s simply not the case 7F that any misrepresentation by a state actor is enough to render a confession involuntary as a categorical rule.

2022So as a result, the timing sequence described above stopped at rule 73(f), meaning that American United’s augmentation request was simply required to have been made “within a reasonable time after the fees were incurred.” 20200903-CA 17 2022 UT App 105 American United v. Murray ¶45 We see no textual basis for concluding that when an augmentation request is governed by rule 73(f)’s “reasonable time” requirement, there is a categorical rule under which the request must be made at the same time as the writ or motion to which it is linked.

2020A ¶13 Prior to trial the district court granted the Boggess motion in limine on the basis of a categorical rule prohibiting evidence of any sale or development of property after the date of its taking. 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 35 Opinion of the Court And it rooted this rule in both the governing provisions of the Utah Code and controlling case law. ¶14 The district court found in Utah Code section 78B-6-512 a “law and policy that only values for the date of valuation are relevant.” It thus deemed the statute to establish a rule that “later-occurring facts that might affect valuation should not be co

2019Specifically, I have concerns about the propriety of admitting, pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts under the “doctrine of chances” to rebut a defense of fabrication, and I wonder whether our law should either reconsider the conclusions reached in State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 , or consider adoption of a categorical rule (akin to rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that simply admits, in a more up-front way, evidence of similar crimes in se

2019Specifically, I have concerns about the propriety of admitting, pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts under the “doctrine of chances” to rebut a defense of fabrication, and I wonder whether our law should either reconsider the conclusions reached in State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 , or consider adoption of a categorical rule (akin to rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that simply admits, in a more up-front way, evidence of similar crimes in se

2019In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort , 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), we erased the categorical bar on recovery for inherent risks of skiing listed in the statute and introduced negligence into the equation.

2019It does so by obliterating the concept of statutory immunity for enumerated risks "establish[ed] as a matter of law," Id. § 78B-4-401, and "includ[ed]" in the definition of "[i]nherent risks of skiing," id . § 78B-4-402(1), and substituting instead an assessment of whether any given risk should qualify for statutory protection "under the facts of each case." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort , 808 P.2d 1037 , 1044 (Utah 1991). ¶102 Under Clover the statutory list of "inherent risks of skiing" is superfluous.

2019Specifically, I have concerns about the propriety of admitting, pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts under the “doctrine of chances” to rebut a defense of fabrication, and I wonder whether our law should either reconsider the conclusions reached in State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 , or consider adoption of a categorical rule (akin to rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that simply admits, in a more up-front way, evidence of similar crimes in se

2019Specifically, I have concerns about the propriety of admitting, pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts under the “doctrine of chances” to rebut a defense of fabrication, and I wonder whether our law should either reconsider the conclusions reached in State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60 , 296 P.3d 673 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 , or consider adoption of a categorical rule (akin to rule 413 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that simply admits, in a more up-front way, evidence of similar crimes in se

2016We remand with instructions to grant summary judgment. 8 Cite as: 2016 UT 79 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, dissenting: ¶24 The court today adopts a categorical rule exempting children under the age of five from a finding of negligence in tort.

2016We remand with instructions to grant summary judgment. 8 Cite as: 2016 UT 14 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, dissenting: ¶24 The court today adopts a categorical rule exempting children under the age of five from a finding of negligence in tort.

2015In Graham, the Court applied its ban on LWOP for juveniles only where the underlying offense was a nonhomicide crime. 113 The Court distinguished homicide crimes from nonhomicide crimes on the basis of “both moral culpability and consequential harm.” 114 Similarly, Miller declined to adopt a categorical bar to LWOP for juveniles; instead, the Court foreclosed only mandatory LWOP sentences because such sentences “prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 115 And the Court recognized that there co

2015In Graham, the Court applied its ban on LWOP for juveniles only where the underlying offense was a nonhomicide crime. 113 The Court distinguished homicide crimes from nonhomicide crimes on the basis of “both moral culpability and consequential harm.” 114 Similarly, Miller declined to adopt a categorical bar to LWOP for juveniles; instead, the Court foreclosed only mandatory LWOP sentences because such sentences “prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 115 And the Court recognized that there co