exhaustion doctrine in Illinois

2026Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). ¶ 24 There are several recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, including where (1) a statute or ordinance is attacked as unconstitutional on its face, (2) multiple administrative remedies exist and at least one is exhausted, (3) the agency cannot provide an adequate remedy, (3) no issues of fact are presented or agency expertise is not involved, (4) irreparable harm will result, or (5) an agency’s jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute.

2026Considering the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine outlined in Castaneda, the closest exception that might apply is “where no issues of fact are presented or agency expertise is not involved.” Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309 . ¶ 27 Solano argues that because the City uses the adjudicatory pathway set forth in Vehicle Code section 11-208.3 to convert administrative orders into circuit court judgments, the section 11-208.3 fee cap of $250 must apply.

2021Accordingly, Conley’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies—or to plead exhaustion or assert some exception to the exhaustion requirement— provides a sound basis for the dismissal of his complaint. ¶ 12 Our decision today is consistent with Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d 363 , wherein our supreme court held that prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies through the Department’s grievance procedures before seeking a declaratory judgment, even though the declaratory judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2000)) contained no exhaustion requirement.

2021Thus, we determine that in cases under section 8 of the SDP Act, “judicial interference must be withheld until the administrative process has run its course.” Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d at 375 . ¶ 14 We note that, at oral argument, Conley’s counsel explained that he believed the exhaustion requirement was limited to claims falling under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 -4- (PLRA) (42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018)).

2025Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 320-21 (2004). ¶ 46 There are, however, exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.

2021In his complaint, Conley did not allege that he sought administrative review of his treatment, he did not allege any exception to the doctrine of exhaustion (see, e.g., Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 321 (2004)), and nothing in the record indicates that his compliance with the Department’s grievance procedures would be impractical or unjust.

2016“As we have previously noted in discussing the exhaustion rule and its exceptions, ‘[t]he agency’s particular expertise is not implicated in statutory construction.’ ” Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 306 -07 (quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550 (1978)). ¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion doctrine is not a bar to our consideration of the present dispute.

2016“As we have previously noted in discussing the exhaustion rule and its exceptions, ‘[t]he agency’s particular expertise is not implicated in statutory construction.’ ” Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney, 166 Ill. 2d at 306 -07 (quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550 (1978)). ¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion doctrine is not a bar to our consideration of the present dispute.

2014The supreme court explained the purpose and scope of the rule in Arvia: “Importantly, the exhaustion doctrine extends to administrative review in the circuit court. [Citation.] That is, where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and the circuit court may grant the relief a party seeks within the context of reviewing the agency’s decision, a circuit court has no authority to entertain independent causes of action regarding the agency’s actions. [Citations.] Any other conclusion would enable a party to litigate separately every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of the adm

2014The supreme court explained the purpose and scope of the rule in Arvia: “Importantly, the exhaustion doctrine extends to administrative review in the circuit court. [Citation.] That is, where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and the circuit court may grant the relief a party seeks within the context of reviewing the agency’s decision, a circuit court has no authority to entertain independent causes of action regarding the agency’s actions. [Citations.] Any other conclusion would enable a party to litigate separately every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of the adm

2014App. 3d 1034, 1037 , 404 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (1980) (determining Springfield tavern cited for reducing drink prices for certain patrons on “ladies nights” could not maintain action for -7- injunction and declaratory judgment due to “well-settled law in this State that where administrative remedies are available, they must be exhausted before one can seek judicial review”); Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d 363 , 789 N.E.2d 1216 (Statesville inmate whose paints and other art materials were confiscated was expected to exhaust written grievance process prior to filing complaint for injunctive and declaratory

2014App. 3d 1034, 1037 , 404 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (1980) (determining Springfield tavern cited for reducing drink prices for certain patrons on “ladies nights” could not maintain action for -7- injunction and declaratory judgment due to “well-settled law in this State that where administrative remedies are available, they must be exhausted before one can seek judicial review”); Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d 363 , 789 N.E.2d 1216 (Statesville inmate whose paints and other art materials were confiscated was expected to exhaust written grievance process prior to filing complaint for injunctive and declaratory

2021“The exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because relief may be, or even probably will be, denied.” Northwestern University v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80, 89 (1978).

