exhaustion requirement in Florida

2009In State, Department of Environmental Regulation v. Falls Chase Special Taxing District, 424 So.2d 787, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), we recognized an important exception to the exhaustion doctrine: When an agency acts without colorable statutory authority that is clearly in excess of its delegated powers, a party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

2009Mr. Santana’s claim that the DOC has no lawful authority to hold him is analogous to a “challenge to agency jurisdiction,” which, when made “on persuasive grounds,” constitutes “a widely recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine.” Falls Chase, 424 So.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).

2025The exhaustion requirement is a court-created prudential doctrine; it is a matter of policy, not of power.’” (quoting State, Dep’t of Rev. v. Brock, 576 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. denied, 584 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1991))).

2024Cf. State, Dep’t of Rev. v. Brock, 576 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“The exhaustion requirement is a court-created prudential doctrine; it is a matter of policy, not of power.”).

2000Co. v. State of Fla., Dep't of Ins., 458 So.2d 22, 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)("We disagree also with Criterion's argument that section 120.59(3), by using the words "appealable or enjoinable", authorizes a statutory means for permitting entry into the circuit court without complying with the exhaustion doctrine.

1988In Criterion Insurance Company v. State Department of Insurance, 458 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed, 461 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1984), this court stated that the fact that an alternative judicial remedy is explicitly recognized by the Administrative Procedure Act does not mean the exhaustion requirement may be dispensed with, citing Willis and Mitchell .

2024“In this manner, the exhaustion requirement permits full development of the facts, allows the agency to employ its discretion and expertise, and helps preserve executive and administrative autonomy.” Id. (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 193–94 (1969)); see also Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The doctrine which requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies is based upon considerations of policy, rather than of jurisdiction.” (citing Brock, 576 So. 2d 848 )); Fla. Dep’t of Health v. TropiFlora, LLC, 265 So. 3d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)

2015A challenge to agency jurisdiction on persuasive grounds is a widely recognized exception. to the exhaustion doctrine.”) (citation and footnote omitted); Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla., 1st DCA, 1998) (“The doctrine which requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies is based upon considerations of policy, rather than of jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).

2025Owners Ass’n, 392 So. 3d 602 , 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (Kilbane, J. 10 concurring specially) (quoting Brock, 576 So. 2d at 850 ); see also Gulf Pines Mem’l Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Mem'l Park, 361 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978); Fla. Soc'y of Newspaper Eds., Inc. v. Fla. Pub.

2024The exhaustion requirement is a court-created prudential doctrine; it is a matter of policy, not of power,” State, Dep’t of Rev. v. Brock, 576 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Gulf Pines Mem’l Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Mem’l Park, 361 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978); Fla. Soc’y of Newspaper Eds., Inc. v. Fla. Pub.

1985Department of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

1984See State ex rel Dept. of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

1983In Odham , which itself reversed an intervening circuit court, the Supreme Court delivered a general historical survey of the exhaustion principle, and in dicta not controlling Odham or any decision cited by Odham , drew from textbooks the phrases now seized upon by the majority, that "courts have unhesitatingly intervened" when "agencies have attempted to act beyond the powers delegated to them" or when "the invalidity of the administrative act is not subject to reasonable differences of opinion." What was remarkable about Odham was not this inoperative dicta but the result itself, a reversal

1982The opinion further emphasizes the exhaustion requirement by quoting with approval the following statement from Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So.2d 586, 593 (Fla. 1961): "[C]ourts must refrain from `promiscuous intervention' in agency affairs `except for the most urgent reasons.'" Id. at 698 .

2024While “the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes judicial intervention where available administrative remedies can afford the relief a litigant seeks,” Norman v. Ambler, 46 So. 3d 178, 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “the doctrine . . . is not jurisdictional.

2024Bd. of Trs. of Broward Comm. Coll. v. Caldwell, 959 So. 2d 767, 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); People’s Tr.

2024See Wilson v. County of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“[F]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that is not apparent on the face of the complaint.

2024Catholic High Sch., 867 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on the need to avoid prematurely interrupting the administrative process, and to enable the agency 2 While the Florida Supreme Court has not explicitly held that application of the exhaustion doctrine does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction, it has explained that application of the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine, which it described as a companion of the exhaustion doctrine, “is a matter of deference, policy and comity, not subject matter jurisdiction.”

2024“In this manner, the exhaustion requirement permits full development of the facts, allows the agency to employ its discretion and expertise, and helps preserve executive and administrative autonomy.” Id. (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 193–94 (1969)); see also Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The doctrine which requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies is based upon considerations of policy, rather than of jurisdiction.” (citing Brock, 576 So. 2d 848 )); Fla. Dep’t of Health v. TropiFlora, LLC, 265 So. 3d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)

2024Brock, 576 So. 2d at 850 ; TropiFlora, LLC, 265 So. 3d at 675 .

2024MGA, LLC v. Pesta, 279 So. 3d 821 , 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 5 2019) (“We have stated that failure to exhaust administrative remedies goes to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a matter.”); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Bugliaro, 273 So. 3d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Since [section 215.26, Florida Statutes (2016)] requires that an aggrieved party pursue his or her administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction in this case.”). 2 This court has previously recognized the prudential nature of the exhaustion principle: As

2022Ultimately, UM coverage exists solely to protect claimants who, because of a lack of insurance or not enough insurance, cannot be made whole. 1 See Young, 753 So. 2d at 86 (“The critical question in determining whether a motorist is uninsured or underinsured is whether the tortfeasor possesses insurance that will make the injured party whole.”).

2022“The exhaustion requirement includes ‘pursuing an appeal from an administrative ruling where a method of appeal is available.’” Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Best Care Assurance, LLC, 302 So. 3d 1012 , 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Robinson v. Dep’t of Health, 89 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)).

2018See § 760.11, Fla. Stat. (2011); Sheridan v. State, Dep’t of Health, 182 So. 3d 787, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Carter v. Health Mgmt.

2015This judicially-created exception provides that it is permissible to pursue declaratory relief in a circuit court — without first pursuing and exhausting administrative remedies — if “an agency acts without colorable statutory authority that is clearly in excess of its delegated powers.” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.2d 539, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); e.g., Curry, 722 So.2d at 878 (outlining the basis for the exception, providing that when “an agency acts without the benefit of any rule, and in a manner clearly in excess of its statutory authorization, the ac