exhaustion principle in South Dakota

2005We conclude that the answer is no because the Department did not have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret tax statutes, and absent a request for a tax refund, the administrative remedies were not mandated. [¶9.] We begin the exhaustion analysis by noting that South Dakota’s Declaratory Judgment Act “permits [circuit courts to make a] declaration of legal rights or relations before an actual injury occurs.” Boever v. South Dakota Bd. of Accountancy, 526 NW2d 747, 749 (SD 1995).

2005We conclude that the answer is no because the Department did not have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret tax statutes, and absent a request for a tax refund, the administrative remedies were not mandated. [¶ 9.] We begin the exhaustion analysis by noting that South Dakota’s Declaratory Judgment Act “permits [circuit courts to make a] declaration of legal rights or relations before an actual injury occurs.” Boever v. South Dakota Bd. of Accountancy, 526 N.W.2d 747, 749 (S.D.1995).

2005And, as it relates to the question of primary jurisdiction, SDCL 15-6-57 specifically provides that “[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” Therefore, as we stated in an earlier tax dispute, “[a] request for declaratory relief [to interpret taxation statutes] may be allowed even when another adequate remedy exists.” Agar School Dist. v. McGee, 527 NW2d 282, 287 (SD 1995) ( Agar I ). [4] [¶10.] The Department, however, contends that two specific provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act req

2005And, as it relates to the question of primary jurisdiction, SDCL 15-6-57 specifically provides that “[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” Therefore, as we stated in an earlier tax dispute, “[a] request for declaratory relief [to interpret taxation statutes] may be allowed even when another adequate remedy exists.” Agar School Dist. v. McGee, 527 N.W.2d 282, 287 (S.D.1995) (Agar 7). 4 [¶ 10.] The Department, however, contends that two specific provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act require admi

2018We concluded exhaustion was *327 not required because of the "constitutional questions" and the "showing of the inadequacy of administrative relief and impending irreparable harm flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed administrative procedures[.]" Id. at 532 , 223 N.W.2d at 504 . [¶24.] Dollar Loan's case does not qualify for the exhaustion exception applied in Mordhorst .

2018We concluded exhaustion was *327 not required because of the "constitutional questions" and the "showing of the inadequacy of administrative relief and impending irreparable harm flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed administrative procedures[.]" Id. at 532 , 223 N.W.2d at 504 . [¶24.] Dollar Loan's case does not qualify for the exhaustion exception applied in Mordhorst .

2018To conclude otherwise and allow Dollar Loan to appeal before the hearing would subvert these essential purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. [¶21.] Dollar Loan, however, argues it is entitled to the exhaustion exception recognized in South Dakota Board of Regents v. Heege , 428 N.W.2d 535 , 539 (S.D. 1988) : "Exhaustion is not required where the board having appropriate jurisdiction has improperly made a decision prior to a hearing or is so biased that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be had." Dollar Loan contends the exception applies here because exhaustion "at this point would be an exerc

2018To conclude otherwise and allow Dollar Loan to appeal before the hearing would subvert these essential purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. [¶21.] Dollar Loan, however, argues it is entitled to the exhaustion exception recognized in South Dakota Board of Regents v. Heege , 428 N.W.2d 535 , 539 (S.D. 1988) : "Exhaustion is not required where the board having appropriate jurisdiction has improperly made a decision prior to a hearing or is so biased that a fair and impartial hearing cannot be had." Dollar Loan contends the exception applies here because exhaustion "at this point would be an exerc

1985“The exhaustion principle divides largely into two doctrines, (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies and (2) primary jurisdiction.” Gottschalk, 89 S.D. at 93 , 228 N.W.2d at 642 .

1985“The exhaustion principle divides largely into two doctrines, (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies and (2) primary jurisdiction.” Gottschalk, 89 S.D. at 93 , 228 N.W.2d at 642 .

1977“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies holds an important position in our scheme of laws, allowing the agency an opportunity to exercise its discretion, apply its expertise, or, * * * make a factual record upon which to base subsequent judicial review.” Delzer Construction Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 908, 909 (8th Cir. 1973), as quoted in Gottschalk, supra. As this court noted in Mordhorst v. Egert, S.D., 223 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1975), Professor Davis suggests that the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine be determined by weighing certain factors: The key factors are three:

1975In the recent case of Delzer Construction Co. v. United States, 1973, 8 Cir,, 487 F.2d 908 , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said: “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies holds an -important position in pur scheme of laws, *94 allowing the agency an opportunity to exercise its discretion, apply its expertise, or, relevantly here, make a factual record upon which to base subsequent judicial review, (citations omitted) Appellees claim that their livelihood is . being stripped from them in violation of their due process rights, yet they have not carried, through to the hearing

1997Generally, one is not required to exhaust administrative remedies if “a party is not mandated or required to proceed administratively and a separate avenue of judicial review is available.” In re Petree, 520 N.W.2d 610, 612 (S.D.1994)(citing Sioux Valley Hosp.