exhaustion requirement in Massachusetts

2015See Saint Luke’s Hosp. v. Labor Relations Commn., 320 Mass. 467, 469 (1946); East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Commn.

1989Relying on Saint Luke’s Hosp. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 320 Mass. 467, 470 (1946), the plaintiffs argue that they are excused from the exhaustion requirement on the ground that their claim is that DEQE lacks jurisdiction to consider the new plans.

2012Factors we have considered in determining whether to suspend the exhaustion requirement include: whether resort to the administrative remedy would be futile, Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 141 (1975); whether the case raises important public questions whose resolution will affect people beyond the parties to the case, East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 450 (1973); whether pursuing the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to either party, Everett v. Local 1656, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 368 (1

2007See East Chop Tennis Club, supra at 449 (exception to the exhaustion requirement generally not extended outside of the tax context); Kelleher v. Personnel Administrator of the Dept. of Personnel Admn., 421 Mass. 382, 385 (1995) (exception to exhaustion requirement “if the case presents a purely legal question of wide public significance”); Balcam v. Hingham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266-267 (1996).

2026See Hingham v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 451 Mass. 501, 502 (2008) (affirming dismissal of complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 2 Judgment affirmed.

2012Only in extraordinary cases may a court take jurisdiction of a matter that is pending before an administrative agency. 6 “Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement have been made when the administrative remedy is inadequate.” Hingham v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 451 Mass. 501, 509 (2008).

2012Factors we have considered in determining whether to suspend the exhaustion requirement include: whether resort to the administrative remedy would be futile, Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 141 (1975); whether the case raises important public questions whose resolution will affect people beyond the parties to the case, East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 450 (1973); whether pursuing the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to either party, Everett v. Local 1656, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 368 (1

2012Factors we have considered in determining whether to suspend the exhaustion requirement include: whether resort to the administrative remedy would be futile, Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 141 (1975); whether the case raises important public questions whose resolution will affect people beyond the parties to the case, East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 450 (1973); whether pursuing the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to either party, Everett v. Local 1656, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 368 (1

2008The town contends that the circumstances of this case warrant an exception to the exhaustion requirement because challenging the SHI presents a “novel and unique case” that is a matter of “particular public interest.” The town’s reliance on Kelleher v. Personnel Adm’r of the Dep’t of Personnel Admin., 421 Mass. 382, 385 (1995), and Norfolk Elec., Inc. v. Fall River Hous.

2007See East Chop Tennis Club, supra at 449 (exception to the exhaustion requirement generally not extended outside of the tax context); Kelleher v. Personnel Administrator of the Dept. of Personnel Admn., 421 Mass. 382, 385 (1995) (exception to exhaustion requirement “if the case presents a purely legal question of wide public significance”); Balcam v. Hingham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266-267 (1996).

2026The plaintiff was a tenured civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute.1 Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (commission). 1 A Civil Service Commission decision included in the record appendix shows that he had successfully challenged certain disciplinary actions taken against him in the past. 3 The exhaustion doctrine "is a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administ

2026The plaintiff was a tenured civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute.1 Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (commission). 1 A Civil Service Commission decision included in the record appendix shows that he had successfully challenged certain disciplinary actions taken against him in the past. 3 The exhaustion doctrine "is a sound principle of law and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the administ

2017See Liability Investigative Effort, Inc. v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of Massachusetts, 409 Mass. 734, 750-51 (1991). ‘The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies contemplates a situation where some administrative action has begun, but has not yet been completed; where there is no administrative proceeding under way, the exhaustion doctrine has no application.

2017In contrast, primary jurisdiction situations arise in cases where a plaintiff, in the absence of pending administrative proceedings, invokes the original jurisdiction of a court to decide the merits of a controversy.” Id., quoting Murphy, 377 Mass. at 220 .

2005Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (applying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to case where plaintiff-inmate alleged that corrections officers, including defendant Porter, subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation, and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of Eighth Amendment).

2003Id. at 521 .

2008Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement have been made when the administrative remedy is inadequate, “when important novel, or recurrent issues are at stake, when the decision has public significance, or when the case reduces to a question of law.” Luchini v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass. 403, 405 (2002), quoting Space Bldg.

2002Compare Luchini v. Commissioner of Rev., 436 Mass. 403, 404-405 (2002) (where the agency has jurisdiction to provide an administrative remedy, it should be invoked prior to seeking judicial relief in the absence of a demonstration that such remedy would be futile or seriously inadequate, under the exhaustion principle); Boston Edison Co. v. Brookline Realty & Investment Corp., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 66-67 (1980) (administrative rather than judicial resolution of a controversy within an agency’s authority is preferable under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).

