categorical rule in Illinois

2026If the conduct is protected, then the court asks whether the challenged statute is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. -4- 2026 IL App (2d) 240341-U ¶ 12 Lastly, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bruen test and clarified that “Heller never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home.” Indeed, the Court noted that “Heller stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally i

2026If the conduct is protected, then the court asks whether the challenged statute is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. -4- 2026 IL App (2d) 240341-U ¶ 12 Lastly, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bruen test and clarified that “Heller never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home.” Indeed, the Court noted that “Heller stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally i

2023Although the court did not reach the question of whether the eighth amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, the court stated -9- that such sentences should be uncommon given “children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.” Id.

2021See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 ); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 37 (same). ¶ 71 The Supreme Court in Miller declared: - 21 - “We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . ¶ 72 In Miller, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether “the Eight

2026If the conduct is protected, then the court asks whether the challenged statute is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. -4- 2026 IL App (2d) 240341-U ¶ 12 Lastly, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bruen test and clarified that “Heller never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home.” Indeed, the Court noted that “Heller stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally i

2026If the conduct is protected, then the court asks whether the challenged statute is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. ¶ 45 Lastly, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bruen test and clarified that “Heller never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home.” Indeed, the Court noted that “Heller stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful

2025See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29-30 (a proper analogue does not require -4- No. 1-24-1260 a “historical twin,” as historical and modern-day regulations are sufficiently analogous if they “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” that is “comparably justified” (emphasis in original)). ¶ 18 In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), the Supreme Court, while reaffirming the Bruen analysis, stated that its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) “never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm po

2025See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29-30 (a proper analogue does not require a “historical twin”; rather, historical and modern-day regulations are sufficiently analogous if they “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” that is “comparably justified” (emphasis in original)). ¶ 13 As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024), its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), “never established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home.” Rather, Heller “stated that

2021See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 ); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 37 (same). ¶ 71 The Supreme Court in Miller declared: - 21 - “We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . ¶ 72 In Miller, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether “the Eight

2020See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 ); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 37 (same). ¶ 71 The Supreme Court in Miller declared: - 21 - “We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . ¶ 72 In Miller, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether “the Eight

2021See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 ); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 37 (same). ¶ 71 The Supreme Court in Miller declared: - 21 - “We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . ¶ 72 In Miller, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether “the Eight

2020See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 ); Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 37 (same). ¶ 71 The Supreme Court in Miller declared: - 21 - “We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. [Citation.] By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . ¶ 72 In Miller, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether “the Eight

2017Rather, that such a sentence should not be imposed—as it was in that case and as it was for Derrick Thomas—without the trial court being given an opportunity to consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. ¶ 67 Our court in House, in deciding that youth remained a relevant factor for a defendant who was convicted of two murders that occurred when he was 20 years old, cited several scholarly articles recognizing that several European countries have extended juvenile justice considerations to include, in Germany and in the Netherlands for example, all young adults from ages 18 to 21 an

2017Rather, that such a sentence should not be imposed— as it was in that case and as it was for Derrick Thomas—without the trial court being given an opportunity to consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. ¶ 67 Our court in House, in deciding that youth remained a relevant factor for a defendant who was convicted of two murders that occurred when he was 20 years old, cited several scholarly articles recognizing that several European countries have extended juvenile justice considerations to include, in Germany and in the Netherlands for example, all young adults from ages 18 to 21 a

2016Pratt, 399 Ill. at 252 (“In [Kane v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill. 172 (1945),] we said, ‘We are of the opinion that the case before us does not, on the facts alleged, bring plaintiff’s case within the definition of a taking of property by invasion ***.’ What was there said applies here and in our opinion the allegations of the amended petition are not sufficient to show a taking of any of appellants’ property.”).

2016Pratt, 399 Ill. at 252 (“In [Kane v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill. 172 (1945),] we said, ‘We are of the opinion that the case before us does not, on the facts alleged, bring plaintiff’s case within the definition of a taking of property by invasion ***.’ What was there said applies here and in our opinion the allegations of the amended petition are not sufficient to show a taking of any of appellants’ property.”).

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 (“Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis.”); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: “Community consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judi

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 , 356 Ill.Dec. 149 , 960 N.E.2d 1272 ("Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis."); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 , 356 Ill.Dec. 442 , 961 N.E.2d 831 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: "Community consensus, while `entitled to great weight,' is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, `the task of interpreti

2007Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, too, has rejected that Remmer created a categorical presumption in Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Ripped from its context, the statement is difficult to take seriously, because it is so easy to imagine situations in which a 'private communication ... with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury' would not create a rational presumption of prejudice").

2007Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, too, has rejected that Remmer created a categorical presumption in Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Ripped from its context, the statement is difficult to take seriously, because it is so easy to imagine situations in which a ‘private communication ... with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury’ would not create a rational presumption of prejudice”).

