exhaustion doctrine in Connecticut

2019We address each in turn. 1 The defendant first invokes the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement, claiming that an appeal to the board in this case "would have been futile ...." As our Supreme Court has explained, the futility exception applies " only when [the administrative remedy] could not result in a favorable decision ...." (Emphasis added.) O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 232 Conn. 419 , 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) ; see also Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling , 204 Conn. 551 , 560, 529 A.2d 666 (1987) ("[F]utility is more than a mere allegation

2019We address each in turn. 1 The defendant first invokes the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement, claiming that an appeal to the board in this case "would have been futile ...." As our Supreme Court has explained, the futility exception applies " only when [the administrative remedy] could not result in a favorable decision ...." (Emphasis added.) O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 232 Conn. 419 , 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) ; see also Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling , 204 Conn. 551 , 560, 529 A.2d 666 (1987) ("[F]utility is more than a mere allegation

2019Rather, the plaintiffs argue that they were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies through this process because ‘‘the claims against the state defendants . . . involve the ‘special circumstances’ exception [to the exhaustion doctrine], or, in the alternative, the constitutional question excep- tion to the exhaustion requirement . . . .’’ Our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that ‘‘when a plaintiff can obtain relief from an administrative agency by requesting a declaratory ruling pursuant to § 4-176, the failure to exhaust that remedy deprives the trial court of subject matter j

2019Rather, the plaintiffs argue that they were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies through this process because ‘‘the claims against the state defendants . . . involve the ‘special circumstances’ exception [to the exhaustion doctrine], or, in the alternative, the constitutional question excep- tion to the exhaustion requirement . . . .’’ Our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that ‘‘when a plaintiff can obtain relief from an administrative agency by requesting a declaratory ruling pursuant to § 4-176, the failure to exhaust that remedy deprives the trial court of subject matter j

2000Despite this principle, in Reynolds we held that any person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation without first exhausting administrative remedies. . . ." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings v. Tripp , 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987); see also Reynolds v. Soffer , 183 Conn. 67 , 69 , 438 A.2d 1163 (1981) (finding that allegations of specific and material damage must be present for there to be

2000Despite this principle, in Reynolds we held that any person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation without first exhausting administrative remedies. . . ." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings v. Tripp , 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987); see also Reynolds v. Soffer , 183 Conn. 67 , 69 , 438 A.2d 1163 (1981) (finding that allegations of specific and material damage must be present for there to be

2019See Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , 207 Conn. 346 , 369, 542 A.2d 672 (1988) (holding that "no form of injunctive relief, under § 1983 or otherwise, is justified as an exception to the [administrative] exhaustion requirement"); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that "none of the concerns expressed in Patsy " warrant an "exception to the exhaustion doctrine" in cases for injunctive relief).

2019See Pet v. Dept. of Health Services , 207 Conn. 346 , 369, 542 A.2d 672 (1988) (holding that "no form of injunctive relief, under § 1983 or otherwise, is justified as an exception to the [administrative] exhaustion requirement"); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac , supra, at 691 , 485 A.2d 1272 (holding that "none of the concerns expressed in Patsy " warrant an "exception to the exhaustion doctrine" in cases for injunctive relief).

2020Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual func- tions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessar- ily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency’s role in administering its statutory responsibilities.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558 , 564–65, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). ‘‘Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement’’; Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 432 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996); appellate courts in this state have recognized several exceptions to the

2020Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual func- tions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessar- ily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency’s role in administering its statutory responsibilities.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558 , 564–65, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). ‘‘Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement’’; Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 432 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996); appellate courts in this state have recognized several exceptions to the

2018In Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection , supra, 215 Conn. 616 , 577 A.2d 1017 , the plaintiffs-like the plaintiff here-relied on Aaron for their argument that a challenge to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency qualifies for "an exception to the exhaustion requirement." Id., at 621, 577 A.2d 1017 .

2018In Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection , supra, 215 Conn. 616 , 577 A.2d 1017 , the plaintiffs-like the plaintiff here-relied on Aaron for their argument that a challenge to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency qualifies for "an exception to the exhaustion requirement." Id., at 621, 577 A.2d 1017 .

2000“We have frequently held that where a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure.” Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 708 , 513 A.2d 77 (1986); Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra, 215 Conn. 623 . “[B]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiff [s’] claim.” (Internal quotation marks

1998It has been held that "a mere conclusory assertion that an agency will not reconsider its decision does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement," Polymer Resources Ltd v. Keeney , 227 Conn. 545 , 562 (1993), cf Housing Authority v. Papandrea , 222 Conn. 414 , 428-432 (1992).

