categorical rule in Mississippi

2022Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2019), as modified on rehearing (April 4, 2022); see also Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021) (recognizing that Miller does not impose a categorical bar against life without parole for juveniles “because Miller said so: ‘Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),] or Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)]’” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483)).

2019But “the United States Supreme Court has declined to announce such a categorical rule.” Cook, 242 So. 3d at 877 (¶45) (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 ).

2019And the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that “Miller does not prohibit sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders.” Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995 (¶19).

2016It instead found that 30 Bullcoming “did not clearly establish the categorical rule . . . that when the prosecution introduces a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification . . . the only witness whose in-court testimony can satisfy the Confrontation Clause is the analyst who performed the underlying analyses contained in the report.” Grim v. Fisher, 816 F.3d at 307 (emphasis added).

2016It instead found that Bullcoming “did not clearly establish the categorical rule ... that when the prosecution introduces a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification ... the only witness whose in-court testimony can satisfy the Confrontation Clause is the analyst who performed the underlying analyses contained in the report.” Grim v. Fisher, 816 F.3d at 307 (emphasis added).

2016Admin. for Children & Families, 556 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir.2009) (“[T]he Has-sett canon is not a categorical rule that compels courts to always read statutory cross-references as pointing to their original targets.” (internal quotations omitted)).