exhaustion requirement in Iowa

1985Before an exhaustion requirement can be imposed, two conditions must be met: “An administrative remedy must exist for the claimed wrong, and the statutes must expressly or impliedly require that remedy to be exhausted before resort to the courts.” Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Company, 230 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Iowa 1975).

1985The exhaustion rule is inapplicable unless two conditions are met: “An administrative remedy must exist for the claimed wrong, and the statutes must expressly or impliedly require that remedy to be exhausted before resort to the courts.” Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Iowa 1975).

2014Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Iowa 2013) (“The exhaustion requirement in section 17A.19 ‘has several purposes, including honoring agency expertise, handling matters within an agency and not in the courts, and preserving precious judicial resources.’ ” (quoting IES Utils., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996))).

2014Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179,189 (Iowa 2013) (“The exhaustion requirement in section 17A.19 ‘has several purposes, including honoring agency expertise, handling matters within an agency and not in the courts, and preserving precious judicial resources.’” (quoting IES Utils., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996))).

2019Bonilla further argues that his case fits within the exception to the exhaustion requirement for situations "when the administrative remedy is inadequate or its pursuit would be fruitless." Riley v. Boxa , 542 N.W.2d 519 , 521 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Alberhasky v. City of Iowa City , 433 N.W.2d 693 , 695 (Iowa 1988) ).

2019Additionally, there is an exception to the exhaustion requirement for a clear showing of substantial dimension that "irreparable injury resulting from following the administrative process would make judicial review of final agency action an inadequate remedy." Riley , 542 N.W.2d at 522 (quoting Salsbury Labs. v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl.

2017Looking to the underlying principles of the exhaustion doctrine, we found it inappropriate to invoke it, as doing so would not “avoid interference with the administrative process.” See id.

2017Looking to the underlying principles of the exhaustion doctrine, we found it inappropriate to invoke it, as doing so would not “avoid interference with the administrative process.” See id.

2001Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192-93 , 105 S.Ct. at 3119-20 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 142-43 (citations omitted).

2001Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192-93 , 105 S.Ct. at 3119-20 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 142-43 (citations omitted).

2017Wells resisted, claiming it was entitled to proceed under the “futility exception” as the exhaustion doctrine “has never been thought to be absolute.” Salsbury Labs., 276 N.W.2d at 837 .

1993While “irreparable harm” may obviate the exhaustion requirement under Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act, id., and under the federal act, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331-32 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 901 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 31 (1976), McManus does not claim irreparable harm.

2014Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Iowa 2013) (“The exhaustion requirement in section 17A.19 ‘has several purposes, including honoring agency expertise, handling matters within an agency and not in the courts, and preserving precious judicial resources.’ ” (quoting IES Utils., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996))).

2014Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179,189 (Iowa 2013) (“The exhaustion requirement in section 17A.19 ‘has several purposes, including honoring agency expertise, handling matters within an agency and not in the courts, and preserving precious judicial resources.’” (quoting IES Utils., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996))).

2019Bonilla further argues that his case fits within the exception to the exhaustion requirement for situations "when the administrative remedy is inadequate or its pursuit would be fruitless." Riley v. Boxa , 542 N.W.2d 519 , 521 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Alberhasky v. City of Iowa City , 433 N.W.2d 693 , 695 (Iowa 1988) ).

1999Alberhasky v. City of Iowa City, 433 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1988).

2017Keokuk Cty. v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1999).

2017Keokuk Cty. v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1999).

1988Although approving the rule, we held that the plaintiff was still faced with the exhaustion requirement because he had challenged the ordinance “as applied,” not “on its face.” Matters, 219 N.W.2d at 720 .

1979Salsbury refers to this situation as “a time-honored exception to the exhaustion doctrine.” We approved this “emerging rule” in Matters v. City of Ames, 219 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Iowa 1974), a pre-IAPA case.

2026“The exhaustion doctrine applies when (1) an adequate administrative remedy exists, and (2) the governing statute requires the remedy to be exhausted before allowing judicial review.” Shors v. Johnson, 581 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa 1998).

2017“The exhaustion doctrine applies when (1) an adequate administrative remedy exists, and (2) the governing statute requires the remedy to be exhausted before allowing judicial review.” Id.

2026Two conditions must be satisfied before imposing an exhaustion requirement: “(1) an administrative remedy exists for the claimed wrong; and (2) the involved statute expressly or impliedly 7 requires the remedy to be exhausted before resorting to the courts.” Pruess Elevator, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Res., 477 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1991).

2026Pruess Elevator, Inc., 477 N.W.2d at 677 .

2017See Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 145 (“We have noted that the doctrine requiring a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies ‘is designed to promote orderly procedures within the judicial system by requiring a preliminary administrative sifting process.’ ” (quoting Charles Gabus Ford, 224 N.W.2d at 648 )).

2017See Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 145 (“We have noted that the doctrine requiring a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies ‘is designed to promote orderly procedures within the judicial system by requiring a preliminary administrative sifting process.’ ” (quoting Charles Gabus Ford, 224 N.W.2d at 648 )).

