exhaustion requirement in Maryland

2015Soley v. State Comm’n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526 , 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976). *217 “We have recognized a few limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, the principal one being an action challenging the validity of a legislative enactment on its face.” Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 294 Md. 225, 232 , 449 A.2d 385, 388 (1982).

2015Soley v. State Comm’n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526 , 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976). *217 “We have recognized a few limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, the principal one being an action challenging the validity of a legislative enactment on its face.” Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 294 Md. 225, 232 , 449 A.2d 385, 388 (1982).

2021Soley explained that the exhaustion rule is based, in part, on the “discretionary nature” of agency decisions and the “expertise” that “the agency can bring to bear in sifting the information presented.” Id. 2 At the hearing on the motions, without objection, counsel for the developers explained: [COUNSEL FOR DEVELOPERS]: The Preliminary Plan approval allows the Owner Developer to subdivide the property.

2017When a legislature provides an administrative remedy as the exclusive or primary means by which an aggrieved party may challenge a government action, the doctrine of administrative exhaustion requires the aggrieved party to exhaust the prescribed process of administrative remedies before seeking “any other” remedy or “invok[ing] the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts.” Soley v. State Comm’n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526 , 356 A.2d 254 (1976) (emphasis added). 12 The Court in Soley explained that the exhaustion rule is based, in part, on the “discretionary nature” of agency decisions an

2015Comm’r v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 622 , 664 A.2d 862 (1995)). *296 When a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, courts normally dismiss the action, “because, although the court may well have subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it, the exhaustion doctrine bars the court from exercising that jurisdiction, thereby gratifying the paramount legislative intent that the matter be dealt with first by the Executive Branch agency.” State Ret. & Pension Sys. v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 65-66 , 792 A.2d 277 (2002).

2015Comm’r v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 622 , 664 A.2d 862 (1995)). *296 When a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, courts normally dismiss the action, “because, although the court may well have subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it, the exhaustion doctrine bars the court from exercising that jurisdiction, thereby gratifying the paramount legislative intent that the matter be dealt with first by the Executive Branch agency.” State Ret. & Pension Sys. v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 65-66 , 792 A.2d 277 (2002).

2007Such express language ‘is totally inconsistent with the notion that the [administrative agency’s] jurisdiction over [the matter] can be circumvented[.]’ ”)(quoting McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 609 , 552 A.2d 881 (1989)) (alterations in Md.

2007Such express language ‘is totally inconsistent with the notion that the [administrative agency’s] jurisdiction over [the matter] can be circumvented[.]’ ”)(quoting McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 609 , 552 A.2d 881 (1989)) (alterations in Md.

2007Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 457 , 758 A.2d 995, 1005 (2000) (“[T]he constitutional exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply when the constitutional challenge to a statute ‘as a whole’ involves the need for some factual exploration, which may be necessary when statutory classifications are challenged on equal protection grounds or under Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); Ins.

2007Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 457 , 758 A.2d 995, 1005 (2000) (“[T]he constitutional exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply when the constitutional challenge to a statute ‘as a whole’ involves the need for some factual exploration, which may be necessary when statutory classifications are challenged on equal protection grounds or under Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); Ins.

2023Comm’rs, 457 Md. 1, 13 (2017) (stating that just because a claim is properly within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency “does not mean that the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction over the claim[], or necessitate[] the dismissal of the action before the court”; instead, the appropriate course of action is to stay proceedings pending ‘“a final administrative determination’” (quoting Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 660 (2004))); State Ret. & Pension Sys. v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 66 (2002) (“[A]lthough the court may well have subject matter jurisdictio

2015Comm’r v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 622 , 664 A.2d 862 (1995)). *296 When a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, courts normally dismiss the action, “because, although the court may well have subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it, the exhaustion doctrine bars the court from exercising that jurisdiction, thereby gratifying the paramount legislative intent that the matter be dealt with first by the Executive Branch agency.” State Ret. & Pension Sys. v. Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 65-66 , 792 A.2d 277 (2002).

2020We noted that in Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Board, 262 Md. 632 , 643–44 (1971), we “held that ‘there is no fundamental barrier to conferring on the legislative branch of a chartered county the right to constitute itself a zoning body,’ and to delegate to that zoning body both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial zoning functions.” MRA II, 342 Md. at 495– 96.

1996This Court in Turf Valley v. Zoning Board, 262 Md. 632, 639, 643-644 , 278 A.2d 574, 577-580 (1971), held that “there is no fundamental barrier to conferring on the legislative branch of a chartered county the right to constitute itself a zoning body,” and to delegate to that zoning body both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial zoning functions.

2019Furthermore, administrative agencies “are fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality and the validity of statutes or ordinances in adjudicatory administrative proceedings which are subject to judicial review.” Furnitureland South, Inc. v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 138 (2001) (quoting Montgomery Cnty. v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438 , 451 n. 8 (2000)).

2019Furthermore, administrative agencies “are fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality and the validity of statutes or ordinances in adjudicatory administrative proceedings which are subject to judicial review.” Furnitureland South, Inc. v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 138 (2001) (quoting Montgomery Cnty. v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438 , 451 n. 8 (2000)).

