exhaustion requirement in Texas

2022In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27 - 28 (holding counsel’s obligations in parental termination cases extend through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court).

2022In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28 (holding counsel’s obligations in parental termination cases extend through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court).

2005In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.2004), the Texas Supreme Court, in addressing whether certain provisions of the Tort Claims Act [3] were jurisdictional, distinguished a statutory presentment provision from a statutory exhaustion of remedies provision, noting that an exhaustion requirement seeks to ensure that "the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute—the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute." Id. at 361 (citing Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.1998)).

2005In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v. Loutzen-hiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.2004), the Texas Supreme Court, in addressing whether certain provisions of the Tort Claims Act 3 were jurisdictional, distinguished a statutory presentment provision from a statutory exhaustion of remedies provision, noting that an exhaustion requirement seeks to ensure that “the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute — the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute.” Id. at 361 (citing Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.1998)).

2004The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in analyzing sections 21.201, 21.202, 21.208, and 21.256 of the Labor Code, has determined, “To comply with the exhaustion requirement under the [TCHRA], an aggrieved employee must do the following: (1) file with the Texas Commission on Human Rights . . . ; (2) allow the Commission 180 days to dismiss or resolve the complaint before filing suit; and (3) file suit in district court no later than two years after the complaint is filed with the Commission.” City of Houston v. Fletcher , 63 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2004The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in analyzing sections 21.201, 21.202, 21.208, and 21.256 of the Labor Code, has determined, “To comply with the exhaustion requirement under the [TCHRA], an aggrieved employee must do the following: (1) file with the Texas Commission on Human Rights ...; (2) allow the Commission 180 days to dismiss or resolve the complaint before filing suit; and (3) file suit in district court no later than two years after the complaint is filed with the Commission.” City of Houston v. Fletcher, 63 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2025See Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006) (concluding that when “an administrative body has exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial determination in a dispute, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the decision,” so “[u]ntil the party has satisfied this exhaustion requirement, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).

2020Until the party has satisfied this exhaustion requirement, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss those claims without prejudice to refiling.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006)).

2009Id. (citing Vela , 69 S.W.3d at 701-02 ). [12] The court pointed out that workplace discrimination is governed by a separate body of federal and state law.

2009Id. (citing Vela, 69 S.W.3d at 701-02 ). 12 The court pointed *130 out that workplace discrimination is governed by a separate body of federal and state law.

2022“The exhaustion doctrine serves as a timing mechanism to ensure that the administrative process runs its course.” See City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013).

2016However, we have stated multiple times, and most recently in Clint ISD, that the exhaustion requirement "does not deprive parties of their legal rights.” Clint ISD, 487 S.W.3d at 544; accord Rhule, 417 S.W.3d at 442 ; see Tex. Educ.

2011Corp., 321 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (applying the exhaustion doctrine to disputes regarding compensability, the extent of injury, medical necessity, and delay in reimbursing medical expenses or delay in the preauthorization of medical care); see also Stinson, 286 S.W.3d at 84-85 ; Bestor v. Service Lloyds Ins.

2011Corp. , 321 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (applying the exhaustion doctrine to disputes regarding compensability, the extent of injury, medical necessity, and delay in reimbursing medical expenses or delay in the preauthorization of medical care); see also Stinson , 286 S.W.3d at 84-85 ; Bestor v. Service Lloyds Ins.

2015See Lindsay v. Sterling, 690 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. 1985).

2015The exhaustion doctrine does not apply here ...................................... 11 PRAYER ............................................................................................................. 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 13 Appellant’s Reply Brief Page ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES Hawkins v. Community Health Choice, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig.proceeding) ......2, 7, 8, 9 , 10 Janek v.

2021Id.

2008Subaru of Am. v. David McDavid Nissan, 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002). *553 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v. Duenez, 201 S.W.3d 674, 675 (Tex.2006).

2014In brief, “to comply with this exhaustion requirement [under the TCHRA], an employee must: 1) file a complaint with the TCHR [or EEOC] within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act; 2) allow the TCHR [or EEOC] to dismiss the complaint or resolve the complaint within 180 days before filing suit; and 3) file suit no later than two years after the complaint is filed.” Rice v. Russell-Stanley, L.P., 131 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied); see also Tex.Lab.Code Ann. §§ 21.201, 21.202, 21.208, 21.256 (West 2006).

2010Rice v. Russell-Stanley, L.P ., 131 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App. Waco 2004, pet. denied); see Tex. Lab.

2019Compare Jedkins v. Varghese, No. 14-08-00895-CV, 2009 WL 5149877 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“Inmate complaints about actions of TDCJ employees are subject to the grievance procedure.”), with Leachman, 261 S.W.3d at 312 (“[B]ecause [Harris County assistant district attorney] Oncken was not a TDCJ employee, the exhaustion requirement addressed above does not apply.”). 16 employees.

