categorical bar in Indiana

2020That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 , 125 S. Ct. 1183 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 , 130 S. Ct. at 2026-2027 .

2020That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 , 125 S. Ct. 1183 ; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 , 130 S. Ct. at 2026-2027 .

2026Jones v. State, 101 N.E.3d 249, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ind. 1995)). [40] In any case, the majority’s concern that an admonishment would repeat and reinforce the improper remarks is not a categorical bar to a mistrial but, rather, a factor to be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion and shaping a particular remedy for the trial error.

2026See Norton v. State, 785 N.E.2d 625, 628-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming denial of mistrial without admonishment where trial court agreed with the requesting party that the admonishment would only aggravate the harm).

2026Jones v. State, 101 N.E.3d 249, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ind. 1995)). [40] In any case, the majority’s concern that an admonishment would repeat and reinforce the improper remarks is not a categorical bar to a mistrial but, rather, a factor to be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion and shaping a particular remedy for the trial error.

2025The purpose of claim preclusion is to prevent “the type of repeated litigation that would keep parties in interminable conflict, bog down our system, and delay or prevent the administration of justice.” In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). [21] Four requirements must be satisfied for claim preclusion to apply: “(1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1775| February 18, 2025 Page 12 of 27 (2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the m

2020See Swope, 91 F.2d at 262 (“The prisoner ... must be deemed to be serving [his time] from the date he is ordered to serve it ... if, without his fault, the marshal neglects to place him in the proper custody.”).

2020See Kiendra, 763 F.2d at 72-73 (following Swope); Croft, 450 F.2d at 1099 (same); [Pearlman], 42 F.2d at 789 .

2020But such a presumption would conflict with Johnson’s mandate that a warrant-issuing judge find the “affiant qualified to know the odor” to constitute probable cause, 333 U.S. at 13 , which must “be decided based on the facts of each case,” Figert v. State, 686 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind. 1997).

2020See Kiendra, 763 F.2d at 72-73 (following Swope); Croft, 450 F.2d at 1099 (same); [Pearlman], 42 F.2d at 789 .

2019In the aftermath of our decisions holding the residual clauses of the ACCA and § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, the government “abandon[ed] its longstanding position” that § 924(c)(3)(B) requires a categorical analysis and began urging lower courts to “adopt a new ‘case specific’ method” that would look to “the ‘defendant’s actual conduct’ in the predicate offense.” [United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2018)].