categorical rule in Minnesota

2017Id.

1988The court specifically cautioned: “[W]e do not intend to establish a categorical rule that expert testimony concerning all characteristics typically displayed by adolescent sexual assault victims is admissible.” Id.

2026We conclude that the court of appeals erred when it adopted a categorical rule for paramedics because under State v. Staat, 192 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Minn. 1971), when a paramedic is acting “under the direction” of the treating physician, the physician-patient privilege statute protects communications between the patient and the paramedic.

2025“But the need to pursue a misdemeanant does not trigger a categorical rule allowing home entry” in the absence of “a law enforcement emergency.” Id. at 308-09.

2025“When the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and surrounding facts present no such exigency, officers must respect the sanctity of the home—which means that they must get a warrant.” Id. at 309.

2017State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Minn. 1985). 'Moreover, the State’s argument misreads the district court’s findings, which refer specifically to the unique facts and circumstances of Stempfley’s offense.

2016See id. (“[T]he closer-the relationship between the other acts and the charged offense, in terms of time, place, or modus operandi, the greater the relevance and probative value of the other-acts evidence and the lesser the likelihood that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.”).

2016See id. (“[T]he closer the relationship between the other acts and the charged C-6 offense, in terms of time, place, or modus operandi, the greater the relevance and probative value of the other-acts evidence and the lesser the likelihood that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.”).

2015See Riley, - U.S. at -, 134 S.Ct. at 2484-85 (holding that searching the data on a cell phone was not a search incident to arrest, but recognizing a categorical exception justifying searches of an arrestee's person); Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (discussing searches incident to arrest in the context of a search of an automobile).

2015See Riley, - U.S. at -, 134 S.Ct. at 2484-85 (holding that searching the data on a cell phone was not a search incident to arrest, but recognizing a categorical exception justifying searches of an arrestee's person); Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (discussing searches incident to arrest in the context of a search of an automobile).

2015See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 , 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 ; Wright, 726 N.W.2d at 471 .

2015See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 , 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 ; Wright, 726 N.W.2d at 471 .

2015The Davis dissent asserted that the good-faith exception “creates a categorical bar to obtaining redress in every case pending when a precedent is overturned,” leaving defendants “with a right but not a remedy.” Davis, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

2015The Davis dissent asserted that the good-faith exception “creates a categorical bar to obtaining redress in every case pending when a precedent is overturned,” leaving defendants “with a right but not a remedy.” Davis , — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

2015Further, despite narrowing the scope of the exception in terms of searches other than of the defendant’s body, the U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled Robinson, and “only the Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions.” State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. 2012) (citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K.

2015Further, despite narrowing the scope of the exception in terms of searches other than of the defendant’s body, the U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled Robinson, and "only the Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions.” State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn.2012) (citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K.

2015See, e.g., Schneider v. Little, 49 A.3d 333, 358 (Md.

2015See Riley, ___ U.S. at ___ , 134 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (holding that searching the data on a cell phone was not a search incident to arrest, but recognizing a categorical exception justifying searches of an arrestee’s person); Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (discussing searches incident to arrest in the context of a search of an automobile).

2015See Riley, - U.S. at -, 134 S.Ct. at 2484-85 (holding that searching the data on a cell phone was not a search incident to arrest, but recognizing a categorical exception justifying searches of an arrestee's person); Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (discussing searches incident to arrest in the context of a search of an automobile).

2014See id. at 228 (“While that portion of [the witness’s] postconviction testimony conflicts with his trial testimony, the conflict does not necessarily indicate that his trial testimony was false for purposes of the Larrison test.” (emphasis added)). 18 hearing is appropriate because it is difficult if not impossible to test [the witness’s] conflicting statements without examining [the witness] under oath.”).

2014See 737 N.W.2d at 228 (“[The witness] initially stated at the hearing that he could not remember whether the door even had a dead bolt.

2010See 512 U.S. at 601, 603 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ; see also Fed.

2010See 512 U.S. at 601, 603 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ; see also Fed.

2010See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200 (declining to adopt a categorical rule that a plaintiff may not recover negotiated discounts and instead stating that “[t]he jury may decide that the reasonable value of medical care is the amount originally billed, the amount the medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in between”).

2010See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200 (declining to adopt a categorical rule that a plaintiff may not recover negotiated discounts and instead stating that "[t]he jury may decide that the reasonable value of medical care is the amount originally billed, the amount the medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in between").

2007In other words, a property owner must demonstrate that a regulatory action resulted in “a 100% diminution in value.” Norman v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 231, 252 (Fed.Cl.2004), aff'd, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed.Cir.2005), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2288 , 164 L.Ed.2d 813 (2006); see also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 , 122 S.Ct. 1465 , 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002) (explaining that "the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%” and anything less than a total loss "would require the kind of analysis

2007See Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 529 (Minn.2007).

2007See Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 529 (Minn.2007).