exhaustion doctrine in Hawaii

2025Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc., 131 Hawai‘i 257, 269, 318 P.3d 97, 109 (2013) (citing Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of exhaustion requires that the claim be only cognizable before the agency.”).

2025Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc., 131 Hawai‘i 257, 269, 318 P.3d 97, 109 (2013) (citing Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of exhaustion requires that the claim be only cognizable before the agency.”).

2015This court held that the ICA erred “by holding that Kellberg’s Complaint should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the exhaustion doctrine.” Kellberg v. Yuen, 131 Hawai'i 513, 534 , 319 P.3d 432, 453 (2014) (“Kellberg I”).

2015This court held that the ICA erred “by holding that Kellberg’s Complaint should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the exhaustion doctrine.” Kellberg v. Yuen, 131 Hawai'i 513, 534 , 319 P.3d 432, 453 (2014) (“Kellberg I”).

2014The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is “to redirect grievances for their proper resolution, not to preclude them altogether.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 275 , 990 P.2d at 1157 .

2014The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is “to redirect grievances for their proper resolution, not to preclude them altogether.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 275 , 990 P.2d at 1157 .

2014See Williams, 121 Hawai'i at 9 , 210 P.3d at 509 (“In general, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a policy of judicial economy.”). “ ‘The exhaustion principle asks simply that the avenues of relief nearest and simplest should be pursued first.’” Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93 , 734 P.2d at 169 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (ellipses omitted).

2014See Williams, 121 Hawai'i at 9 , 210 P.3d at 509 (“In general, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a policy of judicial economy.”). “ ‘The exhaustion principle asks simply that the avenues of relief nearest and simplest should be pursued first.’” Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93 , 734 P.2d at 169 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 , 97 S.Ct. 1932 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (ellipses omitted).

2014Furthermore, this court has held that the exhaustion doctrine may be excused when the policy interests underlying the doctrine, which involve interests of comity between courts and administrative agencies, are “outweighed by other interests.” Williams, 121 Hawai'i at 11 , 210 P.3d at 511 .

2014Furthermore, this court has held that the exhaustion doctrine may be excused when the policy interests underlying the doctrine, which involve interests of comity between courts and administrative agencies, are “outweighed by other interests.” Williams, 121 Hawai'i at 11 , 210 P.3d at 511 .

2009Although the ICA used an erroneous framework to determine that the district court had jurisdiction over Williams’s petition, the ICA correctly concluded that the district court had jurisdiction because (1) Williams’s petition involves conduct outside the scope of the CBA; (2) even if CBA remedies did apply, tort claims are excepted from the general rule that employees must exhaust their remedies under the CBA before seeking judicial relief; (3) the CBA did not provide Williams with an adequate remedy; and (4) public policy does not support limiting injunctions against harassment for employees

2009Although the ICA used an erroneous framework to determine that the district court had jurisdiction over Williams’s petition, the ICA correctly concluded that the district court had jurisdiction because (1) Williams’s petition involves conduct outside the scope of the CBA; (2) even if CBA remedies did apply, tort claims are excepted from the general rule that employees must exhaust their remedies under the CBA before seeking judicial relief; (3) the CBA did not provide Williams with an adequate remedy; and (4) public policy does not support limiting injunctions against harassment for employees

2024"In order for the doctrine to apply, 'the statute, ordinance or regulation under which the agency exercises its power must establish clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.'" Id. at 536, 319 P.3d at 455 (brackets, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 9 Haw.

2014In order for the doctrine to apply, “[t]he statute, ordinance or regulation under which the agency exercises its power must establish ‘clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.’ ” Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 9 Haw.App. 143, 152 , 827 P.2d 1149, 1154 (App.1992) (quoting Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal.2d 559 , 55 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 421 P.2d 697, 701 (1967)) (emphasis added).

2025MLN and amici correctly note that HRS § 91-14 does not preclude other remedies “provided by law.” We recognized as much in Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, a case in which we articulated that, under HRS § 91-14(a), citizens “are not barred from contesting [an agency’s] actions through alternative 35 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** means.”11 76 Hawai‘i 128, 137, 870 P.2d 1272, 1281 (1994).

