categorical rule in Connecticut

2023See Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (‘‘the interest of the students, staff and faculty as beneficiaries in the financing of the educational institution with which they are associated is a sufficient special interest to entitle them to bring suit’’); Dominy v. Stanley, 162 Ga. 211 , 215–16, 133 S.E. 245 (1926) (patrons and former patrons of school had standing to bring action to enforce terms of trust requiring trustees to use land for school purposes).

2023See Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (‘‘the interest of the students, staff and faculty as beneficiaries in the financing of the educational institution with which they are associated is a sufficient special interest to entitle them to bring suit’’); Dominy v. Stanley, 162 Ga. 211 , 215–16, 133 S.E. 245 (1926) (patrons and former patrons of school had standing to bring action to enforce terms of trust requiring trustees to use land for school purposes).

2018In Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254 , 260, 133 S.Ct. 2276 , 186 L.Ed. 2d 438 (2013), the United States Supreme Court further explained the modified categorical approach, noting that it "serves a limited function: It helps effectuate the categorical analysis when a divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the alternative, renders opaque which element played a part in [the relevant] conviction." Additionally, the Supreme Court explained that the modified categorical approach helps identify the subdivision at issue by allowing a court to review extra statutory material to

2018In Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254 , 260, 133 S.Ct. 2276 , 186 L.Ed. 2d 438 (2013), the United States Supreme Court further explained the modified categorical approach, noting that it "serves a limited function: It helps effectuate the categorical analysis when a divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the alternative, renders opaque which element played a part in [the relevant] conviction." Additionally, the Supreme Court explained that the modified categorical approach helps identify the subdivision at issue by allowing a court to review extra statutory material to

2018Applying a categorical analysis employed by the Second Circuit in Dalton v. Ashcroft , 257 F.3d 200 , 204 (2d Cir. 2001), 9 the Appellate Court explained that all three applicable subdivisions of the threatening in the second degree statute necessarily **207 involve "the type of conduct and mental state that is characteristic of crimes involving moral turpitude." St.

2017This court determined that the physicians could be compelled to testify for three reasons: (1) the defendant had asserted the privilege rather than the physicians; (2) a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition would be contrary to "our liberal discovery rules"; and (3) because there was no justification for a rule that would "wholly" exempt experts from testifying about previously formulated opinions, the court did not wish "to create a testimonial privilege that would prevent such witnesses from being deposed in the present case." (Internal quotati

2017This court determined that the physicians could be compelled to testify for three reasons: (1) the defendant had asserted the privilege rather than the physicians; (2) a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition would be contrary to "our liberal discovery rules"; and (3) because there was no justification for a rule that would "wholly" exempt experts from testifying about previously formulated opinions, the court did not wish "to create a testimonial privilege that would prevent such witnesses from being deposed in the present case." (Internal quotati

2011Moreover, a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules, which explain that “[e]vidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even though ‘the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ Practice Book § [13-2].” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985). *108 Finally, the idea that an expert witness who already has expressed an opinion in connecti

2011Moreover, a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules, which explain that “[e]vidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even though ‘the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ Practice Book § [13-2].” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985). *108 Finally, the idea that an expert witness who already has expressed an opinion in connecti

2011Ed. 2d 123 (1986); and in stark contrast to the “fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 , 116 S. Ct. 1923 , 135 L.

2011Ed. 2d 123 (1986); and in stark contrast to the “fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 , 116 S. Ct. 1923 , 135 L.

2011Moreover, a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules, which explain that “[e]vidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even though ‘the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ Practice Book § [13-2].” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985). *108 Finally, the idea that an expert witness who already has expressed an opinion in connecti

2011Moreover, a categorical rule permitting treating physicians to refuse to testify at a deposition is not in harmony with our liberal discovery rules, which explain that “[e]vidence may be elicited at a discovery deposition even though ‘the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ Practice Book § [13-2].” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985). *108 Finally, the idea that an expert witness who already has expressed an opinion in connecti