71 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernongreen2 sentences2018In Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861 (1997), the Supreme Court considered the exhaustion doctrine in the context of a LUPA petition that followed public hearings before a city council. 2015The exhaustion rule "is founded upon the belief that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise ofjudges." Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City ofMount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861,866 , 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). | 4 | 10 |
Citizens for Mount Vernon v. Mount Vernongreen2 sentences2015The exhaustion rule "is founded upon the belief that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise ofjudges." Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City ofMount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861,866 , 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). 2013Id. ¶11 The exhaustion rule “is founded upon the belief that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise of judges.” Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861, 866 , 947 P.2d 1208 (1997) (citing S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984)). | 4 | 8 |
Chelan County v. Nykreimgreen2 sentences2025App. 2d at 458, see also Chelan County v. Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d 904, 937 , 52 P.3d 1 (2002). 9 Explaining why it chose to follow federal cases, the WUTC court noted that the Washington Supreme Court had cited to the D.C. 2014See also Knight, 173 Wn.2d at 336 (noting that LUPA's standing requirements, which include exhaustion of administrative remedies (RCW 36.70C.060(1 )(d), are jurisdictional) (citing Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d at 926 )). | 3 | 4 |
Knight v. City of Yelmgreen2 sentences2014See also Knight, 173 Wn.2d at 336 (noting that LUPA's standing requirements, which include exhaustion of administrative remedies (RCW 36.70C.060(1 )(d), are jurisdictional) (citing Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d at 926 )). 2014See also Knight, 173 Wn.2d at 336 (noting that LUPA’s standing requirements, which include exhaustion of administrative remedies (RCW 36- .70C.060(2)(d)), are jurisdictional (citing Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d at 926 )). ¶22 Accordingly, we hold that the superior court properly dismissed Durland’s petition in Durland I because there was no land use decision under LUPA and because Durland failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. | 3 | 3 |
Zylstra v. Pivagreen2 sentences1997See Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash.2d 743, 745 , 539 P.2d 823 (1975). 1997See Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash.2d 743, 745 , 539 P.2d 823 (1975). | 3 | 3 |
Estate of Friedman v. Pierce Countygreen2 sentences2014App. 141, 154 , 298 P.3d 110 (“A court may relieve a petitioner of the exhaustion requirement if exhaustion would be futile”), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1005 (2013); Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wn.2d 68, 74, 77 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989) (whether administrative remedies are futile is a question for the court and can be demonstrated by factual circumstances); see also RCW 34.05.534. 48 WAC 284-43-915(2), (3) (emphasis added). 2014App. 141, 154 , 298 P.3d 110 (“A court may relieve a petitioner of the exhaustion requirement if exhaustion would be futile”), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1005 (2013); Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wn.2d 68, 74, 77 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989) (whether administrative remedies are futile is a question for the court and can be demonstrated by factual circumstances); see also RCW 34.05.534. 48 WAC 284-43-915(2), (3) (emphasis added). | 2 | 7 |
West v. Stahleygreen2 sentences2014RCW 36.70C.020(2); see also West v. Stahley, 155 Wn. 2014RCW 36.70C.020(2); see also West v. Stahley, 155 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Albert A. Larche v. Mark Simons, Judge Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1998Larche v. Simons, 53 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). 1998Larche v. Simons, 53 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1995). | 2 | 2 |
| Phillip J. Harmon v. Charles Ryan, Wardengreen | 2 | 2 |
South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King Countygreen2 sentences2013Id. ¶11 The exhaustion rule “is founded upon the belief that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise of judges.” Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861, 866 , 947 P.2d 1208 (1997) (citing S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984)). 2013Id. ¶11 The exhaustion rule “is founded upon the belief that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise of judges.” Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861, 866 , 947 P.2d 1208 (1997) (citing S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984)). | 1 | 16 |
Beard v. King Countygreen2 sentences2021Rivin fails to demonstrate following the administrative process would have been futile. 22 Presbytery of Seattle, 114 Wn.2d at 338 . 23 Beard v. King County, 76 Wn. 1996See e.g., Beard v. King County, 76 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
Chaney v. Fetterlygreen2 sentences2013Chaney concluded that as a result, the exhaustion rule does not apply “when a superior court and a quasi-judicial administrative agency have concurrent original jurisdiction.” Id. at 141. 2013Chaney concluded that, as a result, the exhaustion rule does not apply "when a superior court and a quasi-judicial administrative agency have concurrent original jurisdiction." Id. at 141 . | 1 | 2 |
Phillips v. King Countygreen2 sentences2012Phillips v. King County, 87 Wn. 1998Phillips, 87 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
