exhaustion requirement in Maine

2004The exhaustion doctrine does not, therefore, automatically bar the Plaintiff from seeking declaratory relief.” Annable, 507 A.2d at 595 (citations omitted).

2004One of the most important reasons for invoking the exhaustion doctrine is the courts’ unwillingness to interrupt the administrative process until that process is complete.” Id.

2007Co., 618 A.2d 731, 733 (Me.1992). [¶ 11] The Beanes contend that the exhaustion requirement applies only to those who have “a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy.” See 24-A M.R.S. § 4443(1).

2007Co., 618 A.2d 731, 733 (Me.1992). [¶ 11] The Beanes contend that the exhaustion requirement applies only to those who have "a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy." See 24-A M.R.S. § 4443(1).

2007I would conclude that it neither excludes claims covered by third party insurers from the requirement that the claims be exhausted, nor limits the application of the exhaustion requirement to claims against first party insurers. [¶ 19] Moreover, in Jackson Brook , we applied the exhaustion requirement of section 4443(1) to a claim against a third party liability insurer providing coverage against directors’ and officers’ liability; we held that MIGA was not hable for damages because the claimant failed to exhaust all of the claimant’s rights against a solvent liability insurer. 7 Jackson Brook

2007I would conclude that it neither excludes claims covered by third party insurers from the requirement that the claims be exhausted, nor limits the application of the exhaustion requirement to claims against first party insurers. [¶ 19] Moreover, in Jackson Brook , we applied the exhaustion requirement of section 4443(1) to a claim against a third party liability insurer providing coverage against directors’ and officers’ liability; we held that MIGA was not hable for damages because the claimant failed to exhaust all of the claimant’s rights against a solvent liability insurer. 7 Jackson Brook

2007Ass’n, 283 Pa.Super. 217 , 423 A.2d 1224, 1226-27 (1980) overruled by statute, other state courts have held that the exhaustion clause applies to nonparties as well, see e.g., H.K.

2007Ass’n, 283 Pa.Super. 217 , 423 A.2d 1224, 1226-27 (1980) overruled by statute, other state courts have held that the exhaustion clause applies to nonparties as well, see e.g., H.K.

2024The exhaustion principle allows agencies to “correct their own errors, clarify their policies, and reconcile conflicts before [an aggrieved party] resort[s] to judicial relief.” Id. at 409 (quotation marks omitted).

2015Occupational Exch., Inc., 473 A.2d 406 (discussing the exhaustion doctrine in reviewing a judgment entered in an administrative appeal). [¶ 28] For the same reasons, any due process claim that could be inferred from Marshall’s complaint was properly dismissed.

2024See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Boyce, 1997 ME 4 , { 11, 688 A.2d 908 (observing that the exhaustion requirement may be relaxed “[w]hen a party seeks relief that is beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative agency” and when it would be futile for the party to pursue the claim at the agency level (quotation marks omitted)). 8 The authority DHHS cites, Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, is not to the contrary. 1999 ME 112 , 736 A.2d 241 .

2024See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Boyce, 1997 ME 4 , { 11, 688 A.2d 908 (observing that the exhaustion requirement may be relaxed “[w]hen a party seeks relief that is beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative agency” and when it would be futile for the party to pursue the claim at the agency level (quotation marks omitted)). 8 The authority DHHS cites, Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, is not to the contrary. 1999 ME 112 , 736 A.2d 241 .

2024See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1978) (where “clear purport of [the] complaint” was that the administrative process was “unconstitutionally constituted and so did not provide ... an adequate administrative remedy,” plaintiffs did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies); see also id. at n. 14 (noting that “administrative remedies have been deemed inadequate by federal courts and hence not subject to the exhaustion requirement, on a variety of grounds’).

2024See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Boyce, 1997 ME 4 , { 11, 688 A.2d 908 (observing that the exhaustion requirement may be relaxed “[w]hen a party seeks relief that is beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative agency” and when it would be futile for the party to pursue the claim at the agency level (quotation marks omitted)). 8 The authority DHHS cites, Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, is not to the contrary. 1999 ME 112 , 736 A.2d 241 .

2024See Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Boyce, 1997 ME 4 , { 11, 688 A.2d 908 (observing that the exhaustion requirement may be relaxed “[w]hen a party seeks relief that is beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative agency” and when it would be futile for the party to pursue the claim at the agency level (quotation marks omitted)). 8 The authority DHHS cites, Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, is not to the contrary. 1999 ME 112 , 736 A.2d 241 .

2020See Medina-Claudio v Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2002).

2004LEXIS 109, at *6; Prutzman v. Armstrong, 90 Wash.2d 118 , 579 P.2d 359, 362 (1978); see also Vokey v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund, 381 Mass. 386 , 409 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1980) (“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement ... is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of insolvency.”).

2004LEXIS 109, at *6; Prutzman v. Armstrong, 90 Wash.2d 118 , 579 P.2d 359, 362 (1978); see also Vokey v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund, 381 Mass. 386 , 409 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1980) (“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement ... is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of insolvency.”).

2004LEXIS 109, at *6; Prutzman v. Armstrong, 90 Wash.2d 118 , 579 P.2d 359, 362 (1978); see also Vokey v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund, 381 Mass. 386 , 409 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1980) (“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement ... is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of insolvency.”).

2004LEXIS 109, at *6; Prutzman v. Armstrong, 90 Wash.2d 118 , 579 P.2d 359, 362 (1978); see also Vokey v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund, 381 Mass. 386 , 409 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1980) (“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement ... is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of insolvency.”).

2002See also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000) (prisoner required to exhaust administrative remedies even when money damages are sought).

1996F.D.I.C. v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Me.1992). 6 .Three distinct interpretations of section 1821(d)(13)(D) have emerged from the case law: (1) all affirmative defenses are subject to the exhaustion requirement, see e.g.

1996Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir.1993); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Schonacher, 844 F.Supp. 689, 694 (D.Kan.1994); and (3) only claims and counterclaims, not affirmative defenses, are subject to the exhaustion requirement.

1996Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir.1993); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Schonacher, 844 F.Supp. 689, 694 (D.Kan.1994); and (3) only claims and counterclaims, not affirmative defenses, are subject to the exhaustion requirement.

1996Corp. v. Shelton, 789 F.Supp. 1367, 1371 (M.D.La.1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Tri-State Realty Investors of K.C., Inc., 838 F.Supp. 1448, 1451 (D.Kan.1993); (2) only those affirmative defenses that could have been the basis for an independent claim against the receiver or failed institution are subject to the exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed.

1996Corp. v. Shelton, 789 F.Supp. 1367, 1371 (M.D.La.1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Tri-State Realty Investors of K.C., Inc., 838 F.Supp. 1448, 1451 (D.Kan.1993); (2) only those affirmative defenses that could have been the basis for an independent claim against the receiver or failed institution are subject to the exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed.

1996F.D.I.C. v. Barnaby, 839 F.Supp. 935, 939 (D.Me.1993); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins.

1986McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 , 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821 (Me.1984).

1984Moreover, as an Illinois Appellate Court noted, the rule is “primarily designed to allow administrative agencies to correct their own errors, clarify their policies, and reconcile conflicts before resorting to judicial relief.” Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. Mauck, 50 Ill.App.3d 823, 826 , 8 Ill.Dec. 665, 667 , 365 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (1977).

1984Moreover, as an Illinois Appellate Court noted, the rule is “primarily designed to allow administrative agencies to correct their own errors, clarify their policies, and reconcile conflicts before resorting to judicial relief.” Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. Mauck, 50 Ill.App.3d 823, 826 , 8 Ill.Dec. 665, 667 , 365 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (1977).