2009See Northwestern University v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80, 89 (1978) (“The exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because relief may be, or even probably will be, denied by the local authorities”).

2017Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Guaranty Ass’n v. Shapo, 357 Ill.

2017Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Guaranty Ass’n v. Shapo, 357 Ill.

1979Recognizing that it had long been held that the exception to the exhaustion requirement relating to an attack on a statute applies only where the statute is attacked in its terms and not where it is attacked as applied (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 , 150 N.E.2d 97 ), we therefore rejected the plaintiffs argument that the mere assertion of a constitutional question rendered the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable.

1979Recognizing that it had long been held that the exception to the exhaustion requirement relating to an attack on a statute applies only where the statute is attacked in its terms and not where it is attacked as applied (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 , 150 N.E.2d 97 ), we therefore rejected the plaintiffs argument that the mere assertion of a constitutional question rendered the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable.

2020See County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 555 ; see also Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309 ; Business & - 11 - Professional People for the Public Interest, 136 Ill. 2d at 245 (finding, to the extent an agency acts without statutory authority, it acts outside its jurisdiction). ¶ 48 In seeking to avoid this result, defendants contend that the appellate court erroneously excused the exhaustion requirement by applying the authority exception to plaintiffs’ complaints.

2000Another exception to the exhaustion doctrine that we find applicable to the present case is "where no issues of fact are presented or agency experience involved." Office of the Cook County State's Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board , 166 Ill. 2d 296, 306-07 , 652 N.E.2d 301 (1995) (stating that where an issue can be resolved by statutory and case law interpretation, it falls within a court's expertise and not an administrative agency's); see, e.g. , County of Knox , 188 Ill. 2d at 552 (agency's particular expertise was not implicated in the necessary statutory interpretation); So

2026See Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 42 (finding an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies when the aggrieved party has no chance to succeed before the agency). ¶ 57 Apart from his arguments directed toward the Department, Tucker argues the circuit court—which does possess authority to vacate a void order at any time—should have vacated the paternity and support orders.

2026See Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 42 (finding an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies when the aggrieved party has no chance to succeed before the agency). ¶ 58 Apart from his arguments directed toward the Department, Tucker argues the circuit court—which does possess authority to vacate a void order at any time—should have vacated the paternity and support orders.

2016Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action.

2016Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action.

2014See Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1989); see also Stykel, , 318 Ill.

2014See Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1989); see also Stykel, , 318 Ill.

2026Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (2003) (challenges to a municipality’s jurisdiction are not subject to the exhaustion doctrine); County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 199 (1987) (same).

1990App. 3d 814, 816 , affd (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 186 (issue of whether deputy circuit clerks are “public employees” under the Public Labor Relations Act is an attack on the Illinois State Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction which comes within the exception to the exhaustion doctrine).) The questions presented by the State’s Attorney’s attack on the jurisdiction of the Commission here are “entirely legal and do not require fact finding by the administrative agency or an application of its particular expertise.” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 199 .

1986Ed. 2d 519 (1969), Justice Black noted ‘that the exhaustion requirement is subject to a number of exceptions for a variety of situations in which doctrinaire application of the exhaustion rule would defeat the overall purposes of federal labor relations policy.’ One of these exceptions involves facts which show, as they did in Glover, ‘that a formal effort to pursue contractual or administrative remedies would be absolutely futile.’ 393 U.S. at 331 , 89 S. Ct. at 552 (emphasis supplied).” In Vaca v. Sipes (1966), 386 U.S. 171 , 17 L.

1986Ed. 2d 519 (1969), Justice Black noted ‘that the exhaustion requirement is subject to a number of exceptions for a variety of situations in which doctrinaire application of the exhaustion rule would defeat the overall purposes of federal labor relations policy.’ One of these exceptions involves facts which show, as they did in Glover, ‘that a formal effort to pursue contractual or administrative remedies would be absolutely futile.’ 393 U.S. at 331 , 89 S. Ct. at 552 (emphasis supplied).” In Vaca v. Sipes (1966), 386 U.S. 171 , 17 L.

2019See Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin, 385 Ill. 245, 256 (1943) (“where a tax is unauthorized by law, or where it is levied upon property exempt from taxation, equity will take jurisdiction and enjoin the collection of the tax”). ¶ 68 But all of that changed in 1975, when our supreme court severely curtailed the Owens- Illinois “unauthorized by law” exception to the exhaustion requirement.

