exhaustion requirement in District of Columbia

2017See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , 14 n.15, 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) ("Lay consumers of elec-trie service, the uninterrupted continuity of which is essential to health and safety, should be informed clearly of the availability of an opportunity to present their complaint.”); cf. Barnett, 491 A.2d at 1162 ("[A] major premise of the exhaustion rule is that the claimant enjoyed a fair opportunity to exhaust h[er] administrative remedies.”). 21 .Any effort Ms. Owens might now make to seek relief from DC Water would be untimely.

2008We know from Barnett and other cases that the exhaustion requirement is “not jurisdictional,” id. at 1163 , but the case law also tells us that it may be overlooked or ignored only “in exceptional cases.” Id.; see id. at 1164 (concurring opinion) (“cases which allow the exhaustion requirement to be relaxed all speak in terms of ‘exceptional,’ ‘extraordinary,’ or ‘compelling’ circumstances”); see also Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 486 (D.C.1989) (listing as exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine “inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and futility”).

1989See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 , 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (noting that the exhaustion doctrine is “an expression of executive and administrative autonomy”) (footnote omitted).

1989See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 , 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (noting that the exhaustion doctrine is “an expression of executive and administrative autonomy”) (footnote omitted).

2014Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (noting that there is an exception to the exhaustion requirement when the agency can only provide an inadequate remedy).

2006Admin., supra, 633 A.2d at 20-21 (holding that disappointed bidder claiming irreparable harm in order to avoid the exhaustion requirement must show entitlement to such extraordinary relief); Dano Resource, supra, 566 A.2d at 487 (affirming the trial court’s ruling that a contractor was subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement because it had failed to show that the appeals procedure was inadequate or otherwise futile).

2008We know from Barnett and other cases that the exhaustion requirement is “not jurisdictional,” id. at 1163 , but the case law also tells us that it may be overlooked or ignored only “in exceptional cases.” Id.; see id. at 1164 (concurring opinion) (“cases which allow the exhaustion requirement to be relaxed all speak in terms of ‘exceptional,’ ‘extraordinary,’ or ‘compelling’ circumstances”); see also Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 486 (D.C.1989) (listing as exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine “inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and futility”).

2008We know from Barnett and other cases that the exhaustion requirement is “not jurisdictional,” id. at 1163 , but the case law also tells us that it may be overlooked or ignored only “in exceptional cases.” Id.; see id. at 1164 (concurring opinion) (“cases which allow the exhaustion requirement to be relaxed all speak in terms of ‘exceptional,’ ‘extraordinary,’ or ‘compelling’ circumstances”); see also Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 486 (D.C.1989) (listing as exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine “inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and futility”).

2009See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 113, 155 (1998) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 , 50-51 & n. 9, 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938), and arguing that before the Myers decision, "[t]he Court had never before described the exhaustion doctrine as a rule of judicial administration,” applicable to both law and equity); Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L.J. 981 , 993 (1939) ("Although the exhaustion doctrine is a product of chancery, the rule has gradually been ex

2009See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 113, 155 (1998) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 , 50-51 & n. 9, 58 S.Ct. 459 , 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938), and arguing that before the Myers decision, "[t]he Court had never before described the exhaustion doctrine as a rule of judicial administration,” applicable to both law and equity); Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L.J. 981 , 993 (1939) ("Although the exhaustion doctrine is a product of chancery, the rule has gradually been ex

2017“The exhaustion requirement is intended to maintain proper relationships between courts and the agencies that have been given regulatory responsibility in certain specialized areas.” Davis & Assocs., 892 A.2d at 1148 .

2007See, e.g., Davis v. Williams 892 A.2d 1144 , 1148-49 & n. 5 (D.C.2006) ("[T]he exhaustion rule is not one of jurisdiction.”); Burton v. District of Columbia, 835 A.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C.2003) (quoting Barnett v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C.1985) and explaining that exhaustion doctrine "is simply a ‘rule of judicial administration’ rather than a jurisdictional requirement”). 4 .

1988This result is precisely what the exhaustion doctrine is intended to avoid.” Williams v. District of Columbia, supra, 467 A.2d at 142 (footnote omitted).

1986Cf. Williams v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 140 , 142 n. 7 (D.C.1983).

