exhaustion requirement in Rhode Island

2007Burns , 617 A.2d at 117 ; M.B.T.

2007Almeida , 722 A.2d at 259 ; Burns , 617 A.2d at 117 .

2026“This Court recognizes ‘an exception to the exhaustion requirement when exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.’” Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of -6- Newport County, 151 A.3d 1223, 1232 (R.I. 2017) (quoting DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 385 (R.I. 2011) (mem.)).

2017In Kahn, a hearing justice dismissed BOPNA’s action because it lacked standing to appeal. 11 BOPNA argues thát exhaustion of administrative remediés would be futile because, with this recent dismissal, it has no administrative remedies to exhaust. *1232 This Court recognizes “an exception to the exhaustion requirement when exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.” DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 385 (R.I. 2011) (mem.) (quoting Richardson, 947 A.2d at 259 ).

2008See Ward, 639 A.2d at 1382 (“To require exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking injunctive relief would destroy the effectiveness of such relief.”).

1998Although we have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement — for example, when an appeal to an administrative review board would be futile or would destroy the effectiveness of the relief sought, see Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Department, 639 A.2d 1379, 1382-83 (R.I.1994) — such exceptions do not appear to apply here.

2009See Id , at § 13.22[4]; Arnold v. Lebel , 941 A.2d 813 , 818 (R.I. 2007) ("[TJhis Court has made exceptions when the exhaustion of administrative *Page 10 remedies would be futile.") Furthermore, in discussing other exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, our Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e give less deference to the exhaustion doctrine when `a pure matter of law' is before the administrative agency." Power , 582 A.2d at 899 -900 ; see also Koch at § 13.22[7].

2008In spite of this preference, however, the exhaustion requirement need not be fulfilled when the "exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile." Id. (quoting Arnold , 941 A.2d at 818 ).

2008Exhaustion also is not required when it "would destroy the effectiveness of the relief sought." Id. (quoting Almeida v. Plasters' and Cement Masons' Local 40 Pension Fund , 722 A.2d 257 , 259 (R.I. 1998)).

2005Furthermore, the exhaustion rule "aids judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of the case, and it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial fact finding, perhaps avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement." Almeida, 722 A.2d at 259 .

2017In Kahn, a hearing justice dismissed BOPNA’s action because it lacked standing to appeal. 11 BOPNA argues thát exhaustion of administrative remediés would be futile because, with this recent dismissal, it has no administrative remedies to exhaust. *1232 This Court recognizes “an exception to the exhaustion requirement when exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.” DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 385 (R.I. 2011) (mem.) (quoting Richardson, 947 A.2d at 259 ).

2011A corollary to that principle is that there exists “an exception to the exhaustion requirement when exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.” Richardson, 947 A.2d at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2006Although that court has noted that “exhaustion is not a rigid requirement,” Pihl, *1267 9 F.3d at 190 n. 10, the strong policy considerations that undergird the exhaustion doctrine may explain why, in practice, the First Circuit repeatedly has insisted that litigants exhaust the administrative process under the IDEA.

2004Id. at 211.

2006Id. at 1102.

2001The exhaustion clause was interpreted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1100-1102 .

2026Futility may be established when “a permit application is not a ‘viable option’ or where the permitting authority has made it ‘transparently clear’ that a permit will not be granted.” Cullen v. Town Council of Town of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 906 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991)).

2026Cullen, 850 A.2d at 906 .

2026Futility may be established when “a permit application is not a ‘viable option’ or where the permitting authority has made it ‘transparently clear’ that a permit will not be granted.” Cullen v. Town Council of Town of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 906 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991)).

2026“This Court recognizes ‘an exception to the exhaustion requirement when exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile.’” Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of -6- Newport County, 151 A.3d 1223, 1232 (R.I. 2017) (quoting DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 385 (R.I. 2011) (mem.)).

2009Policy-wise, adherence to the exhaustion doctrine "enables the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to the problem, to exercise its discretion, and to correct its own mistakes, and is credited with promoting accuracy, efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial economy." Power v. City of Providence , 582 A.2d 895 , 899 (R.I. 1990) (citing Christopher W. v. Portsmouth School Committee , 877 F.2d 1089 , 1094 (1st Cir. 1989)).

2009See Id , at § 13.22[4]; Arnold v. Lebel , 941 A.2d 813 , 818 (R.I. 2007) ("[TJhis Court has made exceptions when the exhaustion of administrative *Page 10 remedies would be futile.") Furthermore, in discussing other exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, our Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e give less deference to the exhaustion doctrine when `a pure matter of law' is before the administrative agency." Power , 582 A.2d at 899 -900 ; see also Koch at § 13.22[7].

2008Latham v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 116 R.I. 245, 248 , 355 A.2d 400, 402 (1976).

2008Latham v. Rhode Island Department of Education, 116 R.I. 245, 248 , 355 A.2d 400, 402 (1976).

2007Further, the use of the AAD here promotes judicial economy, because — despite all prognostications from Southern, including the premise that the Director has already made a decision, and the assumption that Southern will "lose" at the agency level — there is likely to be a resolution following the fleshing out of all issues surrounding the issuance of the NOV. 4 Id. ; Portela-Gonzalez v. Secretary of the Navy , 109 F.3d 74 , 78 (1st Cir. 1997) ("A *Page 25 pessimistic prediction or a hunch that further administrative proceedings will prove unproductive is not enough to sidetrack the exhaustion

2007Further, the use of the AAD here promotes judicial economy, because — despite all prognostications from Southern, including the premise that the Director has already made a decision, and the assumption that Southern will "lose" at the agency level — there is likely to be a resolution following the fleshing out of all issues surrounding the issuance of the NOV. 4 Id. ; Portela-Gonzalez v. Secretary of the Navy , 109 F.3d 74 , 78 (1st Cir. 1997) ("A *Page 25 pessimistic prediction or a hunch that further administrative proceedings will prove unproductive is not enough to sidetrack the exhaustion

2007Id. at 73.

2006See Rafferty v. Cranston Public School Committee, 315 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2002); Frazier, 276 F.3d at 64 ; Rose, 214 F.3d at 210 ; Weber v. Cranston School Committee, 212 F.3d 41, 51-52 (1st Cir.2000).

2006Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir.2002).

2006See Rafferty v. Cranston Public School Committee, 315 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2002); Frazier, 276 F.3d at 64 ; Rose, 214 F.3d at 210 ; Weber v. Cranston School Committee, 212 F.3d 41, 51-52 (1st Cir.2000).