1981This relief, the Director contends, citing Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358-59 , overruling Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin (1943), 385 Ill. 245 , which had provided an exception in equity to the exhaustion rule, is not permitted in a tax case unless a party has exhausted its administrative remedies or has shown special circumstances to avoid this requirement.

1980Exceptions to the exhaustion rule have been allowed where a statute, ordinance or rule is challenged as unconstitutional on its face (Bright v. City of Evanston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 178 , 139 N.E.2d 270 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540 , 370 N.E.2d 223 ), where multiple remedies exist before the same zoning board and at least one has been exhausted (Herman v. Village of Hillside (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 396 , 155 N.E.2d 47 ), where irreparable harm will result from further pursuit, of administrative remedies (Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery (1939), 373 Ill. 3

1980Exceptions to the exhaustion rule have been allowed where a statute, ordinance or rule is challenged as unconstitutional on its face (Bright v. City of Evanston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 178 , 139 N.E.2d 270 ; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540 , 370 N.E.2d 223 ), where multiple remedies exist before the same zoning board and at least one has been exhausted (Herman v. Village of Hillside (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 396 , 155 N.E.2d 47 ), where irreparable harm will result from further pursuit, of administrative remedies (Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery (1939), 373 Ill. 3

2022Thus, the failure of such a person “to exhaust his administrative remedies—or to plead exhaustion or assert some exception to the exhaustion requirement—provides a sound basis for the dismissal of his complaint.” Id.

2020Thus, we held that an SDP’s “failure to exhaust his administrative remedies—or to plead exhaustion or assert some exception to the exhaustion requirement—provides a sound basis for dismissal of his complaint.” Id. ¶ 24 Defendant contends that the exhaustion requirement is not absolute.

1984The court referred to policy reasons supporting the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement as stated in McKart v. United States (1969), 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194, 203-04 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 1662-63: (1) The requirement avoids interruption of the administrative process; (2) it allows the involved agency to develop the necessary factual background upon which to base a decision; (3) it allows the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its particular expertise; (4) the exhaustion requirement serves to improve the efficiency of the administrative process; (5) it serves to c

1984Ed. 2d 194, 203-04 , 89 S. Ct. 1657 , 1662-63: (1) The requirement avoids interruption of the administrative process; (2) it allows the involved agency to develop the necessary factual background upon which to base a decision; (3) it allows the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its particular expertise; (4) the exhaustion requirement serves to improve the efficiency of the administrative process; (5) it serves to conserve scarce judicial resources; (6) it gives the agency an opportunity to discover and correct its own errors; and (7) it avoids the possibility that frequent and deliber

2014App. 3d 1034, 1037 , 404 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (1980) (determining Springfield tavern cited for reducing drink prices for certain patrons on “ladies nights” could not maintain action for -7- injunction and declaratory judgment due to “well-settled law in this State that where administrative remedies are available, they must be exhausted before one can seek judicial review”); Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d 363 , 789 N.E.2d 1216 (Statesville inmate whose paints and other art materials were confiscated was expected to exhaust written grievance process prior to filing complaint for injunctive and declaratory

1990App. 3d 1034, 1037 , 404 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 .) The exhaustion doctrine allows full development of the facts before the administrative tribunal and allows the administrative agency to utilize its expertise.

2013See, Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309 (citing Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 359 , 326 N.E.2d 737 (1975) (finding an exception to the exhaustion doctrine, which antedated the Administrative Review Law, no longer applied but applied to the plaintiff's case as it arose before the enactment of the new law); and McKenna v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 90 Ill.

2013See Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309 (citing Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 359 (1975) (finding an exception to the exhaustion doctrine, which antedated the Administrative Review Law, no longer applied but applied to the plaintiff’s case as it arose before the enactment of the new law), and McKenna v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 90 Ill.

1988(See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill.2d 202 ; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill.2d 350 ; Village of Cary v. Pollution Control Board (1980), 82 Ill.

1988(See Fred-man Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 202 ; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. All-phin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350 ; Village of Cary v. Pollution Control Board, (1980), 82 Ill.