2017See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , 14 n.15, 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) ("Lay consumers of elec-trie service, the uninterrupted continuity of which is essential to health and safety, should be informed clearly of the availability of an opportunity to present their complaint.”); cf. Barnett, 491 A.2d at 1162 ("[A] major premise of the exhaustion rule is that the claimant enjoyed a fair opportunity to exhaust h[er] administrative remedies.”). 21 .Any effort Ms. Owens might now make to seek relief from DC Water would be untimely.

2017See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , 14 n.15, 98 S.Ct. 1554 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) ("Lay consumers of elec-trie service, the uninterrupted continuity of which is essential to health and safety, should be informed clearly of the availability of an opportunity to present their complaint.”); cf. Barnett, 491 A.2d at 1162 ("[A] major premise of the exhaustion rule is that the claimant enjoyed a fair opportunity to exhaust h[er] administrative remedies.”). 21 .Any effort Ms. Owens might now make to seek relief from DC Water would be untimely.

2016Innovation, Inc., 92 A.3d 1114, 1125 (D.C. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

2016Innovation, Inc., 92 A.3d 1114, 1125 (D.C.2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

2009See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 480 F.3d 104 , 118-19 & n. 18 (2d Cir.2007); see also Grullon v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir.2007) (clarifying, after Lin Zhong , that failure to take an administrative appeal forecloses circuit court jurisdiction). .

2009See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 480 F.3d 104 , 118-19 & n. 18 (2d Cir.2007); see also Grullon v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir.2007) (clarifying, after Lin Zhong , that failure to take an administrative appeal forecloses circuit court jurisdiction). .

2008Appellants rely upon a case where the Maryland Court of Appeals specifically ad *937 dressed the question: “Do the strictures of federal preemption require that we impose an exhaustion requirement in the context of a state tort action for abusive discharge?” See Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197 , 586 A.2d 1275, 1278 (1991).

2008Appellants rely upon a case where the Maryland Court of Appeals specifically ad *937 dressed the question: “Do the strictures of federal preemption require that we impose an exhaustion requirement in the context of a state tort action for abusive discharge?” See Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197 , 586 A.2d 1275, 1278 (1991).

2007See, e.g., Davis v. Williams 892 A.2d 1144 , 1148-49 & n. 5 (D.C.2006) ("[T]he exhaustion rule is not one of jurisdiction.”); Burton v. District of Columbia, 835 A.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C.2003) (quoting Barnett v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C.1985) and explaining that exhaustion doctrine "is simply a ‘rule of judicial administration’ rather than a jurisdictional requirement”). 4 .

2005For example, in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that “to exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim,” such that “[i]f the state stands on its time limits and rejects the filing as too late, then state remedies have not been properly invoked.” In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit joined “the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like [the federal habeas corpus statute], contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustio

2005For example, in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that “to exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim,” such that “[i]f the state stands on its time limits and rejects the filing as too late, then state remedies have not been properly invoked.” In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit joined “the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like [the federal habeas corpus statute], contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustio

2005For example, in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that “to exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim,” such that “[i]f the state stands on its time limits and rejects the filing as too late, then state remedies have not been properly invoked.” In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit joined “the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like [the federal habeas corpus statute], contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustio

2005For example, in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that “to exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim,” such that “[i]f the state stands on its time limits and rejects the filing as too late, then state remedies have not been properly invoked.” In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit joined “the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like [the federal habeas corpus statute], contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustio

2005For example, in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that “to exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim,” such that “[i]f the state stands on its time limits and rejects the filing as too late, then state remedies have not been properly invoked.” In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit joined “the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like [the federal habeas corpus statute], contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustio

2003See Fisher v. District of Columbia, 803 A.2d 962, 964 (D.C.2002) (“Although there is no formula for identifying such ‘compelling circumstances’ ... a lack of fault on the part of the claimant is a necessary prerequisite” (citation omitted)).

1997However, “the exhaustion requirement is not in general jurisdictional in nature, but rather must be applied in accord with its purposes.” Andrade v. Lauer, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 393 , 729 F.2d 1475, 1484 (1984) (as amended) (citations omitted).

1997However, “the exhaustion requirement is not in general jurisdictional in nature, but rather must be applied in accord with its purposes.” Andrade v. Lauer, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 393 , 729 F.2d 1475, 1484 (1984) (as amended) (citations omitted).