19 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daily Advertiser v. TRANS-LA, ETC.green2 sentences2024The supreme court then noted that " when the interpretation of [an agency' s] orders or regulations is at issue, Louisiana courts have invoked the exhaustion rule, requiring that until the plaintiff has exhausted his available remedies before the 13 agency], he cannot resort to the courts." Id. 2024“The distinction between primary jurisdiction and the exhaustion rule (exclusive jurisdiction) is that primary jurisdiction applies when concurrent jurisdiction exists between the courts and the administrative agency; and the exhaustion rule applies when exclusive jurisdiction exists in the administrative agency, and the courts have only appellate, as opposed to original, jurisdiction to review the agency’s decisions.” Id. 4 Contrary to the majority opinion, I do not find the inclusion of Subsection (D) in this statute prohibits a finding that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction. | 3 | 6 |
Strate v. A-1 Contractorsgreen2 sentences2007It also does not apply “[w]hen ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S.Ct. 1245 , 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) ]‘s main rule,” and the exhaustion requirement “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 , 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, fn. 14 , 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). 2007It also does not apply “[w]hen ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S.Ct. 1245 , 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) ]‘s main rule,” and the exhaustion requirement “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 , 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, fn. 14 , 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). | 1 | 3 |
Drumm v. Browngreen2 sentences2008Id. at 57. 2007See Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 01-1256 (7/17/03), 265 Wis.2d 64 , 665 N.W.2d 899 ; Drumm v. Brown, 15809 (7/28/98), 245 Conn. 657 , 716 A.2d 50 ; and Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, C6-95-279 (Minn:App.8/l/95), 535 N.W.2d 379 . | 1 | 2 |
Polk v. STATE EX REL. DOTDgreen1 sentence2014Polk v. State, through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 538 So.2d 239, 250 (La.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Iowa Mutual Insurance v. LaPlantegreen2 sentences2008First, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the "alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement." Id. at 19 , 107 S.Ct. at 978 (the Court further stated that an incompetence exception "would be contrary to the congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts"). 2008First, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the "alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement." Id. at 19 , 107 S.Ct. at 978 (the Court further stated that an incompetence exception "would be contrary to the congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts"). | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. BAD RIVER CHIPPEWA INDIANSgreen2 sentences2007See Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 01-1256 (7/17/03), 265 Wis.2d 64 , 665 N.W.2d 899 ; Drumm v. Brown, 15809 (7/28/98), 245 Conn. 657 , 716 A.2d 50 ; and Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, C6-95-279 (Minn:App.8/l/95), 535 N.W.2d 379 . 2007See Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 01-1256 (7/17/03), 265 Wis.2d 64 , 665 N.W.2d 899 ; Drumm v. Brown, 15809 (7/28/98), 245 Conn. 657 , 716 A.2d 50 ; and Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, C6-95-279 (Minn:App.8/l/95), 535 N.W.2d 379 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. TSOSIEgreen2 sentences2004Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.2000) ("Where applicable, this prudential doctrine has force whether or not an action actually is pending in a tribal court."); United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037 , 1041 (10th Cir.1996) ("The exhaustion rule does not require an action to be pending in a *995 tribal court."); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see generally Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion Abstention Doctrine, 80 Marq. 2004Tsosie, 92 F.3d at 1042; see also Crawford, 947 F.2d at 1407 ; Ninigret Dev. | 1 | 1 |
BRENDALE v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION Et Al.green2 sentences2004Accord, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427, n. 10 , 109 S.Ct. 2994, 3006, n. 10 , 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (opinion of White, J.). 2004Accord, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427, n. 10 , 109 S.Ct. 2994, 3006, n. 10 , 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (opinion of White, J.). | 1 | 1 |
Wyoming v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004Accord, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427, n. 10 , 109 S.Ct. 2994, 3006, n. 10 , 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (opinion of White, J.). | 1 | 1 |
Jess Wesley Crawford Diane Laplante Rodney Lane v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc. Echlin, Inc.green2 sentences2004Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.2000) ("Where applicable, this prudential doctrine has force whether or not an action actually is pending in a tribal court."); United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037 , 1041 (10th Cir.1996) ("The exhaustion rule does not require an action to be pending in a *995 tribal court."); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see generally Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion Abstention Doctrine, 80 Marq. 2004Tsosie, 92 F.3d at 1042; see also Crawford, 947 F.2d at 1407 ; Ninigret Dev. | 1 | 1 |
Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authoritygreen1 sentence2004Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.2000) ("Where applicable, this prudential doctrine has force whether or not an action actually is pending in a tribal court."); United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037 , 1041 (10th Cir.1996) ("The exhaustion rule does not require an action to be pending in a *995 tribal court."); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see generally Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion Abstention Doctrine, 80 Marq. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vanderpoolgreen1 sentence1999See, State v. Vanderpool, 493 So.2d at 575 . | 1 | 1 |
Florida Power Corp. v. Zenith Industries Co.green1 sentence1993See Zenith, supra . *27 The distinction between primary jurisdiction and the exhaustion rule (exclusive jurisdiction) is that primary jurisdiction applies when concurrent jurisdiction exists between the courts and the administrative agency; and the exhaustion rule applies when exclusive jurisdiction exists in the administrative agency, and the courts have only appellate, as opposed to original, jurisdiction to review the agency's decisions. | 1 | 1 |
Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Southern Cities Distributing Co.green1 sentence1993Moreover, we note that when the interpretation of commission orders or regulations is at issue, Louisiana courts have invoked the exhaustion rule, requiring that "until the plaintiff has exhausted his available remedies before the commission, he cannot resort to the courts." Shreveport Laundries, 147 So. at 57 (collecting cases); see also Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., 329 So.2d 719, 722 (La. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Bruce Penny and James Penny v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oilgreen1 sentence1993Magnolia Coal, 576 So.2d at 487-88 (Dennis, J. concurring) (citing 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.1 (2d Ed.1983) (" Davis ")). | 1 | 1 |
Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporationgreen1 sentence1993Moreover, we note that when the interpretation of commission orders or regulations is at issue, Louisiana courts have invoked the exhaustion rule, requiring that "until the plaintiff has exhausted his available remedies before the commission, he cannot resort to the courts." Shreveport Laundries, 147 So. at 57 (collecting cases); see also Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., 329 So.2d 719, 722 (La. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Capitol House Preserv. v. Perryman Consult
neutral
2 sentences2020App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02), 836 So. 2d 680 , writs denied, 2003-0323, 2003-0324 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So. 2d 794 , 795. 2015Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 ; Capitol House Preservation Company, L.L.C. v. Perryman Consultants, Inc., 01-2524 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02) , 836 So.2d 680, 685 , writs denied, 03-0323, 03-0324 (La.4/21/03), 841 So.2d 794 , 795. | 3 | 2013–2020 |
Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co.
