categorical bar (Montana) · Go Syfert
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categorical bar in Montana

16 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 2007–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Crawford v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 2 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Issue II ¶100 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the Supreme Court announced a categorical bar to the admission of certain hearsay evidence at a criminal trial.

2008Issue II ¶100 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the Supreme Court announced a categorical bar to the admission of certain hearsay evidence at a criminal trial.

22
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2012 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36 , 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012) (rejecting a categorical bar of takings claims based upon temporary flooding, and stating, “[t]o reject a categorical bar to temporary-flooding takings claims, however, is scarcely to credit all, or even many, such claims.

2022Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36 , 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012) (rejecting a categorical bar of takings claims based upon temporary flooding, and stating, “[t]o reject a categorical bar to temporary-flooding takings claims, however, is scarcely to credit all, or even many, such claims.

11
Martin Development Co. v. Keeney Construction Co.green
mont · 1985 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See Martin, 216 Mont. at 219-20 , 703 P.2d at 147-48 .

2012See Martin, 216 Mont. at 219-20 , 703 P.2d at 147-48 .

11
Eberhart v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2005 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008The Court suggested that “[cjlarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 , 124 S. Ct. at 915 ; accord Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 , 126 S. Ct. 403, 405 (2005) (per curiam).

2008The Court suggested that “[cjlarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 , 124 S. Ct. at 915 ; accord Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 , 126 S. Ct. 403, 405 (2005) (per curiam).

11
Doggett v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 660-66 , 112 S. Ct. at 2695-98 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶69 But assuming that impairment of the defense is “the most serious” or “the most important” of the interests protected by the speedy trial right, it would defy logic to adopt a categorical rule excluding from our analysis the time which passes while the State appeals a district court’s grant of a speedy trial motion.

2008See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 660-66 , 112 S. Ct. at 2695-98 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶69 But assuming that impairment of the defense is “the most serious” or “the most important” of the interests protected by the speedy trial right, it would defy logic to adopt a categorical rule excluding from our analysis the time which passes while the State appeals a district court’s grant of a speedy trial motion.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Garland v. Anaconda Co. green
mont · 1978
2 sentences

2007Garland, 177 Mont. at 244 , 581 P.2d at 433 . ¶56 This Court also refused to treat a violation of the authorization rule as a categorical bar to coverage in Hutchison v. General Host Corp., 178 Mont. 81 , 582 P.2d 1203 (1978).

2007Garland, 177 Mont. at 244 , 581 P.2d at 433 . ¶56 This Court also refused to treat a violation of the authorization rule as a categorical bar to coverage in Hutchison v. General Host Corp., 178 Mont. 81 , 582 P.2d 1203 (1978).

22007–2011
State v. Bullock green
mont · 1995
2 sentences

2021Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384 , 901 P.2d at 75 .

2021Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384 , 901 P.2d at 75 .

12021–2021
Ohio v. Clark green
scotus · 2015
1 sentence

2018Clark , 135 S.Ct. at 2181 .

12018–2018
Miller v. Alabama green
scotus · 2012
2 sentences

2015Miller, 367 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 .

2015Miller , 367 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 .

12015–2015
State v. Bullplume green
mont · 2013
2 sentences

2014We have, however, declined to adopt such a categorical rule, stating that “[e]ach case must turn on its specific facts.” State v. Bullplume, 2013 MT 169, ¶ 24 , 370 Mont. 453 , 305 P.3d 753 (citing Melton, ¶ 20). ¶21 Furthermore, we have already found this argument to be unpersuasive in more than one instance.

2014We have, however, declined to adopt such a categorical rule, stating that “[e]ach case must turn on its specific facts.” State v. Bullplume, 2013 MT 169, ¶ 24 , 370 Mont. 453 , 305 P.3d 753 (citing Melton, ¶ 20). ¶21 Furthermore, we have already found this argument to be unpersuasive in more than one instance.

12014–2014
Maya v. Centex Corp. green
ca9 · 2011
1 sentence

2012TW]e cannot say that it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment”; accordingly, “plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation.” Maya, 658 F.3d at 1073 . ¶53 Contrary to the PSC’s assumption, therefore, there is not a categorical bar to a party’s amending her complaint, after an order of dismissal, in order to cure a deficiency in her pleadings on the issue of standing.

12012–2012
United States v. John Scott green
ca8 · 2001
1 sentence

2012The court reasoned that “the special conditions seem unlikely to serve the goals of deterrence or public safety, since the behavior on which the special conditions are based, though highly reprehensible, has ceased.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 636 . ¶20 While the State suggests that a nexus to the “original offense” (rather than to the SVORA offense for which the defendant is being sentenced) is sufficient, we decline to adopt this as a categorical rule.

12012–2012
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2011Instead, given “the special considerations” that arise when land patents are at issue-not the least of which is the special need for “certainty and predictability” where land titles are concerned4;he court reasoned that “when a claimant traces common ownership back to the federal government and seeks to establish an implied reservation of an access right-of-way, the intent of Congress is paramount and the government’s power of eminent domain also bears significance.” Murphy, 205 P.3d at 294 , 295 (citing Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 679-82 , 99 S. Ct. 1403 ).

2011Instead, given “the special considerations” that arise when land patents are at issue-not the least of which is the special need for “certainty and predictability” where land titles are concerned4;he court reasoned that “when a claimant traces common ownership back to the federal government and seeks to establish an implied reservation of an access right-of-way, the intent of Congress is paramount and the government’s power of eminent domain also bears significance.” Murphy, 205 P.3d at 294 , 295 (citing Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 679-82 , 99 S. Ct. 1403 ).

12011–2011
Murphy v. Burch green
cal · 2009
2 sentences

2011The court declined, however, to ‘impose a categorical bar to all easement-by-necessity claims tracing common ownership to the federal government.” Murphy, 205 P.3d at 295 .

2011Instead, given “the special considerations” that arise when land patents are at issue-not the least of which is the special need for “certainty and predictability” where land titles are concerned4;he court reasoned that “when a claimant traces common ownership back to the federal government and seeks to establish an implied reservation of an access right-of-way, the intent of Congress is paramount and the government’s power of eminent domain also bears significance.” Murphy, 205 P.3d at 294 , 295 (citing Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 679-82 , 99 S. Ct. 1403 ).

12011–2011
Kontrick v. Ryan green
scotus · 2004
2 sentences

2008Correspondingly, it is necessary that we reconsider whether the filing deadline on a notice of appeal is truly “jurisdictional” or merely a categorical claim-processing rule. ¶22 In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 , 124 S. Ct. 906 (2004), the Supreme Court observed that classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, as “jurisdictional” can be “confounding.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 , 124 S. Ct. at 915 .

2008Correspondingly, it is necessary that we reconsider whether the filing deadline on a notice of appeal is truly “jurisdictional” or merely a categorical claim-processing rule. ¶22 In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 , 124 S. Ct. 906 (2004), the Supreme Court observed that classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, as “jurisdictional” can be “confounding.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 , 124 S. Ct. at 915 .

12008–2008
Gergos v. Ashcroft, Attorney General green
scotus · 2004
1 sentence

2007Co. v. Campbell, 543 U.S. 874 , 125 S.Ct. 114 (2004). ¶188 Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court’s view, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Campbell’s reference to a 1:1 ratio does not establish a categorical rule in favor of a 1:1 ratio where compensatory damages are substantial.

12007–2007
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell neutral
scotus · 2004
1 sentence

2007Co. v. Campbell, 543 U.S. 874 , 125 S.Ct. 114 (2004). ¶188 Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court’s view, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Campbell’s reference to a 1:1 ratio does not establish a categorical rule in favor of a 1:1 ratio where compensatory damages are substantial.

12007–2007
Hutchison v. General Host Corp. green
mont · 1978
2 sentences

2007Garland, 177 Mont. at 244 , 581 P.2d at 433 . ¶56 This Court also refused to treat a violation of the authorization rule as a categorical bar to coverage in Hutchison v. General Host Corp., 178 Mont. 81 , 582 P.2d 1203 (1978).

2007Garland, 177 Mont. at 244 , 581 P.2d at 433 . ¶56 This Court also refused to treat a violation of the authorization rule as a categorical bar to coverage in Hutchison v. General Host Corp., 178 Mont. 81 , 582 P.2d 1203 (1978).

12007–2007

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MT § Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-104 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 228 (1974–2026) WA 92 (1980–2026) TX 84 (1965–2026) IA 76 (1996–2025) IL 66 (1983–2026) FL 54 (1959–2026) KS 45 (1994–2026) MI 44 (1991–2025) OR 37 (1994–2026) CO 36 (1987–2026) PA 34 (1971–2026) WI 32 (1999–2026) LA 28 (1977–2022) MN 27 (1988–2026) NC 25 (1987–2026) UT 25 (1999–2026) NJ 24 (1980–2026) NM 20 (1999–2025) OH 19 (1996–2026) GA 19 (2008–2024) NY 18 (1990–2024) AZ 18 (1969–2026) SC 17 (2011–2022) MT 16 (2007–2022) DC 16 (1993–2025) MA 14 (1997–2024) MD 14 (1995–2025) VA 14 (1957–2024) ID 12 (1991–2024) IN 11 (2012–2026) MO 11 (2013–2025) WY 10 (1983–2019) AR 10 (2001–2026) TN 9 (1985–2018) KY 9 (2013–2026) OK 8 (2016–2023) AL 8 (1920–2016) MS 8 (2009–2022) NH 8 (2003–2019) HI 7 (1998–2017) SD 7 (2007–2025) CT 6 (2011–2023) ND 6 (1997–2016) NE 6 (2003–2017) AK 5 (1998–2023) RI 5 (1984–2025) ME 4 (1980–2017) VT 3 (1988–2009) NV 3 (1990–2026) DE 3 (2015–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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