2025MLN and amici correctly note that HRS § 91-14 does not preclude other remedies “provided by law.” We recognized as much in Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, a case in which we articulated that, under HRS § 91-14(a), citizens “are not barred from contesting [an agency’s] actions through alternative 35 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** means.”11 76 Hawai‘i 128, 137, 870 P.2d 1272, 1281 (1994).

2025Leone v. Cnty. of Maui, 128 Hawai#i 183, 192, 284 P.3d 956, 965 (App. 2012).

2025Nonetheless, the ICA held that MLN’s article XI, section 9 claims were still subject to the jurisdictional limitations provided under HRS § 632-1, which the ICA characterized as “akin to a legislative codification of the exhaustion doctrine.” Id. at 562-63, 542 P.3d at 1257-58 .

2025Nonetheless, the ICA held that MLN’s article XI, section 9 claims were still subject to the jurisdictional limitations provided under HRS § 632-1, which the ICA characterized as “akin to a legislative codification of the exhaustion doctrine.” Id. at 562-63, 542 P.3d at 1257-58.

2025Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc., 131 Hawai‘i 257, 269, 318 P.3d 97, 109 (2013) (citing Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93 , 734 P.2d at 169 ) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of exhaustion requires that the claim be only cognizable before the agency.”).

2025Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc., 131 Hawai‘i 257, 269, 318 P.3d 97, 109 (2013) (citing Kona Old, 69 Haw. at 93, 734 P.2d at 169) (“[A]pplying the doctrine of exhaustion requires that the claim be only cognizable before the agency.”).

2023We conclude that, to the extent MLN's article XI, section 9 claim defined by HRS chapter 343 seeks a declaratory judgment that the CUP is invalid, HRS § 632-1 34 (...continued) Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (citations omitted) ("The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies."). 56 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER precludes that claim.

2014See South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n, 677 P.2d at 118 (“Washington courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in circumstances in which these policies are outweighed by consideration of fairness or practicality.”); Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232 , 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (the court has recognized exception to exhaustion doctrine “when the interests of justice so require”).

2014See South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n, 677 P.2d at 118 (“Washington courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in circumstances in which these policies are outweighed by consideration of fairness or practicality.”); Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232 , 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (the court has recognized exception to exhaustion doctrine “when the interests of justice so require”).

2014In order for the doctrine to apply, “[t]he statute, ordinance or regulation under which the agency exercises its power must establish ‘clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.’ ” Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 9 Haw.App. 143, 152 , 827 P.2d 1149, 1154 (App.1992) (quoting Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal.2d 559 , 55 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 421 P.2d 697, 701 (1967)) (emphasis added).

2014In order for the doctrine to apply, “[t]he statute, ordinance or regulation under which the agency exercises its power must establish ‘clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.’ ” Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 9 Haw.App. 143, 152 , 827 P.2d 1149, 1154 (App.1992) (quoting Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal.2d 559 , 55 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 421 P.2d 697, 701 (1967)) (emphasis added).

2014See South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n, 677 P.2d at 118 (“Washington courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in circumstances in which these policies are outweighed by consideration of fairness or practicality.”); Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232 , 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (the court has recognized exception to exhaustion doctrine “when the interests of justice so require”).

2014See South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n, 677 P.2d at 118 (“Washington courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in circumstances in which these policies are outweighed by consideration of fairness or practicality.”); Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232 , 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (the court has recognized exception to exhaustion doctrine “when the interests of justice so require”).

2013Compare Hawai'i Blind Vendors Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Haw. 367, 371 , 791 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1990) (concluding that the agency was the appropriate forum for an initial decision in Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction) with Tamashiro v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 112 Hawai'i 388 , 411—12, 146 P.3d 103, 126-27 (2006) (overruling Hawai'i Blind Vendors to the extent that it held that the circuit court had any original subject matter jurisdiction over Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims); see also, Tamashiro, 112 Hawai'i at 429-30 , 146 P.3

2013Compare Hawai'i Blind Vendors Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Haw. 367, 371 , 791 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1990) (concluding that the agency was the appropriate forum for an initial decision in Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction) with Tamashiro v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 112 Hawai'i 388 , 411—12, 146 P.3d 103, 126-27 (2006) (overruling Hawai'i Blind Vendors to the extent that it held that the circuit court had any original subject matter jurisdiction over Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims); see also, Tamashiro, 112 Hawai'i at 429-30 , 146 P.3