2025Similarly, our appellate courts have stated that ‘‘one purpose underlying the exhaustion doctrine is that judicial review may be hindered by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to exercise discretion or apply its expertise.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fitzgerald v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. App. 301, 318 , 202 A.3d 385 (2019); see also Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 568 , 821 A.2d 725 (2003) (policies underlying exhaustion doctrine were best served by requiring plaintiff to take claim before agency’s commissioner, where issue involved f

2025Similarly, our appellate courts have stated that ‘‘one purpose underlying the exhaustion doctrine is that judicial review may be hindered by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to exercise discretion or apply its expertise.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fitzgerald v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. App. 301, 318 , 202 A.3d 385 (2019); see also Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 568 , 821 A.2d 725 (2003) (policies underlying exhaustion doctrine were best served by requiring plaintiff to take claim before agency’s commissioner, where issue involved f

2018Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Board of Education , 310 Conn. 576 , 598-99, 81 A.3d 184 (2013) ; see also McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185 , 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 194 (1969) (exhaustion doctrine an expression of executive autonomy); American Federation of Government Employees v. Resor , 442 F.2d 993 ,

2018Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Board of Education , 310 Conn. 576 , 598-99, 81 A.3d 184 (2013) ; see also McKart v. United States , 395 U.S. 185 , 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 194 (1969) (exhaustion doctrine an expression of executive autonomy); American Federation of Government Employees v. Resor , 442 F.2d 993 ,

1995Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 115 , 439 A.2d 441 (1982); see also Cummings v. Tripp, supra, 204 Conn. 74 -81; Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 541 , 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Sullivan v. State, 189 Conn. 550, 553-54 , 457 A.2d 304 (1983); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 111 Conn. 420, 425 , 418 A.2d 66 (1979); Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 554-55 , 254 A.2d 898 (1969). 5 The plaintiff argues that these exceptions to the exhaustion requirement excuse its failure to pursue administrative remedies.

1995Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 115 , 439 A.2d 441 (1982); see also Cummings v. Tripp, supra, 204 Conn. 74 -81; Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 541 , 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Sullivan v. State, 189 Conn. 550, 553-54 , 457 A.2d 304 (1983); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 111 Conn. 420, 425 , 418 A.2d 66 (1979); Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 554-55 , 254 A.2d 898 (1969). 5 The plaintiff argues that these exceptions to the exhaustion requirement excuse its failure to pursue administrative remedies.

2018See Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney , supra, 227 Conn. at 562 , 630 A.2d 1304 ("a mere conclusory assertion that an agency will not reconsider its decision does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement"); O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , supra, 232 Conn. at 429 , 655 A.2d 1121 (when party's suspicion of bias on part of zoning commission is purely speculative, such suspicion does not render exhaustion of administrative remedies futile); LaCroix v. Board of Education , 199 Conn. 70 , 84-85, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) ("the statutory remedies are not rendered futi

2018See Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney , supra, 227 Conn. at 562 , 630 A.2d 1304 ("a mere conclusory assertion that an agency will not reconsider its decision does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement"); O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , supra, 232 Conn. at 429 , 655 A.2d 1121 (when party's suspicion of bias on part of zoning commission is purely speculative, such suspicion does not render exhaustion of administrative remedies futile); LaCroix v. Board of Education , 199 Conn. 70 , 84-85, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) ("the statutory remedies are not rendered futi

2006In this case, the plaintiff was discharged from his duties as maintenance supervisor and, thus, the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement was his exclusive remedy. 2 “The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. ” Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 811 , 643 A.2d 1268 (1994).

2006In this case, the plaintiff was discharged from his duties as maintenance supervisor and, thus, the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement was his exclusive remedy. 2 “The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. ” Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 811 , 643 A.2d 1268 (1994).

2026The court explained in relevant part: “[T]he plaintiff has baldly alleged only that, ‘[i]f the construction is not enjoined until it is properly designed and permitted, the plaintiff is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.’ The complaint is devoid of any assertion of specific and material damage as a result of the defendants’ activities.”4 Accordingly, 4 Our Supreme Court has explained: “We cannot state too strongly . . . the necessity for clear and precise allegations of specific and material claims of damage in order to establish the t

2026The court explained in relevant part: “[T]he plaintiff has baldly alleged only that, ‘[i]f the construction is not enjoined until it is properly designed and permitted, the plaintiff is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.’ The complaint is devoid of any assertion of specific and material damage as a result of the defendants’ activities.”4 Accordingly, 4 Our Supreme Court has explained: “We cannot state too strongly . . . the necessity for clear and precise allegations of specific and material claims of damage in order to establish the t

2019"The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board's judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 504, 661 A.2d 1018 (1995) ; see also Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Assn. of America v. State , 209 Conn. 679 , 692, 553 A.2d 1104 (1989) (exhaustion doctrine "relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions t

2019"The exhaustion doctrine reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board's judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simko v. Ervin , 234 Conn. 498 , 504, 661 A.2d 1018 (1995) ; see also Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Assn. of America v. State , 209 Conn. 679 , 692, 553 A.2d 1104 (1989) (exhaustion doctrine "relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions t

2009Notwithstanding the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, this court has carved out several exceptions from the exhaustion doctrine; Harwinton Drilling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 94 , 448 A.2d 210 (1982); although “only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561 , 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 79 , 505 A.2d 1233 (1986).

2009Notwithstanding the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, this court has carved out several exceptions from the exhaustion doctrine; Harwinton Drilling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 94 , 448 A.2d 210 (1982); although “only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561 , 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 79 , 505 A.2d 1233 (1986).