2007See Breyne v. Potter, 258 Ga. App. 728, 730-31 , 574 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2002) (explaining that in Roseberry the court “held that the termination performed for the purpose of obtaining experimental treatment was an intervening act that superseded any medical negligence by the defendant doctor that also caused the mother to terminate the pregnancy. [Citation.] Roseberry does not stand for the proposition that a patient’s decision to terminate a pregnancy breaks the chain of proximate cause following a doctor’s erroneous diagnosis on which the patient relied in making that decision”); see also Shir

2007See Breyne v. Potter, 258 Ga. App. 728, 730-31 , 574 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2002) (explaining that in Roseberry the court “held that the termination performed for the purpose of obtaining experimental treatment was an intervening act that superseded any medical negligence by the defendant doctor that also caused the mother to terminate the pregnancy. [Citation.] Roseberry does not stand for the proposition that a patient’s decision to terminate a pregnancy breaks the chain of proximate cause following a doctor’s erroneous diagnosis on which the patient relied in making that decision”); see also Shir

2007See Breyne v. Potter, 258 Ga. App. 728, 730-31 , 574 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2002) (explaining that in Roseberry the court “held that the termination performed for the purpose of obtaining experimental treatment was an intervening act that superseded any medical negligence by the defendant doctor that also caused the mother to terminate the pregnancy. [Citation.] Roseberry does not stand for the proposition that a patient’s decision to terminate a pregnancy breaks the chain of proximate cause following a doctor’s erroneous diagnosis on which the patient relied in making that decision”); see also Shir

2007See Breyne v. Potter, 258 Ga. App. 728, 730-31 , 574 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2002) (explaining that in Roseberry the court “held that the termination performed for the purpose of obtaining experimental treatment was an intervening act that superseded any medical negligence by the defendant doctor that also caused the mother to terminate the pregnancy. [Citation.] Roseberry does not stand for the proposition that a patient’s decision to terminate a pregnancy breaks the chain of proximate cause following a doctor’s erroneous diagnosis on which the patient relied in making that decision”); see also Shir

2019Thus, the court’s holding was “a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under *** the Iowa Constitution.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 839 .

2018Thus, the court's holding was "a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under * * * the Iowa Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 839 .

2023This was particularly the case given the “great difficulty *** of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479-480 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).

2021See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole may not be imposed on juvenile defendants absent consideration of the mitigating characteristics of youth); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that the eighth amendment categorically bars sentencing juvenile defendants to natural life in prison for offenses other than homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the eighth amendment requires a categorical bar on death sentences for juvenile defendants).

2018Cf. City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 104, 113-14 (1981) (where the parties apparently did not dispute that an ordinance, requiring landlords to “make a good faith effort to rent [property] at a fair rental,” intended to foreclose contractual waiver of such duty, the supreme court rejected the landlord’s assertion that the ordinance impermissibly interfered with the right to contract). ¶ 13 Tenant contends that as a categorical rule, parties cannot waive statutory requirements.

2018Cf. City of Evanston v. Create, Inc. , 85 Ill. 2d 101 , 106, 114-15, 51 Ill.Dec. 688 , 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981) (where the parties apparently did not dispute that an ordinance, requiring landlords to "make a good faith effort to rent [property] at a fair rental," intended to foreclose contractual waiver of such duty, the supreme court rejected the landlord's assertion that the ordinance impermissibly *15 *246 interfered with the right to contract (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ). ¶ 13 Tenant contends that as a categorical rule, parties cannot waive statutory requirements.

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 (“Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis.”); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: “Community consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judi

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 , 356 Ill.Dec. 149 , 960 N.E.2d 1272 ("Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis."); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 , 356 Ill.Dec. 442 , 961 N.E.2d 831 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: "Community consensus, while `entitled to great weight,' is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, `the task of interpreti

2012In any case, defendant was 19 years old at the time of the murders and was thus not a minor or a "youth." People v. McCoy, 337 Ill.App.3d 518, 525 , 272 Ill.Dec. 218 , 786 N.E.2d 1052 (2003); 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002) (excluding from juvenile court's jurisdiction those defendants at least 15 years old charged with first degree murder). ¶ 64 The categorical analysis consists of the following approach: "The Court first considers `objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national consensus against the

2012In any case, defendant was 19 years old at the time of the murders and was thus not a minor or a "youth." People v. McCoy, 337 Ill.App.3d 518, 525 , 272 Ill.Dec. 218 , 786 N.E.2d 1052 (2003); 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002) (excluding from juvenile court's jurisdiction those defendants at least 15 years old charged with first degree murder). ¶ 64 The categorical analysis consists of the following approach: "The Court first considers `objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national consensus against the