23 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Missouri Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2015If it involves an agency decision[,] the exhaustion rule does apply.” Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 851 S.W.2d at 569 . 2015If it involves an agency decision[,] the exhaustion rule does apply.” Mo. Health Care Ass’n, 851 S.W.2d at 569 . | 2 | 4 |
Boot Heel Nursing Center, Inc. v. Missouri Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1996Boot Heel Nursing Center, Inc. v. Missouri Department of Social Services, 826 S.W.2d 14, 16 [2] (Mo.App.W.D.1992), recognizes there is an exception to the exhaustion requirement where a party seeking relief from an administrative order raises a constitutional challenge to the statute under which the agency acted, and the challenge is the only issue presented. 1993While noting that an exception to the exhaustion requirement is recognized under some circumstances where a direct constitutional challenge to a rule or regulation of a state administrative agency is the only issue presented, 2 this court found that a challenge to the application of a rule or regulation does not involve a constitutional challenge “in an appellate jurisdictional sense.” Id. at 16 . | 2 | 3 |
City of Bridgeton v. City of St. Louisgreen2 sentences2015Louis, 18 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000), for the proposition that questions of legal authority are strictly legal issues to which the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply. 2015Louis, 18 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), for the proposition that questions of legal authority are strictly legal issues to which the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply. | 2 | 2 |
Willamette Industries, Inc. v. Clean Water Commissiongreen2 sentences2015“All of the statutory exceptions to the exhaustion requirement deal with actions attacking the validity of ‘rules.’ ” Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Clean Water Comm’n, 34 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Mo.App.W.D.2000). 2015“All of the statutory exceptions to the exhaustion requirement deal with actions attacking the validity of ‘rules.’” Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Clean Water Comm’n, 34 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
Schierding v. Missouri Dental Boardgreen2 sentences1990This is true even if constitutional issues are raised. “[T]he existence of a constitutional issue does not obviate the exhaustion requirement because adherence to the administrative procedural ‘chain allows for the orderly development of a clear factual record within which the legitimacy of the constitutional challenge can be more adequately assessed, rather than in a vacuum devoid of any factual context’.” Id. (quoting from Schierding v. Missouri Dental Board, 705 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Mo.App.1985)). 1989Weinberger v. Salfi, supra; Schierding, supra. Normally, however, the existence of a constitutional issue does not obviate the exhaustion requirement because adherence to the administrative procedural chain “allows for the orderly development of a clear factual record within which the legitimacy of the constitutional challenge can be more adequately assessed, rather than in a vacuum devoid of any factual context.” Schierding, supra, [1-3]. | 1 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Harvey v. Wellsgreen1 sentence2021Harvey v. Wells, 955 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Mo. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Scott v. Scearcegreen1 sentence2020Scott v. Scearce, 303 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. App. 1957). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Ideker, Inc. v. Garrettgreen1 sentence2017Ideker, Inc. v. Garrett, 471 S.W.3d 743, 747-48 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (stating that the exhaustion rule applies where an agency decision, as opposed to an agency rule, is implicated). | 1 | 1 |
Sperry Corp. v. Wilesgreen1 sentence1996The trial court presumably relied on the exhaustion doctrine, which provides that “where a remedy before an administrative agency is available, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.” Sperry Corp. v. Wiles, 695 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Mo. banc 1985); see also § 536.100, RSMo 1994 (granting judicial review of a final decision in a contested case only to those parties who have exhausted all administrative remedies provided by law). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 579986green1 sentence1995Id.; see Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 959 F.2d 655 , 659 (7th Cir.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Richard Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.green1 sentence1990Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 261 , 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Women's Christian Assn. v. Browngreen2 sentences1977Although it is generally said that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where petitioner challenges the validity of a zoning ordinance [Women’s Christian Ass’n of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 709 , 190 S.W.2d 900, 906 [12] (1945); 82 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning, § 333, at p. 904], well reasoned cases in other jurisdictions do not except challenges to validity from the exhaustion requirement [State ex rel. 1977Although it is generally said that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where petitioner challenges the validity of a zoning ordinance [Women’s Christian Ass’n of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 709 , 190 S.W.2d 900, 906 [12] (1945); 82 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning, § 333, at p. 904], well reasoned cases in other jurisdictions do not except challenges to validity from the exhaustion requirement [State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Wyrostok v. Town of Hempsteadgreen2 sentences1977Equally well reasoned cases have rejected the exhaustion requirement for challenges to the validity of an ordinance as applied where the administrative remedy was found to be inadequate. *641 Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus, 21 Ohio St.2d 265 , 257 N.E.2d 355 , 357—358[1] (1970); Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead, 16 Misc.2d 554 , 176 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443-444 [4] (1958). 1977Equally well reasoned cases have rejected the exhaustion requirement for challenges to the validity of an ordinance as applied where the administrative remedy was found to be inadequate. *641 Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus, 21 Ohio St.2d 265 , 257 N.E.2d 355 , 357—358[1] (1970); Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead, 16 Misc.2d 554 , 176 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443-444 [4] (1958). | 1 | 1 |
State, Ex Rel. v. West Lakegreen2 sentences1977Lieux v. Village of Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412 , 96 N.E.2d 414, 416-417 [2] (1951)] or confine this exception to cases where the validity of the ordinance is being attacked in its entirety, and do require exhaustion where the validity of the ordinance is being challenged in its application to a particular parcel. 1977Lieux v. Village of Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412 , 96 N.E.2d 414, 416-417 [2] (1951)] or confine this exception to cases where the validity of the ordinance is being attacked in its entirety, and do require exhaustion where the validity of the ordinance is being challenged in its application to a particular parcel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alhalabi v. Missouri Department of Natural Resources
green
1 sentence2021Thus, the majority contends that Williams’ administrative complaint is “virtually identical in substance” to the charge in Alhalabi v. Missouri Department of Natural Resources, 300 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009), where the Eastern District found that a hostile work environment claim was adequately exhausted. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Marquart v. Director of Revenue
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 717 . 2010Id. at 718 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Weinberger v. Salfi
green
2 sentences2001The policy reasons for the exhaustion doctrine have been stated as follows: “ ‘Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.’ ” Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 , 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2467 , 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)). 2001The policy reasons for the exhaustion doctrine have been stated as follows: “ ‘Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.’ ” Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 , 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2467 , 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Dye v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Social Services
green
1 sentence1996Neither does Dye v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, 811 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. banc 1991), cited by Branch. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of Joplin v. Missouri Lead & Zinc Co.
