categorical rule in Arizona

18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Browngreen scotus · 2012 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022Decision of the Court in that it accrues after death; it is not the result of a rule that categorically disfavors arbitration. ¶13 Montecito correctly notes that the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce, and “includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 ; Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532-33 (2012) (vacating state court decision setting forth general state policy prohibiting enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in a nursing home admission agreement to arbitrate personal-injury	1	1
Greeves v. Rosenbaumgreen wyo · 1998 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022See, e.g., Turner v. Westhampton Ct., LLC, 903 So. 2d 82, 93 (Ala. 2004) (“[T]he principle of freedom of contract permits a party to effectively disclaim the implied warranty of habitability.”); Greeves v. Rosenbaum, 965 P.2d 669, 673 (Wyo. 1998) (“The protection afforded to purchasers of a new home, however, does not go so far as to 24 ZAMBRANO V.	1	1
Turner v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C.green ala · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022See, e.g., Turner v. Westhampton Ct., LLC, 903 So. 2d 82, 93 (Ala. 2004) (“[T]he principle of freedom of contract permits a party to effectively disclaim the implied warranty of habitability.”); Greeves v. Rosenbaum, 965 P.2d 669, 673 (Wyo. 1998) (“The protection afforded to purchasers of a new home, however, does not go so far as to 24 ZAMBRANO V.	1	1
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen · 2016 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018See Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 734 (" Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.").	1	1
United States v. Michael Johnsongreen ca9 · 2001 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n.6. 9 ¶ 20 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it had never laid down “a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 3, 6 , 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per cu-riam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 .	1	1
Stanton v. Simsgreen scotus · 2013 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n.6. 9 ¶ 20 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it had never laid down “a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 3, 6 , 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per cu-riam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 . 2017See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n.6. 9 ¶ 20 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it had never laid down “a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 3, 6 , 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per cu-riam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 .	1	1
Welsh v. Wisconsingreen scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n.6. 9 ¶ 20 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it had never laid down “a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 3, 6 , 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per cu-riam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 . 2017See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n.6. 9 ¶ 20 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it had never laid down “a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 3, 6 , 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per cu-riam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 .	1	1
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B.green ariz · 2013 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015The Court’s disapproval of a categorical exception in the exigent-circumstances context is, however, instructive on the issue of consent, as the Arizona Supreme Court recognized in State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013). 2015The Court’s disapproval of a categorical exception in the exigent-circumstances context is, however, instructive on the issue of consent, as the Arizona Supreme Court recognized in State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013).	1	1
State v. Micah Abraham Wulffgreen idaho · 2014 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015Butler relied on McNeely to conclude that “a compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to § 28-1321, is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints,” and that “independent of § 28-1321, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw,” with voluntariness to be assessed “under the totality of the circumstances.” Butler, 232 Ariz. at 87, 88, ¶¶ 10, 18 , 302 P.3d at 612, 613 ; accord Flonnory v. Delaware, 109 A3d 1060, 1065-66 (Del.2015); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 , 337 P.3d 575, 581 (2014). 2015Butler relied on McNeely to conclude that “a compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to § 28-1321, is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints,” and that “independent of § 28-1321, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw,” with voluntariness to be assessed “under the totality of the circumstances.” Butler, 232 Ariz. at 87, 88, ¶¶ 10, 18 , 302 P.3d at 612, 613 ; accord Flonnory v. Delaware, 109 A3d 1060, 1065-66 (Del.2015); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 , 337 P.3d 575, 581 (2014).	1	1
Roper v. Simmonsgreen scotus · 2005 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic	1	1
Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v. Community Inns of America, Inc.green texapp · 1965 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002Such refusal must be unconditional and the renunciation of the contract complete---“To precipitate anticipatory breach, there must be a complete renunciation of the contract, a categorical claim that it never has been, or no longer is, valid and binding whatsoever.” Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v. Community Inns of America, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.1965), quoting Lumbermens Mut.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Miller v. Alabama green scotus · 2012 2 sentences 2015The Court, however, expressly declined to address any “argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles.” Id. 2015Miller held only that a mandatory life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and expressly declined to address any “argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 .	3	2015–2015