| Heck v. Humphreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ward v. Board of Skagit County Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Department of Ecologygreen | 1 | 1 |
| King County v. Washington State Boundary Review Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffey v. City of Walla Wallagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel's Furniture, Inc. v. Department of Ecologygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brotherton v. Jefferson Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wright v. Woodardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orion Corporation v. State
green
2 sentences2011Under Orion Corp. v. State, 103 *764 Wn.2d 441, 456-57, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) (Orion I), the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to (1) [e]nsure against premature interruption of the administrative process, (2) allow the agency to develop the necessary factual background on which to base a decision, (3) allow the exercise of agency expertise, (4) provide a more efficient process and allow the agency to correct its own mistake, and (5) insure that individuals are not encouraged to ignore administrative procedures by resort to the courts. 1995"The futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine is premised upon the rationale that courts will not require vain and useless acts.” Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 458 , 693 P.2d 1369 (1985). | 5 | 1988–2021 |
McKart v. United States
green
2 sentences2014S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73-74 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 , 89 S. Ct. 1657 , 23 L. 2014S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73-74 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 , 89 S. Ct. 1657 , 23 L. | 4 | 1986–2014 |
Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2012This argument also fails. ¶35 The South Hollywood Hills court generally stated, “[I]f the party is challenging the constitutionality of the agency’s action or of the agency itself, the exhaustion requirement will be waived.” 101 Wn.2d at 74 (citing Ackerley Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 905 , 602 P.2d 1177 (1979)). 2012This argument also fails. ¶35 The South Hollywood Hills court generally stated, “[I]f the party is challenging the constitutionality of the agency’s action or of the agency itself, the exhaustion requirement will be waived.” 101 Wn.2d at 74 (citing Ackerley Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 905 , 602 P.2d 1177 (1979)). | 4 | 1984–2012 |
Smith v. Bates Technical College
green
2 sentences2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wash.2d 887, 907 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976). 2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wn.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Emps. | 4 | 2003–2010 |
Smith v. Bates Technical College
green
2 sentences2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wash.2d 887, 907 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976). 2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wn.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Emps. | 4 | 2003–2010 |
Stafne v. Snohomish County
green
2 sentences2025While there are limited exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine—futility, patently inadequate remedies, or irreparable harm—a “strong bias exists toward requiring parties to follow the statutorily prescribed administrative path before resorting to the courts.” Stafne, 174 Wn.2d at 34-35 . 2025In view of the significant policies favoring the exhaustion requirement, the 10 No. 86814-4-I/11 futility exception is “narrowly applied.” Id. at 34-35 . | 3 | 2015–2025 |
Buechler v. Wenatchee Valley College
green
2 sentences2014App. 141, 154 , 298 P.3d 110 (“A court may relieve a petitioner of the exhaustion requirement if exhaustion would be futile”), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1005 (2013); Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wn.2d 68, 74, 77 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989) (whether administrative remedies are futile is a question for the court and can be demonstrated by factual circumstances); see also RCW 34.05.534. 48 WAC 284-43-915(2), (3) (emphasis added). 2014App. 141, 154 , 298 P.3d 110 ("A court may relieve a petitioner of the exhaustion requirement if exhaustion would be futile."), review denied. 178Wn.2d 1005 (2013); Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County. 112 Wn.2d 68, 74, 77 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989) (whether administrative remedies are futile is a question for the court and can be demonstrated by factual circumstances); see also RCW 34.05.534. 17 No. 69848-6-1/18 commissioner's own public statements of his limited authority, the statutes and regulations provide no mechanism for him to actively regulate a nonprofit insurer's excessive surplus. | 3 | 2014–2025 |
State v. Tacoma-Pierce County Multiple Listing Service
green
2 sentences2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches. 2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches. | 3 | 1986–2021 |
Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau
green
2 sentences2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wash.2d 887, 907 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976). 2010Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 808 , 991 P.2d 1135 (2000); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. Wash. Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wash.2d 887, 907 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976). | 3 | 1987–2010 |
Payne v. Texas
green