2013Compare Hawai'i Blind Vendors Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Haw. 367, 371 , 791 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1990) (concluding that the agency was the appropriate forum for an initial decision in Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction) with Tamashiro v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 112 Hawai'i 388 , 411—12, 146 P.3d 103, 126-27 (2006) (overruling Hawai'i Blind Vendors to the extent that it held that the circuit court had any original subject matter jurisdiction over Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims); see also, Tamashiro, 112 Hawai'i at 429-30 , 146 P.3

2013Compare Hawai'i Blind Vendors Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Haw. 367, 371 , 791 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1990) (concluding that the agency was the appropriate forum for an initial decision in Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction) with Tamashiro v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 112 Hawai'i 388 , 411—12, 146 P.3d 103, 126-27 (2006) (overruling Hawai'i Blind Vendors to the extent that it held that the circuit court had any original subject matter jurisdiction over Rudolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act claims); see also, Tamashiro, 112 Hawai'i at 429-30 , 146 P.3

2012See Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1342 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining the purpose of the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to Title VII claims); Martin v. Fisher, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining the purpose of the exhaustion requirement under California's employment discrimination law).

2012See Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1342 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining the purpose of the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to Title VII claims); Martin v. Fisher, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining the purpose of the exhaustion requirement under California's employment discrimination law).

2009Applying the exhaustion doctrine to the terms of a CBA “is in keeping with prevailing National Labor Relations policy and Hawaii policy favoring arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism.” Santos v. State, Dept. of Transp., Kauai Div., 64 Haw. 648, 655 , 646 P.2d 962, 967 (1982) (per curiam).

2009Applying the exhaustion doctrine to the terms of a CBA “is in keeping with prevailing National Labor Relations policy and Hawaii policy favoring arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism.” Santos v. State, Dept. of Transp., Kauai Div., 64 Haw. 648, 655 , 646 P.2d 962, 967 (1982) (per curiam).

2007That case concerned a UIM insurer’s exhaustion clause, which provided that “ ‘there is no coverage until the limits of liability of all [BI] ... insurance policies ... that apply ... have been used up by payment of judgments or settlements.’” 122 Ill.Dec. 657 , 527 N.E.2d at 35 (emphases omitted).

2007That case concerned a UIM insurer’s exhaustion clause, which provided that “ ‘there is no coverage until the limits of liability of all [BI] ... insurance policies ... that apply ... have been used up by payment of judgments or settlements.’” 122 Ill.Dec. 657 , 527 N.E.2d at 35 (emphases omitted).

2007The appellate court balked at the practical difficulty of “pretry[ing] the ease and rul[ing] on the ... reasonable] viability]” of a claim, but affirmed on unrelated grounds, to wit, that “the exhaustion clause ... is against public policy and therefore unenforceable,” accord Taylor, 90 Hawai'i at 312, 313 & n. 10, 978 P.2d at 750, 751 & n. 10.

2005Trust v. Tackett, 778 So.2d 136, 142 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (adopting “the general rule that an insurance company’s intervention in an injured worker’s third-party tort claim to assert the company’s right of subro-gation is not subject to a statute of limita *286 tions bar so long as the original action was commenced ... within the applicable limitation period”); see also Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1985) (explaining that generally circuit courts have “allowed the exhaustion requirement [pursuit to civil action under Title VII] to be satisfied vicariously [ (i.e., by other parti

2005Trust v. Tackett, 778 So.2d 136, 142 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (adopting “the general rule that an insurance company’s intervention in an injured worker’s third-party tort claim to assert the company’s right of subro-gation is not subject to a statute of limita *286 tions bar so long as the original action was commenced ... within the applicable limitation period”); see also Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1985) (explaining that generally circuit courts have “allowed the exhaustion requirement [pursuit to civil action under Title VII] to be satisfied vicariously [ (i.e., by other parti

2004In Taylor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a non-custodial parent pursuing a records-access *60 claim under the IDEA against school official was exempted from the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA on the grounds of futility and the inadequacy of the administrative remedies. 313 F.3d at 789.

1999See generally DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. 2281 ; Clayton v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr.

1999See generally DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 , 103 S.Ct. 2281 ; Clayton v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr.