categorical rule in Wisconsin

2022We noted that Miller did “not consider [the] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles” and that “nothing in Miller undercuts our supreme court’s holding in Ninham.” Barbeau, 370 Wis. 2d 736, ¶32 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ). ¶43 In sum, Ninham dictates that new scientific research on brain development in emerging adults regarding juveniles does not constitute a new factor warranting sentence modification, and that, under McDermott, the same science applied to eighteen- to twenty-two-year-olds d

2018STAT. § 973.014(1g)(a) (2015-2016) 3 ; see also Barbeau , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , ¶24. ¶35 Barbeau mounted a categorical challenge to the truth-in-sentencing statute on the grounds that it allows for a juvenile convicted of first-degree intentional homicide to be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for extended supervision. 4 Barbeau , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , ¶24.

2022We noted that Miller did “not consider [the] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles” and that “nothing in Miller undercuts our supreme court’s holding in Ninham.” Barbeau, 370 Wis. 2d 736, ¶32 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ). ¶43 In sum, Ninham dictates that new scientific research on brain development in emerging adults regarding juveniles does not constitute a new factor warranting sentence modification, and that, under McDermott, the same science applied to eighteen- to twenty-two-year-olds d

2018While the Court declined to consider whether the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles, it indicated that the imposition of "this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon," because after taking youth into consideration, it is difficult to distinguish between "the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted). ¶28 Subsequently in Montgomery , the Supreme Court determined that the holdi

2001Williams relies upon the Supreme Court's statement in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997), that "while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety. . .not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree." However, that the officers were responding to a drug complaint is not the only reason to justify the protective search here.

2000See, e.g., State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319 , 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), rev'd Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (U.S. Supreme Court reversed our court decision that held law-enforcement officer may enter home to arrest driver suspected of driving under the influence of intoxicants, a noncriminal offense); State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410 , 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845 , 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996), and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (U.S. Supreme Court concluded that our court erred in adopting a categorical rule holding that a no-knock entry is permissibl

2010Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (violation of knock and announce rule); and even for sufficiently attenuated reliance on withdrawn judicial warrants that remained in the system due to executive branch negligence, see Herring v. United States, _U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 , 172 L.

2010Although the Court rejected a categorical exception similar to the one in Evans , it held that the police conduct in Herring did not warrant exclusion because it "was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest." Id. at 698. 2.

2022See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 536 n.19 (1975).

2022See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 7 S.R. concedes that it is not a categorical rule that the circuit court must hear from the adoptive resource; however, she asserts that in this case the circuit court was unable to properly exercise its discretion without such information.

2022See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 7 S.R. concedes that it is not a categorical rule that the circuit court must hear from the adoptive resource; however, she asserts that in this case the circuit court was unable to properly exercise its discretion without such information.

2022See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 536 n.19 (1975).

2021See Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶41 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 (declining to address sufficiency challenge to involuntary commitment due to mootness). 9 No. 2021AP678 Mootness Exceptions ¶16 A court reviewing an expired medication order may address moot issues under certain circumstances.

2021See Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶41 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 (declining to address sufficiency challenge to involuntary commitment due to mootness). 9 No. 2021AP678 Mootness Exceptions ¶16 A court reviewing an expired medication order may address moot issues under certain circumstances.

2021Although the Court again "decline[d] to adopt a categorical rule" on the issue, id., it pointed out that statements by someone as young as this child "will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause," id. at 248.

2021Although the Court again "decline[d] to adopt a categorical rule" on the issue, id., it pointed out that statements by someone as young as this child "will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause," id. at 248.

2020See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 705 & n.20 (1981) (creating the categorical rule for search warrants to detain the occupants of a premises while a search for contraband is conducted).

2020Notably, the State on appeal does not justify Monn’s initial seizure under either Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), or a different case suggesting the existence of a categorical rule that allows the detention of all occupants of a premises during the execution of an arrest warrant. 7 No. 2019AP640-CR ¶18 Although the issue regarding the duration of Monn’s seizure was not fully vetted below, the record is sufficiently developed for us to analyze this issue, and the parties briefed the issue on appeal.

2017See State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65 , ¶39 n.10, 354 Wis. 2d 545 , 849 N.W.2d 867 . 21 No. 2014AP1870-CR.ssa voluntary because the State's interpretation of the statute makes implied consent irrevocable;16 and that the statutory provisions regarding unconscious drivers are the functional equivalent of a categorical rule rejected in McNeely.17 ¶148 Relying on State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶26 , 354 Wis. 2d 545 , 849 N.W.2d 876 , in which the court of appeals distinguished between implied consent (which is consent to choose between a blood draw and license revocation) and actual voluntary cons

2017See State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65 , ¶39 n.10, 354 Wis. 2d 545 , 849 N.W.2d 867 . 21 No. 2014AP1870-CR.ssa voluntary because the State's interpretation of the statute makes implied consent irrevocable;16 and that the statutory provisions regarding unconscious drivers are the functional equivalent of a categorical rule rejected in McNeely.17 ¶148 Relying on State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, ¶26 , 354 Wis. 2d 545 , 849 N.W.2d 876 , in which the court of appeals distinguished between implied consent (which is consent to choose between a blood draw and license revocation) and actual voluntary cons

2016As noted above, in deciding a categorical challenge such as this, a court will first consider "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue." Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 50 (citation omitted).

2016See Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63, ¶5 (holding that 13 No. 2013AP2433-CR an attorney's advice that a "guilty plea carried a 'strong chance' of deportation" constituted effective assistance where "deportation was not an absolute certainty"); Ortiz-Mondragon, 364 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5 (concluding that an attorney's advice that a plea carried a "risk" of adverse immigration consequences was sufficient where federal immigration law was not "succinct, clear, and explicit" that the pending charge "constituted a crime involving moral turpitude" (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 )). ¶28 In this case, LeMere turns our

2016See Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63, ¶5 (holding that 13 No. 2013AP2433-CR an attorney's advice that a "guilty plea carried a 'strong chance' of deportation" constituted effective assistance where "deportation was not an absolute certainty"); Ortiz-Mondragon, 364 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5 (concluding that an attorney's advice that a plea carried a "risk" of adverse immigration consequences was sufficient where federal immigration law was not "succinct, clear, and explicit" that the pending charge "constituted a crime involving moral turpitude" (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 )). ¶28 In this case, LeMere turns our

2014Kennedy, 359 Wis. 2d 454, ¶ 32 ("In light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNeely, we recognize our holding in Bohling , that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient for law enforcement officers to order a warrantless investigatory blood draw, is no longer an accurate interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.").

2012Instead of applying the familiar attenuation test, the Harris Court adopted the following categorical rule: Statements obtained outside the home following a warrantless arrest are not "the product of illegal governmental activity." Id. at 19.

2012Accordingly, "where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by a defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton." Id. at 21.