categorical rule in Maryland

2023When this Court cited Manpower in Matthews, it did so to demonstrate the proposition that where a sufficient factual basis exists under Rule 5-702(3) and Daubert- Rochkind – that is, where an expert has applied a reliable methodology to an adequate supply of data – courts should not exclude an expert merely because the expert’s particular conclusions may be inaccurate, but rather should only exclude expert testimony that is “mere speculation or conjecture.” Matthews, 479 Md. at 316 .

2023When this Court cited Manpower in Matthews, it did so to demonstrate the proposition that where a sufficient factual basis exists under Rule 5-702(3) and Daubert- Rochkind – that is, where an expert has applied a reliable methodology to an adequate supply of data – courts should not exclude an expert merely because the expert’s particular conclusions may be inaccurate, but rather should only exclude expert testimony that is “mere speculation or conjecture.” Matthews, 479 Md. at 316 .

2025In fact, our opinion stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 , 627 n.26).

2025Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (noting that Heller did not “establish[] a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home[,]” but rather “stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful’”) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 , 627 n.26).

2025In fact, our opinion stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 , 627 n.26).

2020Of course, the party opposing admission is 17 free to cross-examine the sponsoring witness concerning any defects in the data, as happened in this case, or to present its own expert to contest the accuracy of a particular device. 457 Md. at 532-33 .

2017More specifically, it causes us to consider whether the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), that it is a categorical violation of the Eighth Amendment for a juvenile nonhomicide offender to be sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”), extends to these multiple-victim, multiple-crime term-of-years sentences.

2017More specifically, it causes us to consider whether the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), that it is a categorical violation of the Eighth Amendment for a juvenile nonhomicide offender to be sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”), extends to these multiple-victim, multiple-crime term-of-years sentences.

2017In its view, the Graham Court’s decision to impose a categorical bar rested on “(1) the ‘sentencing practice’; (2) ‘the nature of the offense’; and (3) ‘the characteristics of the offender.’ ” Id. at 1055 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 60-61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 )).

2016Circuit stated its belief “that the categorical rule we announce today will greatly simplify the application of Exemption 4 in a significant number of cases.” Id. at 877 .

2015Such a categorical rule defies logic and its more pedestrian partner, common sense, and is, moreover, inconsistent with the “contextual inquiry” that is required in assessing whether a statement is “testimonial.” Id.

2013Subsequently, however, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Court rejected this interpretation of the above-quoted language, observing that "Davis should not be read as establishing, without analysis, a categorical exception to the harmless-error rule,” id. at 683 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , and the Court thus held "that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to ... harmless-error analysis.” Id. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . .

2013Subsequently, however, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Court rejected this interpretation of the above-quoted language, observing that "Davis should not be read as establishing, without analysis, a categorical exception to the harmless-error rule,” id. at 683 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , and the Court thus held "that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to ... harmless-error analysis.” Id. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . .

2012The State argues that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a categorical rule in Howes v. Fields, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1181 , 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012), in which the Court reiterated that a trial court should have considered all the facts surrounding an interrogation of a prison inmate to determine if the interrogation was custodial or not.

2012The State argues that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a categorical rule in Howes v. Fields, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1181 , 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012), in which the Court reiterated that a trial court should have considered all the facts surrounding an interrogation of a prison inmate to determine if the interrogation was custodial or not.

1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995).

1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995).

1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995).

1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995).

1995The United States Supreme Court, 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2134 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 342 , summarized the holding of the Minnesota high court: The court expressly refused “to extend the plain view doctrine to the sense of touch” on the grounds that “the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight” and that “the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [FJourth [Ajmendment.” The court thus appeared to adopt a categorical rule barring the seizure of any contraband detected by an officer through the sense of

1995The Supreme Court also found support for that position in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 , 93 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 343 n. 5, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), where the Court had, at least obliquely, recognized the potential for a pat-down search to yield, through the cloth of a shirt, probable cause to believe that contraband was present inside “a cigarette pack with objects in it”: The Court’s analysis does not suggest, and indeed seems inconsistent with, the existence of a categorical bar against seizures of contraband detected manually during a Terry patdown search. 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2137

1995The Supreme Court also found support for that position in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 , 93 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 343 n. 5, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), where the Court had, at least obliquely, recognized the potential for a pat-down search to yield, through the cloth of a shirt, probable cause to believe that contraband was present inside “a cigarette pack with objects in it”: The Court’s analysis does not suggest, and indeed seems inconsistent with, the existence of a categorical bar against seizures of contraband detected manually during a Terry patdown search. 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2137

1995The Supreme Court also found support for that position in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 , 93 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 338 , 343 n. 5, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), where the Court had, at least obliquely, recognized the potential for a pat-down search to yield, through the cloth of a shirt, probable cause to believe that contraband was present inside “a cigarette pack with objects in it”: The Court’s analysis does not suggest, and indeed seems inconsistent with, the existence of a categorical bar against seizures of contraband detected manually during a Terry patdown search. 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2137