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington green ariz · 2011 2 sentences 2026But in Eddington, our supreme court established a categorical rule that one class of prospective jurors is necessarily “interested”—peace officers employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated a criminal case. 228 Ariz. 361, ¶ 18 . 2026But in Eddington, our supreme court established a categorical rule that one class of prospective jurors is necessarily “interested”—peace officers employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated a criminal case. 228 Ariz. 361, ¶ 18 .	2	2026–2026
Graham v. Florida green scotus · 2010 2 sentences 2023Thus, this case presents whether a state’s sentencing scheme may subject a preadolescent juvenile offender to adult sentencing only because the offender was an adult when the State filed the charges. ¶36 Because the first cruel and unusual punishment question presented is a categorical challenge, the analysis typically “begins with objective indicia of national consensus.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 . 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic	2	2011–2023
Lockwood v. Superior Court green calctapp · 1984 2 sentences 2019The court recognized that the California Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in Lockwood v. Superior Court , 160 Cal.App.3d 667 , 206 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1984), but noted that another California appellate panel had refused to follow Lockwood as inconsistent with intervening California Supreme Court precedent. 2019The court recognized that the California Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in Lockwood v. Superior Court , 160 Cal.App.3d 667 , 206 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1984), but noted that another California appellate panel had refused to follow Lockwood as inconsistent with intervening California Supreme Court precedent.	2	2019–2019
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County Board of Equalization green ca9 · 2013 1 sentence 2022There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether § 5 preempted a county tax on a resort, conference center, and water park owned by a limited liability company and built on land held in trust by the United States for the Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation. 724 F.3d at 1154–55.	1	2022–2022
State v. Cobb green ariz · 1977 1 sentence 2018Cobb does not announce a categorical rule, but rather clarifies that "[t]he test ... should be that of reasonableness, both of the possessor's expectations of privacy and of the officers' reasons for being on that driveway." 115 Ariz. at 489, 566 P.2d at 290 (quoting Magana , 512 F.2d at 1171 ). ¶15 Under these circumstances, where the officers contacted Hernandez on the driveway's confluence with the back of the home which was at least partially obscured from public view, we hold that Hernandez held a reasonable expectation of privacy.	1	2018–2018
United States v. Victor F. Magana green ca9 · 1975 2 sentences 2018Cobb does not announce a categorical rule, but rather clarifies that “[t]he test . . . should be that of reasonableness, both of the possessor’s expectations of privacy and of the officers’ reasons for being on that driveway.” 115 Ariz. at 489 (quoting Magana, 512 F.2d at 1171 ). ¶15 Under these circumstances, where the officers contacted Hernandez on the driveway’s confluence with the back of the home which was at least partially obscured from public view, we hold that Hernandez 5 STATE V. 2018Cobb does not announce a categorical rule, but rather clarifies that "[t]he test ... should be that of reasonableness, both of the possessor's expectations of privacy and of the officers' reasons for being on that driveway." 115 Ariz. at 489, 566 P.2d at 290 (quoting Magana , 512 F.2d at 1171 ). ¶15 Under these circumstances, where the officers contacted Hernandez on the driveway's confluence with the back of the home which was at least partially obscured from public view, we hold that Hernandez held a reasonable expectation of privacy.	1	2018–2018
Budder v. Addison green ca10 · 2017 1 sentence 2018As the Tenth Circuit explained in providing relief to a juvenile sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 155 years, "we cannot read the Court's categorical rule [stated in Graham ] as excluding juvenile offenders ... merely because the state does not label this punishment as 'life without parole.' The Constitution's protections do not depend upon a legislature's semantic classifications." Budder v. Addison , 851 F.3d 1047 , 1056 (10th Cir. 2017). 3 ¶ 22 In sum, the Eighth Amendment imposes a categorical rule that a child cannot be sentenced to an irrevocable life of imprisonment without specia	1	2018–2018
Atkins v. Virginia green scotus · 2002 2 sentences 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic	1	2011–2011
Enmund v. Florida green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic 2011Id; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (categorically excluding defendants under eighteen years of age from death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (applying categorical exclusion to mentally impaired); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for nonhomicide offenses). ¶ 17 For the first time in Graham , the Court addressed the issue of proportionality in the context of a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence in a nonhomic	1	2011–2011
McNicol's Case green · 1913 1 sentence 1969This was well stated in a Michigan case, a jurisdiction which rejected the categorical doctrine of the “on premise” •exception and reaffirmed the early Massachusetts reasoning of In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497 , 102 N.E. 697 , L.R.A.1916A, 306: “Plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and for that reason the award should be set aside.	1	1969–1969

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-202 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 228 (1974–2026) WA 92 (1980–2026) TX 84 (1965–2026) IA 76 (1996–2025) IL 66 (1983–2026) FL 54 (1959–2026) KS 45 (1994–2026) MI 44 (1991–2025) OR 37 (1994–2026) CO 36 (1987–2026) PA 34 (1971–2026) WI 32 (1999–2026) LA 28 (1977–2022) MN 27 (1988–2026) NC 25 (1987–2026) UT 25 (1999–2026) NJ 24 (1980–2026) NM 20 (1999–2025) OH 19 (1996–2026) GA 19 (2008–2024) NY 18 (1990–2024) AZ 18 (1969–2026) SC 17 (2011–2022) MT 16 (2007–2022) DC 16 (1993–2025) MA 14 (1997–2024) MD 14 (1995–2025) VA 14 (1957–2024) ID 12 (1991–2024) IN 11 (2012–2026) MO 11 (2013–2025) WY 10 (1983–2019) AR 10 (2001–2026) TN 9 (1985–2018) KY 9 (2013–2026) OK 8 (2016–2023) AL 8 (1920–2016) MS 8 (2009–2022) NH 8 (2003–2019) HI 7 (1998–2017) SD 7 (2007–2025) CT 6 (2011–2023) ND 6 (1997–2016) NE 6 (2003–2017) AK 5 (1998–2023) RI 5 (1984–2025) ME 4 (1980–2017) VT 3 (1988–2009) NV 3 (1990–2026) DE 3 (2015–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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