22 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ranes v. Adams Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2023“Summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff’s claim lacks evidence to support a jury question on an essential element of the claim.” Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa 2010). 2022“Summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff’s claim lacks evidence to support a jury question on an essential element of the claim.” Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 685 . | 3 | 4 |
Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bankgreen2 sentences2024See Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 736 (Iowa 2009) (“Justifiable reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraud.”); cf. Lauer, 118 N.W. at 449 (holding that exclusion of a contract that had “bearing upon the issues in the case” was “manifestly prejudicial”). 2021“Justifiable reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraud.” Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 736 (Iowa 2009). “[T]he justified standard followed in Iowa means the reliance does not necessarily need to conform to the standard of a reasonably prudent person, but depends on the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff and the specific surrounding circumstances.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Parish v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.green2 sentences2010Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006). 2010Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006). | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Marriage of Cutlergreen2 sentences2009In re Marriage of Cutler, 588 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 1999). 2009In re Marriage of Cutler, 588 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 1999). | 2 | 2 |
Lauer v. Banninggreen1 sentence2024See Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 736 (Iowa 2009) (“Justifiable reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraud.”); cf. Lauer, 118 N.W. at 449 (holding that exclusion of a contract that had “bearing upon the issues in the case” was “manifestly prejudicial”). | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Ridco & Twin City Fire Ins. Co.green1 sentence2017Nonetheless, “[a]n insurer need not expressly rely upon the advice of counsel to waive the attorney-client privilege.” An insurer may impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege “by injecting privileged communications into a case.” When “an insurer makes factual assertions in defense of a claim which incorporate, expressly or implicitly, the advice and judgment of its counsel, it cannot deny an opposing party ‘an opportunity to uncover the foundation for those assertions in order to contradict them.’” “A waiver is to be predicated not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to aban | 1 | 1 |
Sievers v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence2003Co., 581 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2001Prevailing law in Iowa indicates that the only túne evidence of superseding cause is an essential element of a defense case (meaning that the trial court cannot exclude it as evidence), is when that cause is the sole proximate cause of the ultimate injury suf *303 fered. 1 See State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 2000). 2001See id. (citing People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 697 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 , 358 N.E.2d 487 -492 (1976)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2001See id. (citing People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 697 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 , 358 N.E.2d 487 -492 (1976)). 2001See id. (citing People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 697 , 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 , 358 N.E.2d 487 -492 (1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Milton v. Des Moinesgreen1 sentence1996The United States Supreme Court has stated that even a prevailing party may be denied attorney fees: “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citation omitted); accord Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 87 , 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Farrar v. Hobbygreen2 sentences1996The United States Supreme Court has stated that even a prevailing party may be denied attorney fees: “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citation omitted); accord Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 87 , 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). 1996The United States Supreme Court has stated that even a prevailing party may be denied attorney fees: “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citation omitted); accord Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 87 , 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Pan American Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1996The United States Supreme Court has stated that even a prevailing party may be denied attorney fees: “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citation omitted); accord Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 87 , 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). 1996The United States Supreme Court has stated that even a prevailing party may be denied attorney fees: “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 (citation omitted); accord Milton v. Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 945 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 87 , 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., Inc.green1 sentence1995See Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Iowa 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc.green1 sentence1995See Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Iowa 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Nesler v. Fisher and Co., Inc.green1 sentence1994Nesler v. Fisher & Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Iowa 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1980The trial court did not instruct the jury that defendant’s statement was slanderous per se. 1 The court, however, did follow New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and instructed the jury that plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence as an essential element of his claim that defendant made the statement with “actual malice.” The court defined actual malice in the following way: “A statement is made with actual malice, as that term is used in this charge, if it is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whethe 1980The trial court did not instruct the jury that defendant’s statement was slanderous per se. 1 The court, however, did follow New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and instructed the jury that plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence as an essential element of his claim that defendant made the statement with “actual malice.” The court defined actual malice in the following way: “A statement is made with actual malice, as that term is used in this charge, if it is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whethe | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Kellogg v. Payne
green
2 sentences1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. 1936Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 , 32 N. W. 385 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 . | 2 | 1936–1939 |
Brown v. McLeish
neutral
2 sentences1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. 1936Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 , 32 N. W. 385 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 . | 2 | 1936–1939 |
Norton v. Day Coal Co.
green
2 sentences1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. 1937If as to the result, and in the employment of the means he acts entirely independently of the master, he must be regarded as an independent contractor. * * * In all of the cases decided by this court, particular emphasis has been given to the right of the employer to dictate and control the manner, means, and details of performing the services. * * * Unless the employer has the right to direct the means and manner of doing the work, and has the right of control over the employee, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable. * * * An essential element of this doctrine is the right of | 2 | 1937–1939 |
Lembke v. Fritz
green
2 sentences1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. 1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. 1939Brown v. McLeish, 71 Iowa 381 ; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 .” To the same effect, see Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160 , 180 N. W. 905 . *171 Cases such, as Lembke v. Fritz, 223 Iowa 261 , 272 N. W. 300 ; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847 , 234 N. W. 254 ; and similar eases cited and relied upon by appellee present entirely different fact situations. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Pace v. Appanoose County
green
1 sentence1937The poiver to direct must go beyond telling what is to be done, — to telling ‘ how it is to be done’.” The court further states: "It is elementary doctrine * * that one is not an employee if he may choose his own method of working. ’ ’ In Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498 , loc. cit. 514, 168 N. W. 916 , 921, the court quotes with approval from the case of See v. Leidecker, 152 Ky. 724 , 154 S. W. 10 : "One who contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and executing the work either entirely in accordance with his own ideas, or in accordance with a plan previ | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Root v. Shadbolt & Middleton
green
1 sentence1937The poiver to direct must go beyond telling what is to be done, — to telling ‘ how it is to be done’.” The court further states: "It is elementary doctrine * * that one is not an employee if he may choose his own method of working. ’ ’ In Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498 , loc. cit. 514, 168 N. W. 916 , 921, the court quotes with approval from the case of See v. Leidecker, 152 Ky. 724 , 154 S. W. 10 : "One who contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and executing the work either entirely in accordance with his own ideas, or in accordance with a plan previ | 1 | 1937–1937 |
See v. Leidecker
green
2 sentences1937The poiver to direct must go beyond telling what is to be done, — to telling ‘ how it is to be done’.” The court further states: "It is elementary doctrine * * that one is not an employee if he may choose his own method of working. ’ ’ In Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498 , loc. cit. 514, 168 N. W. 916 , 921, the court quotes with approval from the case of See v. Leidecker, 152 Ky. 724 , 154 S. W. 10 : "One who contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and executing the work either entirely in accordance with his own ideas, or in accordance with a plan previ 1937The poiver to direct must go beyond telling what is to be done, — to telling ‘ how it is to be done’.” The court further states: "It is elementary doctrine * * that one is not an employee if he may choose his own method of working. ’ ’ In Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498 , loc. cit. 514, 168 N. W. 916 , 921, the court quotes with approval from the case of See v. Leidecker, 152 Ky. 724 , 154 S. W. 10 : "One who contracts to do a specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants, and executing the work either entirely in accordance with his own ideas, or in accordance with a plan previ | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Donahue v. Prosser
neutral
1 sentence1915Appellant cites Donahue v. Prosser, 10 Iowa 276 , and cases from other jurisdictions on the point that restoration of property is an essential element of the defense of undue influence. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.