neutral
2 sentences2020App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02), 836 So. 2d 680 , writs denied, 2003-0323, 2003-0324 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So. 2d 794 , 795. 2015Daily Advertiser, 612 So.2d at 27 ; Capitol House Preservation Company, L.L.C. v. Perryman Consultants, Inc., 01-2524 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02) , 836 So.2d 680, 685 , writs denied, 03-0323, 03-0324 (La.4/21/03), 841 So.2d 794 , 795. | 3 | 2013–2020 |
McKart v. United States
green
2 sentences1989“Application of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purpose and of the particular administrative scheme involved.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 , 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). 1989“Application of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purpose and of the particular administrative scheme involved.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 , 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Haygood v. Dies
neutral
1 sentence2014Id.; Haygood v. Dies, 47,765, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 114 So.3d 1206, 1214 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bailey v. American Sugar Refinery
neutral
1 sentence2008Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 , 85 S.Ct. 614 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Bailey v. American Sugar Refinery, 342 So.2d 1268 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ not cons., 345 So.2d 60 (1977). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox
green
2 sentences2008Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 , 85 S.Ct. 614 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Bailey v. American Sugar Refinery, 342 So.2d 1268 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ not cons., 345 So.2d 60 (1977). 2008Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 , 85 S.Ct. 614 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Bailey v. American Sugar Refinery, 342 So.2d 1268 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ not cons., 345 So.2d 60 (1977). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008Rather, the court found that under federal law, "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Id. at 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Rogers
neutral
1 sentence2008Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 , 85 S.Ct. 614 , 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Bailey v. American Sugar Refinery, 342 So.2d 1268 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ not cons., 345 So.2d 60 (1977). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
C & L Enterprises Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2007In C & L Enterprises, 532 U.S. 411 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 , 149 L.Ed.2d 628 , the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause which provided for enforcement of any arbitration award in accordance with the laws of Oklahoma waived sovereign immunity; however, the Court specifically noted that authority to waive sovereign immunity was not at issue. 2007In C & L Enterprises, 532 U.S. 411 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 , 149 L.Ed.2d 628 , the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause which provided for enforcement of any arbitration award in accordance with the laws of Oklahoma waived sovereign immunity; however, the Court specifically noted that authority to waive sovereign immunity was not at issue. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store
green
1 sentence2007See Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 01-1256 (7/17/03), 265 Wis.2d 64 , 665 N.W.2d 899 ; Drumm v. Brown, 15809 (7/28/98), 245 Conn. 657 , 716 A.2d 50 ; and Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, C6-95-279 (Minn:App.8/l/95), 535 N.W.2d 379 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Montana v. United States
green
2 sentences2007It also does not apply “[w]hen ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S.Ct. 1245 , 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) ]‘s main rule,” and the exhaustion requirement “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 , 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, fn. 14 , 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). 2007It also does not apply “[w]hen ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S.Ct. 1245 , 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) ]‘s main rule,” and the exhaustion requirement “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 , 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, fn. 14 , 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
green
2 sentences2004In its opinion, the Court indicated that the notion of exhaustion of tribal remedies was not a function of jurisdiction but rather was a function of comity, similar to the abstention doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 , 96 S.Ct. 1236 , 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976): As the Court's directions on remand in National Farmers Union indicate, the exhaustion rule enunciated in National Farmers Union did not deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2004In its opinion, the Court indicated that the notion of exhaustion of tribal remedies was not a function of jurisdiction but rather was a function of comity, similar to the abstention doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 , 96 S.Ct. 1236 , 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976): As the Court's directions on remand in National Farmers Union indicate, the exhaustion rule enunciated in National Farmers Union did not deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Star Ent. v. State Through Dept. of Rev.
green
1 sentence1997R.S. 49:963 and had no authority to apply the declaratory judgment provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, as these provisions only apply when the trial court is sitting as a trial court, not as an appellate court. [8] We note that, although LIRC issued an Order to Show Cause against LMIC, LIRC voted to set aside the order on June 26, 1995. [1] We note that when a constitutional attack is properly made and addressed, this exhaustion requirement may not be necessary. [2] The Star Enterprise court stated, 676 So.2d at 833 , We now consider the Department's argument that the trial co | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Moore v. Roemer
green
1 sentence1993Penny v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 906 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1990). [31] Concurrent jurisdiction exists in the district courts to adjudicate all legal matters, "except for those matters in which original jurisdiction is `otherwise authorized' by the constitution itself in other courts or in other adjudicative tribunals." Moore, 567 So.2d at 79 (citing La. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.