2018See Leachman, 261 S.W.3d at 311 (holding that, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate must file both a Step 1 and a Step 2 grievance against each defendant); see also Catland v. Blackwell, No. 13-16-00567-CV, 2017 WL 3725725 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

2016Compare Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. at 2393 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), with Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 , 741 n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 1819 , 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001).

2010“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).

2011Corp., 321 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (applying the exhaustion doctrine to disputes regarding compensability, the extent of injury, medical necessity, and delay in reimbursing medical expenses or delay in the preauthorization of medical care); see also Stinson, 286 S.W.3d at 84-85 ; Bestor v. Service Lloyds Ins.

2011Corp. , 321 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (applying the exhaustion doctrine to disputes regarding compensability, the extent of injury, medical necessity, and delay in reimbursing medical expenses or delay in the preauthorization of medical care); see also Stinson , 286 S.W.3d at 84-85 ; Bestor v. Service Lloyds Ins.

2011Co., 276 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet.); Schwartz v. Ins.

2011Co. , 276 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.); Schwartz v. Ins.

2010See, e.g. , City of Waco v. Lopez , 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. 2008) (describing "unique and comprehensive provisions" established in chapter 21 and concluding that noncompliance with Commission procedures "deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction" over employment-discrimination disputes); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. , 144 S.W.3d at 446 ("exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the CHRA"); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc. , 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998) (listing section 21.202's 180-day deadline for filing administrative c

2010See, e.g., City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (describing “unique and comprehensive provisions” established in chapter 21 and concluding that noncompliance with Commission procedures “deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction” over employment-discrimination disputes); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 446 (“exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the CHRA”); Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (listing section 21.202’s 180-day deadline for filing administrative complai

2010See, e.g. , City of Waco v. Lopez , 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. 2008) (describing "unique and comprehensive provisions" established in chapter 21 and concluding that noncompliance with Commission procedures "deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction" over employment-discrimination disputes); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. , 144 S.W.3d at 446 ("exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the CHRA"); Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc. , 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998) (listing section 21.202's 180-day deadline for filing administrative c

2010See, e.g., City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (describing “unique and comprehensive provisions” established in chapter 21 and concluding that noncompliance with Commission procedures “deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction” over employment-discrimination disputes); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 446 (“exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the CHRA”); Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.1998) (listing section 21.202’s 180-day deadline for filing administrative complai

2009Compare Davis , 259 S.W.3d at 283 , and Gonzales , 183 S.W.3d at 107-08 , with Van Indep.

2007Texas courts have held, moreover, that among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement is that “the failure to exhaust administrative remedies” does not “deprive a trial court of jurisdiction over a section 1983 claim.” Dallas County v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 109 (Tex.App.Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146-47 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); Mitchison v. Houston Indep.

2016In support of its conclusion that claims “for a violation of a state or federal constitutional right” are excepted from the exhaustion requirement, the court of appeals cited a string of opinions from other Texas courts of appeals. 7 Most of these courts of appeals’ opinions ultimately trace back to a footnote in our: opinion in Texas Education Agency, v. Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District, 830 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1992), 8 In Cypress-Fairbanks, four districts jointly filed a suit challenging the Commissioner’s authority to hear appeals in which district employees alleged federal due pro

2003Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D. , 830 S.W.2d 88, 91 ( Tex. 1992). [5] Thus, we find the second exception to the exhaustion doctrine relied upon by Williams to be inapplicable under the facts of this case.

2010Dist. , 69 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. withdrawn). (11) In order to comply with the exhaustion requirement, an employee must: (1) file a complaint with the Commission within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act; (2) allow the Commission to dismiss the complaint or resolve the complaint within 180 days before filing suit; and (3) file suit no later than two years after the complaint is filed.

2010Dist., 69 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. App.–Waco 2002, pet. withdrawn).11 In order to comply with the exhaustion requirement, 11 The W aco Court of Appeals in Vela v. W aco Independent School District stated that: [E]xhaustion of the adm inistrative review system outlined above is a m andatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the [T]CHRA.

2015See Poole v. West Hardin County Consolidated Independent School District, 385 S.W.3d 52 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2011), rev'd on other grounds, 384 S.W.3d 816 (Tex.2012); Janik v. Lamar Consolidated Independent School District, 961 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied).

2000And, because the Kings neither presented this particular dispute to the Commissioner nor pled any exception relieving them from exhausting their administrative remedy, see Janik v. Lamar Consolidated I.S.D., 961 S.W.2d 322 , 324 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (holding that exceptions to the exhaustion requirement must be pled), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain allegations concerning 37.001 and 37.009. 4 *659 As to the remaining causes of action, each entails allegations of breached constitutional right.

2015Auth., 2015 WL 1870013, at *6 ; see also City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d at 683 (explaining that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to claims that an agency acted outside its authority); Westheimer Indep.

1994E.g., McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-49 , 112 S.Ct. at 1087-88 ; City of Sherman v. Public Utility Com’n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.1983); Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 162 Tex. 1 , 343 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1961); Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Texas Co., 520 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).