categorical rule in Massachusetts

2024The court's own precedent in State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387 (1980), and State v. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d 67 (2018), called for the application of a proportionality test and a categorical bar analysis when considering cruelty.

2020With regard to benchmark data, Lora, 451 Mass. at 443-444 , does not stand for the categorical rule that census data is never an appropriate proxy for the actual population of motorists on the relevant roadway.

2020In Lora, supra, we concluded that it was inappropriate to use census data from the town of Auburn as a benchmark for the demographics of drivers passing through Auburn on a major interstate highway; we noted that, of the fifty-two motorists ticketed by the officer in question on that stretch of highway, ninety percent were not residents of Auburn.

2015Wilkinson, 327 Mass. at 135 ; Lebowitz Jewelers Ltd. v. New England Tel. & Tel.

2015The court further observed that the First Circuit had recently reaffirmed the above principles in rejecting a categorical rule that there must be a record on the effect of the challenged scheme on prices or services, and that “[ijnstead, courts may examine ‘the logical effect that a particular scheme has on the delivery of services or the setting of rates.’ ” Id. at 7, quoting MDA, 769 F.3d at 21 ; Overka v. American Airlines, Inc., 790 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2015).

2014Admittedly, as the trial judge pointed out in his written memorandum, our courts have declined to treat the absence of a “final judgment” as a categorical bar to the application of res judicata, see Tausevich, supra at 148 , endorsing “[t]he better view ... that a final judgment in the traditional sense is not essential to the applicability of issue preclusion.” Id. at 148-149 , citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra §13.

2014Admittedly, as the trial judge pointed out in his written memorandum, our courts have declined to treat the absence of a “final judgment” as a categorical bar to the application of res judicata, see Tausevich, supra at 148 , endorsing “[t]he better view ... that a final judgment in the traditional sense is not essential to the applicability of issue preclusion.” Id. at 148-149 , citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra §13.

2014Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413 (1982), on which the defendant relies, is a case in point: “We recognize that the facts existing at the time the warrant is issued may no longer exist at the time the warrant is executed.

2013In so holding, the Court rejected the argument “that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles,” but acknowledged that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Id. at 2469 .

2013Instead, the Court’s decision “mandates that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at 2471 .

2012It is our understanding that the footnote was meant to provide guidance on the types of reversals “that could well be ‘consistent’ with innocence without any tendency to establish it,” but was not setting forth a definitive rule barring recovery for any of the types of errors listed in the footnote. 4 Guzman, supra at 358, quoting from Guzman v. Commonwealth, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 477 .

1997We recognized the merits of recording such interrogations, Diaz, supra at 272-273 , and that electronic recordings would be a “helpful tool in evaluating the voluntariness of confessions.” Fryar, supra. Our language in those cases echoes our language in Trapp, supra at 359 , that videotaping “might be a sound idea.” Our acknowledgment, however, of the advantages in many circumstances to recording either interrogations by police or interviews by psychiatrists does not lead us to announce a categorical rule on electronic recording in either context.

1997We recognized the merits of recording such interrogations, Diaz, supra at 272-273 , and that electronic recordings would be a “helpful tool in evaluating the voluntariness of confessions.” Fryar, supra. Our language in those cases echoes our language in Trapp, supra at 359 , that videotaping “might be a sound idea.” Our acknowledgment, however, of the advantages in many circumstances to recording either interrogations by police or interviews by psychiatrists does not lead us to announce a categorical rule on electronic recording in either context.

1997We recognized the merits of recording such interrogations, Diaz, supra at 272-273 , and that electronic recordings would be a “helpful tool in evaluating the voluntariness of confessions.” Fryar, supra. Our language in those cases echoes our language in Trapp, supra at 359 , that videotaping “might be a sound idea.” Our acknowledgment, however, of the advantages in many circumstances to recording either interrogations by police or interviews by psychiatrists does not lead us to announce a categorical rule on electronic recording in either context.