green
1 sentence1994That contention is answered by City of Joplin v. Missouri Lead and Zinc Co., 861 S.W.2d 157 (Mo.App.S.D.1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State ex rel. Sago ex rel. Sago v. O'Brien
green
1 sentence1993Sago, 827 S.W.2d at 755 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
STATE EX REL. MO. STATE BD. OF REG. FOR HEALING ARTS v. Hartenbach
green
1 sentence1990This is true even if constitutional issues are raised. “[T]he existence of a constitutional issue does not obviate the exhaustion requirement because adherence to the administrative procedural ‘chain allows for the orderly development of a clear factual record within which the legitimacy of the constitutional challenge can be more adequately assessed, rather than in a vacuum devoid of any factual context’.” Id. (quoting from Schierding v. Missouri Dental Board, 705 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Mo.App.1985)). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Oscar v. Clovervale Foods Processing, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 261 , 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1990Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 261 , 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1990Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 261 , 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Michael Dunn v. Donald Wyrick, Warden, Missouri Penitentiary
green
1 sentence1983The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Dunn v. Wyrick, 679 F.2d 731 (1982), found itself in somewhat the same situation as does this court, and it followed the procedure which I propose above: The Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1205 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), adopted a total exhaustion rule, requiring district courts to dismiss habeas petitions containing such mixed claims. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rose v. Lundy
green
2 sentences1983The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Dunn v. Wyrick, 679 F.2d 731 (1982), found itself in somewhat the same situation as does this court, and it followed the procedure which I propose above: The Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1205 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), adopted a total exhaustion rule, requiring district courts to dismiss habeas petitions containing such mixed claims. 1983The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Dunn v. Wyrick, 679 F.2d 731 (1982), found itself in somewhat the same situation as does this court, and it followed the procedure which I propose above: The Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1205 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), adopted a total exhaustion rule, requiring district courts to dismiss habeas petitions containing such mixed claims. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Westside Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Dexter
green
1 sentence1979Bormann v. City of Richmond Heights, 213 S.W.2d 249 , 253 (Mo.App.1948); Westside Enterprises v. City of Dexter, supra, l.c. 640. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus
green
2 sentences1977Equally well reasoned cases have rejected the exhaustion requirement for challenges to the validity of an ordinance as applied where the administrative remedy was found to be inadequate. *641 Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus, 21 Ohio St.2d 265 , 257 N.E.2d 355 , 357—358[1] (1970); Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead, 16 Misc.2d 554 , 176 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443-444 [4] (1958). 1977Equally well reasoned cases have rejected the exhaustion requirement for challenges to the validity of an ordinance as applied where the administrative remedy was found to be inadequate. *641 Burt Realty Corp. v. City of Columbus, 21 Ohio St.2d 265 , 257 N.E.2d 355 , 357—358[1] (1970); Wyrostok v. Town of Hempstead, 16 Misc.2d 554 , 176 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443-444 [4] (1958). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sammie Preston Irby v. State of Missouri
green
1 sentence1976The case of Irby v. Missouri, 502 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1974), also relied upon by defendant, turned primarily upon whether or not the defendant in a criminal proceeding in the state court of Missouri had waived his right to counsel where such conviction was urged as the basis for proceedings under the Second Offender Act, and whether a federal court habeas corpus proceeding could be entertained under the exhaustion doctrine. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission
green
2 sentences1957Alexander v. State Personnel Board, supra; Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 69 App.D.C. 166 , 99 F.2d 399 ; Red River Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission (Baxter, Intervener), 69 App.D.C. 1 , 98 F.2d 282 . 1957Alexander v. State Personnel Board, supra; Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 69 App.D.C. 166 , 99 F.2d 399 ; Red River Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission (Baxter, Intervener), 69 App.D.C. 1 , 98 F.2d 282 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.