1992As we recognized in Shell Oil Co. v. Bair, 417 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1987), “where the constitutional issues sought to be raised directly affects a matter pending before an agency, administrative exhaustion should ordinarily precede a judicial inquiry into the statute’s validity.” We see no reason to depart from that requirement here.

1988In Shell Oil Co. v. Bair, we required exhaustion whether the constitutional challenge was to the ordinance “as applied” or “on its face,” as long as the constitutional issue affected a matter pending before an agency. 417 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1987).

2026The purpose of the presentment requirement and related administrative processes is to “allow a prompt investigation of claims against the State and facilitate an early settlement when possible.” Id. (quoting In re Est. of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1996)).

2017In Voss, we questioned whether the rule “that a plaintiff must have the capacity to sue in order to commence and maintain an action in district court . . . appl[ied] to claims filed with the State Appeal Board.” 553 N.W.2d at 880 .

2026He points to differences between the temporary incapacity benefits guaranteed by statute and the less-robust 8 disability rights provided in the contract, arguing “[t]here is nothing in the [collective bargaining agreement] that allows a trooper to be paid his full fixed pay and allowances while on leave.” He also relies on Hornby v. State, 559 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 1997), arguing that case recognized an exception to the exhaustion requirement for employees suing for benefits under chapter 91A.

1999See Hornby v. State, 559 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Iowa 1997); Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Iowa 1987).

2017We note, however, that this view is consistent with the vast majority of federal courts interpreting the FTCA; these courts similarly distinguish between presentment under 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) and claims processing under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 . 3 See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901 , 918–19 (D.C.

2017We note, however, that this view is consistent with the vast majority of federal courts interpreting the FTCA; these courts similarly distinguish between presentment under 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) and claims processing under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 . 3 See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901 , 918–19 (D.C.

1996In Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1987), we considered the exhaustion rule and stated: Where a contested case procedure envisioned by section 17A.12 has been undertaken and has run its course to conclusion, it is almost axiomatic that any further challenge to the action taken or confirmed by the final agency decision may only be asserted by proper petition for judicial review under section 17A.19.

1996In Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1987), we considered the exhaustion rule and stated: Where a contested case procedure envisioned by section 17A.12 has been undertaken and has run its course to conclusion, it is almost axiomatic that any further challenge to the action taken or confirmed by the final agency decision may only be asserted by proper petition for judicial review under section 17A.19.

1996In the following limited situations, we have allowed a litigant to bypass the exhaustion requirement: (1) plaintiff challenges, by way of judicial revieiv under Ioiva Code section 17A. 19, an agency action as in violation of the rulemak-ing procedures set forth under the APA, see Lundy, 376 N.W.2d at 894 ; (2) plaintiff claims an adequate administrative remedy does not exist for the claimed wrong, see Rowen v. LeMars Mut.

1996In the following limited situations, we have allowed a litigant to bypass the exhaustion requirement: (1) plaintiff challenges, by way of judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19, an agency action as in violation of the rulemaking procedures set forth under the APA, see Lundy, 376 N.W.2d at 894 ; (2) plaintiff claims an adequate administrative remedy does not exist for the claimed wrong, see Rowen v. LeMars Mut.

1979“Ordinarily an administrative remedy must be exhausted before courts will intervene to grant relief.” City of Council Bluffs v. Pottawattamie County, 254 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa 1977) (citing cases). *662 That decision reiterated, id., our holding in Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Iowa 1975), that the exhaustion rule does not control unless two conditions are present.

1979“Ordinarily an administrative remedy must be exhausted before courts will intervene to grant relief.” City of Council Bluffs v. Pottawattamie County, 254 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa 1977) (citing cases). *662 That decision reiterated, id., our holding in Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Iowa 1975), that the exhaustion rule does not control unless two conditions are present.

1983We formulated the exhaustion requirement in its skeletal form in Oliver v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 1971).

1983We formulated the exhaustion requirement in its skeletal form in Oliver v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 1971).

2026As in that case, the policy here contained an exhaustion clause that essentially required prior litigation to conclude before the carrier had to pay—“We will pay under [the underinsured motorist] coverage only after the limits of liability under any bodily injury bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlement.” Cf. Nicodemus, 612 N.W.2d at 786 (“We are not obligated to make any payment under this insurance until the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident have been exhausted by payment

2026Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2017). 10 Part of the exhaustion requirement is “presentment,” meaning the “plaintiff must first present the claim to the appropriate administrative body.” Id.

2026Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2017). 10 Part of the exhaustion requirement is “presentment,” meaning the “plaintiff must first present the claim to the appropriate administrative body.” Id.

2025Bugely v. State, 464 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1991).

2023See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997).

2019Convenience Stores, 560 S.W.3d at 401 (“A vague or circumscribed EEOC charge cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement for claims it does not fairly embrace.”).

2019Convenience Stores , 560 S.W.3d at 401 ("A vague or circumscribed EEOC charge cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement for claims it does not fairly embrace.").