categorical rule in Iowa

2018Under our caselaw, the defendant may make a categorical challenge to his sentence in which he contends “a particular sentencing practice violated the Eighth Amendment.” State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2012).

2017See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“Statutes that punish recidivists more severely than first offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial time.”). 7 812 N.W.2d at 646 (holding statute did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under a categorical analysis).

2022He also relied on State v. Sweet, which created “a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” 879 N.W.2d at 839 .

2022Two years later, in Sweet, this court extended Lyle and created “a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced 10 to life without the possibility of parole under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” 879 N.W.2d at 839 .

2015In not addressing the categorical challenge, the Court made it clear that the “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty, [life in prison without the possibility of parole,] will be uncommon.” Id.

2015Miller , 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 , 183 L.Ed.2d at 424 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.... [W]e do not consider [the] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on [LWOP] for juveniles.... ”).

2014The United State Supreme Court announced a categorical rule in Graham that the Federal Constitution prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide crimes. 560 U.S. at 82 .

2010The Court explained that a categorical rule “is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonho-micide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.” Id. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2030 , 176 L.Ed.2d at 845 .

2018Id. at 785-6 ; see also State v. Ramirez , 597 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1999) (overruled on other grounds by Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d at 871-72 ). 3 In State v. Roby , our supreme court rejected a categorical challenge to the seventeen-and-a-half-year sentence applied to a juvenile offender. 897 N.W.2d 127 , 148 (Iowa 2017).

2016See State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2012) (discussing a categorical challenge based on either the characteristics of the crime or the criminal); see also State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the test for evaluating whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate).

2020In State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014), the Iowa Supreme Court determined 1 For convictions occurring on or after July 1, 2018, the mandatory minimum for first-degree robbery is now one-half to seven-tenths of the maximum sentence.

2016Id. at 404 n.10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 10 But then in the case of State v. Sweet, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ , 2016 WL 3023726, at *29 (Iowa 2016), the supreme court adopted a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494 & n.6 (citing to doctor testimony that established foundation despite finding there is general need for identity knowledge in domestic abuse cases).

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016Justice O’Connor further concluded that a categorical bar could not be adopted “today.” Id. at 340 , 109 S.Ct. at 2958 , 106 L.Ed.2d at 292 .

2016Justice O’Connor further concluded that a categorical bar could not be adopted “today.” Id. at 340 , 109 S.Ct. at 2958 , 106 L.Ed.2d at 292 .

2016Thus, any categorical rule cannot be adopted that would “ignore[] variables such as the seriousness of the assault, the frequency of the abuse against the victim, the type of domestic relationship, or the presence or absence of emotional or psychological harm.” State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006) (refusing to adopt a categorical exception to rule 803(4) in domestic violence cases).

2016The majority concludes there are too many variables in domestic violence cases to adopt a categorical rule, relying on State v. Robinson, without mentioning the Minnesota Supreme Court in that decision expressly left open the possibility it would adopt a categorical rule for domestic abuse cases in the future. 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006) (“We do not foreclose the possibility that we might in the future adopt a properly limited categorical rule of admissibility under the medical exception to hearsay for statements of identification by victims of domestic violence.”).

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494–95; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145, 150 (Ala. Crim.

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016See Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 577–79.

2016See Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 577-79 .

2014As such, “the ordinary rules of issue preservation do not apply.” Veal v. State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 2010).

2014As such, “the ordinary rules of issue preservation do not apply.” Veal v. State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 2010).

2014Yet, for the bulk of the time after Ed-dings and Thompson and before Roper , a different categorical rule prevailed: the notion “that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.” See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976) (plurality opinion).

2014Yet, for the bulk of the time after Ed-dings and Thompson and before Roper , a different categorical rule prevailed: the notion “that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.” See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976) (plurality opinion).

2014First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court recognized a categorical rule prohibiting courts from imposing the death penalty against persons who committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 , 161 L.

2014First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court recognized a categorical rule prohibiting courts from imposing the death penalty against persons who committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. 551, 578 , 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 , 161 L.

2018Ct. App. 2012) (declining to adopt a categorical rule prohibiting the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted under the felony-murder rule); State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235 , 258–59 (Minn. 25 national consensus remains in favor of subjecting juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule—regardless of whether an offender was aiding and abetting or the principal actor—to the same sentencing options as juvenile offenders convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. 8 2014) (noting the constitutionality of l

2018Ct. App. 2012) (declining to adopt a categorical rule prohibiting the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted under the felony-murder rule); State v. Ali , 855 N.W.2d 235 , 258-59 (Minn. 2014) (noting the constitutionality of life sentences for juveniles convicted of felony murder); cf. Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 700-01, 727 (holding a seventeen year-old's sentence of life imprisonment for felony murder was unconstitutional as applied where the offender fatally shot his victim out of fear for his life in the course of tryin

2021For example, in State v. Keyonnie, the court held that suppression was the proper remedy when there was no evidence that the defendant was deprived of the opportunity 38 to gather exculpatory evidence. 892 P.2d 205, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

2021For example, in State v. Keyonnie, the court held that suppression was the proper remedy when there was no evidence that the defendant was deprived of the opportunity 38 to gather exculpatory evidence. 892 P.2d 205, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

2016The majority also refers to “the constitutional right of people accused of crimes to be confronted by their accusers,” citing for support State v. Bentley. 739 N.W.2d 296 , 300–01 (Iowa 2007).

2016The majority also refers to “the constitutional right of people accused of crimes to be confronted by their accusers,” citing for support State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 300-01 (Iowa 2007).

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

2016App. 2008) (“We believe that the rationale 30 employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child–patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.”)

2016See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1494-95 ; Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So.3d 145, 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (“We believe that the rationale employed by the [Alabama] Supreme Court in [Ex parte C.L.Y., 928 So.2d 1069 (Ala.2005), announcing a categorical rule to admit a child-patient’s identification of their abuser] would also apply to victims of domestic violence.”); Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (“[I]n cases such as the present one where injury occurs as the result- of domestic violence, which .may alter the - course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their

1996In both Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-41 (1973), the Court adopted a categorical rule that when a valid custodial arrest occurs, a search incident to arrest is automatically permissible.

1996In both Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-41 (1973), the Court adopted a categorical rule that when a valid custodial arrest occurs, a search incident to arrest is automatically permissible.