2017In contrast, primary jurisdiction situations arise in cases where a plaintiff, in the absence of pending administrative proceedings, invokes the original jurisdiction of a court to decide the merits of a controversy.” Id., quoting Murphy, 377 Mass. at 220 .

2016In contrast, primary jurisdiction situations arise in cases where a plaintiff, in the absence of pending administrative proceedings, invokes the original jurisdiction of a court to decide the merits of a controversy.” Id., quoting Murphy, 377 Mass. at 220 .

2005“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement of the first sentence of sec. 9 is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of an insolvency.” Id. at 390 .

2005“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to render the Fund a source of last resort in the event of an insolvency.” Vokey v. Massachusetts Insurers Fund, 381 Mass. 386, 390 (1980).

2008Auth., 417 Mass. 207, 210 (1994), is misplaced.

2008Auth., 417 Mass. 207, 210-211 (1994), to support this futility argument is not apt.

2015Application of the exhaustion rule to any particular case requires an understanding not only of its purposes, but also “of the particular administrative scheme involved.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).

2012“Where prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a reasonable prisoner’s efforts to avail himself of an administrative remedy, they render that remedy ‘unavailable’ and a court will excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Carter v. Newland, 441 F.Sup.2d 208, 211 (D.Mass. 2006) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not a bar to suit where inmate’s “attempt to do so was thwarted by either government incompetence or misconduct”).

2012Factors we have considered in determining whether to suspend the exhaustion requirement include: whether resort to the administrative remedy would be futile, Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 141 (1975); whether the case raises important public questions whose resolution will affect people beyond the parties to the case, East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 450 (1973); whether pursuing the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to either party, Everett v. Local 1656, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 368 (1

2012Factors we have considered in determining whether to suspend the exhaustion requirement include: whether resort to the administrative remedy would be futile, Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 141 (1975); whether the case raises important public questions whose resolution will affect people beyond the parties to the case, East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 450 (1973); whether pursuing the administrative remedy will result in irreparable harm to either party, Everett v. Local 1656, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters, 411 Mass. 361, 368 (1

2012Just as prison employees cannot exploit the exhaustion requirement by not responding to grievances, they should not be rewarded for preventing an inmate access to an administrative remedy”); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (inmate’s claims not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where “prison officials denied him the necessary grievance forms”).

2011See generally Adelson v. DiPaola, 131 F.3d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1997) (“the exhaustion principle holds, in general, that a federal court will not entertain an application for habeas relief unless the petitioner first has fully exhausted his state remedies in respect to each and every claim contained within the application”).

2009The exhaustion doctrine is “inapplicable” where an agency has “no power to decree . . . relief.” Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993).

2009The company’s conflation of administrative exhaustion and primary jurisdiction “reflects a mistaken understanding of primary jurisdiction,” which applies to claims that are already “properly cognizable in court.” Id. at 268 . “[D]ismissing a case” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “in order to get an agency opinion on one issue,” rather than applying primary jurisdiction to stay or dismiss the case (see note 32, supra), “is tantamount to confusing primary jurisdiction with the exhaustion doctrine.” J.L.

2008The town further claims that the “unique hardship” placed on it due to the administrative agency’s disregard for its guidelines as well as the “[tjown’s inability to independently appeal augers in favor of not requiring exhaustion.” The town’s reliance on Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 421 Mass. 570, 588 (1996), does not help its argument.

2008The town also contends that the “only mechanism to obtain review of the SHI requires . . . manipulation of the comprehensive permitting process to obtain an appeal.” Its reliance on Planning Bd. of Hingham v. Hingham Campus, LLC, 438 Mass. 364, 370 (2003), to support this claim is misplaced.

2008See Federman v. Board of Appeals of Marblehead, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 729-730 (1994) (appeal not ripe where “administrative tribunal has choices to make about the result, in nuance and fundamental conclusion”). 7 There is no merit to the town’s argument that the circumstances of this case warrant an exception to the exhaustion requirement because “resort to the agency would be futile” given that the HAC determined that the WDC is not affordable housing and that “[compelling a futile remand . . . cuts against the. . . purpose of Chapter 40B — ‘to expedite [comprehensive permit] applications.’

2007See East Chop Tennis Club, supra at 449 (exception to the exhaustion requirement generally not extended outside of the tax context); Kelleher v. Personnel Administrator of the Dept. of Personnel Admn., 421 Mass. 382, 385 (1995) (exception to exhaustion requirement “if the case presents a purely legal question of wide public significance”); Balcam v. Hingham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266-267 (1996).

2007See East Chop Tennis Club, supra at 449 (exception to the exhaustion requirement generally not extended outside of the tax context); Kelleher v. Personnel Administrator of the Dept. of Personnel Admn., 421 Mass. 382, 385 (1995) (exception to exhaustion requirement “if the case presents a purely legal question of wide public significance”); Balcam v. Hingham, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 266-267 (1996).