2 sentences1987We also recognize that in Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 905 , 602 P.2d 1177 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 804 (1980) our Supreme Court declined to apply this exception to the exhaustion rule where a party affirmatively sought declaratory or injunctive relief. 1985See, e.g., Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743 , 539 P.2d 823 (1975) (exhaustion not required where appeal would be futile); Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 905 , 602 P.2d 1177 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 804 , 66 L. | 3 | 1984–1987 |
Cost Management Services, Inc. v. City of Lakewood
green
2 sentences2025Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wn.2d 635, 642 , 310 P.3d 804 (2013) (One purpose underlying the exhaustion rule is to “insure against premature interruption of the administrative process.”). 2025Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wn.2d 635, 642 , 310 P.3d 804 (2013) (One purpose underlying the exhaustion rule is to “insure against premature interruption of the administrative process.”). | 2 | 2017–2025 |
Durland v. San Juan County
green
2 sentences2025Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 68 , 340 P.3d 191 (2014) (quoting S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73-74 , 677 P.2d 114 -8- No. 87084-0-I/9 (1984). 2025Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 68 , 340 P.3d 191 (2014) (quoting S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73-74 , 677 P.2d 114 -8- No. 87084-0-I/9 (1984). | 2 | 2018–2025 |
Presbytery of Seattle v. King County
green
2 sentences2021An administrative remedy is patently inadequate when the administrative agency lacks any authority to make or enforce a decision 5 Id. (citing S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984)). 6 Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 458 , 693 P.2d 1369 (1985). 7 RCW 34.05.534(3). 8 Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 338 , 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (citing Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wn.2d 68, 74 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989)), abrogated on other grounds by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 651 , 451 P.3d 675 (2019), abrogated by Yi 2021An administrative remedy is patently inadequate when the administrative agency lacks any authority to make or enforce a decision 5 Id. (citing S. Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King County, 101 Wn.2d 68, 73 , 677 P.2d 114 (1984)). 6 Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 458 , 693 P.2d 1369 (1985). 7 RCW 34.05.534(3). 8 Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 338 , 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (citing Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wn.2d 68, 74 , 768 P.2d 462 (1989)), abrogated on other grounds by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 651 , 451 P.3d 675 (2019), abrogated by Yi | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Harrington v. Spokane County
green
2 sentences2013Harrington v. Spokane County, 128 Wn. 2013Harrington v. Spokane County, 128 Wn. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Prisk v. City of Poulsbo
green
2 sentences2005Prisk, 46 Wn. 2005Prisk, 46 Wash.App. at 798 , 732 P.2d 1013 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Dils v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2005Dils v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 51 Wn. 2005Dils v. Labor & Industries, 51 Wash.App. 216, 219 , 752 P.2d 1357 (1988). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Snedigar v. Hoddersen
green
2 sentences2004App. at 822 (quoting Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 165 ). 2004Right-Price, 105 Wash.App. at 822 , 21 P.3d 1157 (quoting Snedigar, 114 Wash.2d at 165 , 786 P.2d 781 ). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Right-Price Recreation, L.L.C. v. Connells Prairie Community Council
green
2 sentences2004To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, “the party seeking discovery must make a ‘reasonably explicit’ showing that every reasonable alternative source of information has been exhausted.” Right-Price, 105 Wn. 2004Right-Price, 105 Wash.App. at 822 , 21 P.3d 1157 (quoting Snedigar, 114 Wash.2d at 165 , 786 P.2d 781 ). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Gardner v. Pierce County Board of Commissioners green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America green | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Chelan County v. Nykreim green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Simpson Tacoma Kraft Co. v. Department of Ecology green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Thun v. City of Bonney Lake green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Credit General Insurance v. Zewdu green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Chong Yim v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| City of Arlington v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| City of Arlington v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| IGI Resources, Inc. v. City of Pasco neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Smoke v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Smoke v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Marley v. Department of Labor & Industries green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Weinberger v. Salfi green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Janet Belczyk Cunningham v. Railroad Retirement Board green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. J.P. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. JP green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Spokoiny v. Washington State Youth Soccer Ass'n green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Durland v. San Juan County green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Porter v. Nussle green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.