2015Specifically with regard to the tax scheme at issue here, the Court of Appeals “has consistently treated the special statutory administrative remedies for the determination of tax questions to be exclusive or primary.” Furnitureland S., Inc., 364 Md. at 134 , 771 A.2d 1061 (cataloguing prior holdings); accord White v. Prince George’s Cnty., 282 Md. 641, 649-50 , 387 A.2d 260 (1978) These exclusive remedies are set forth in the Tax-General Article, which we detailed at the outset of this opinion.

2015Specifically with regard to the tax scheme at issue here, the Court of Appeals “has consistently treated the special statutory administrative remedies for the determination of tax questions to be exclusive or primary.” Furnitureland S., Inc., 364 Md. at 134 , 771 A.2d 1061 (cataloguing prior holdings); accord White v. Prince George’s Cnty., 282 Md. 641, 649-50 , 387 A.2d 260 (1978) These exclusive remedies are set forth in the Tax-General Article, which we detailed at the outset of this opinion.

2011Perhaps, under a different set of circumstances, the principles marshaled in the Dissenting opinion might have been applicable and made a difference; here, it appears they do not. [1] The pragmatic flexibility of the exhaustion rule is further demonstrated in Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n. v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 17-18 , 511 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1986), a case representative of our procedural approach in an administrative exhaustion case.

2011Perhaps, under a different set of circumstances, the principles marshaled in the Dissenting opinion might have been applicable and made a difference; here, it appears they do not. [1] The pragmatic flexibility of the exhaustion rule is further demonstrated in Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n. v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 17-18 , 511 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1986), a case representative of our procedural approach in an administrative exhaustion case.

2001As we recently reiterated in Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, supra, 360 Md. at 451 n. 8, 758 A.2d at *138 1002 n. 8, “[ujnder Maryland law, administrative agencies are fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality and the validity of statutes or ordinances in adjudicatory administrative proceedings which are subject to judicial review.” See also, e.g., Josephson v. Annapolis, supra, 353 Md. at 677 , 728 A.2d at 694-695 ; Holiday Point Marina v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 349 Md. at 199-200, 707 A.2d at 834 , and cases there cited.

2001As we recently reiterated in Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, supra, 360 Md. at 451 n. 8, 758 A.2d at *138 1002 n. 8, “[ujnder Maryland law, administrative agencies are fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality and the validity of statutes or ordinances in adjudicatory administrative proceedings which are subject to judicial review.” See also, e.g., Josephson v. Annapolis, supra, 353 Md. at 677 , 728 A.2d at 694-695 ; Holiday Point Marina v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 349 Md. at 199-200, 707 A.2d at 834 , and cases there cited.

2017In 1980, the Court of Appeals decided Blumberg, in which the Court compiled a list of five exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine derived from Maryland cases decided over the previous 40 to 50 years. 16 Prince George’s Cnty. v. Blumberg, 288 *201 Md. 275, 283-85, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980).

2009The Court of Appeals laid out five recognized exceptions to the exhaustion rule in Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284-85 , 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), as follows: 1.

2018App. 178 , 200, 157 A.3d 301 (2017) ; see also McKart v. U.S. , 395 U.S. 185 , 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (Citation omitted) (explaining that the exhaustion doctrine at the federal level is "an expression of executive and administrative autonomy").

2018App. 178 , 200, 157 A.3d 301 (2017) ; see also McKart v. U.S. , 395 U.S. 185 , 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (Citation omitted) (explaining that the exhaustion doctrine at the federal level is "an expression of executive and administrative autonomy").

2020We noted that in Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Board, 262 Md. 632 , 643–44 (1971), we “held that ‘there is no fundamental barrier to conferring on the legislative branch of a chartered county the right to constitute itself a zoning body,’ and to delegate to that zoning body both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial zoning functions.” MRA II, 342 Md. at 495– 96.

2007Reclamation v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476, 493 , 677 A.2d 567 (1996) (“When the legislative body expressly states that the administrative remedy is primary or exclusive or must be exhausted, the mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement is underscored.

2007The inmate asserted breach of contract and negligence claims against the medical provider, but the trial court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLA. 20 The Court of Appeals held that the administrative exhaustion requirement of the PLA did not encompass “prisoner malpractice lawsuits filed against private contractors who provide medical services to prisoners under the control and responsibility of the [Division of Correction].” Id. at 250 , 753 A.2d 501 (Emphasis added.) In reaching its decision, the Court looked to C.J. § 5-1001(c), which defines “ci

2007The inmate asserted breach of contract and negligence claims against the medical provider, but the trial court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLA. 20 The Court of Appeals held that the administrative exhaustion requirement of the PLA did not encompass “prisoner malpractice lawsuits filed against private contractors who provide medical services to prisoners under the control and responsibility of the [Division of Correction].” Id. at 250 , 753 A.2d 501 (Emphasis added.) In reaching its decision, the Court looked to C.J. § 5-1001(c), which defines “ci

2005See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 455-60 , 758 A.2d 995, 1004-07 (2000) (chronicling the development and scope of the “constitutional exception” to the exhaustion doctrine and emphasizing that it is very “narrow”); Shipp v. Bevard, 291 Md. 590, 599 , 435 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1981).

2005See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 455-60 , 758 A.2d 995, 1004-07 (2000) (chronicling the development and scope of the “constitutional exception” to the exhaustion doctrine and emphasizing that it is very “narrow”); Shipp v. Bevard, 291 Md. 590, 599 , 435 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1981).