essential element claim in Utah

2026As noted above, “where the burden of production falls on the nonmoving party, . . . the moving party may carry its burden of persuasion without putting on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim.” Salo, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

2022See Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 2 , 417 P.3d 581 (explaining that where the nonmoving party “will bear the burden of production at trial . . . the moving party may carry its burden of persuasion” on a motion for summary judgment—“without putting on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim”). ¶21 In support of her fraud claim, Nelson alleged in her complaint that Houghtalen made the following false representations: (a) That he would procure a private lender who would advance funds to [Nelson]; (b) That the private len

2026See supra n.5. 20241273-CA 14 2026 UT App 106 Hammon v. Zoom Inc. on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim.

2023See Zendler v. University of Utah Health Care, 2020 UT App 143, ¶ 15 , 476 P.3d 1009 (holding that when a party that does not carry the burden of proof at trial moves for summary judgment, that party “may carry its burden of persuasion without putting on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim” (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2021). ¶19 Because Brinkerhoff could not prove causation without an expert, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Fleming. 4 4.

2023See Zendler v. University of Utah Health Care, 2020 UT App 143, ¶ 15 , 476 P.3d 1009 (holding that when a party that does not carry the burden of proof at trial moves for summary judgment, that party “may carry its burden of persuasion without putting on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim” (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2021). ¶19 Because Brinkerhoff could not prove causation without an expert, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Fleming. 4 4.

2023See Zendler v. University of Utah Health Care, 2020 UT App 143, ¶ 15 , 476 P.3d 1009 (holding that when a party that does not carry the burden of proof at trial moves for summary judgment, that party “may carry its burden of persuasion without putting on any evidence of its own—by showing that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support an essential element of a claim” (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2021). ¶19 Because Brinkerhoff could not prove causation without an expert, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Fleming. 4 4.

2014Supply, *1009 Inc. v. Star Mountain Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App 70 , ¶ 5, 277 P.3d 649 (quoting Jones, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 23 , 214 P.3d 859 ); see also Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (defining excusable neglect as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar cireunmstances" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2006The rule bars the rescuer’s recovery “for the very valid public policy reason that the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter was employed to confront.” Wag-goner, 894 S.W.2d at 915 (adopting rule). ¶ 20 In one of the earliest cases to adopt the professional-rescuer doctrine, Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court explained the absence of the duty element of negligence, stating: In terms of duty, it may be said there is none owed the fireman to exercise care so as not to require the spe

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all”); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) (“[AJttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.”); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all”); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) (“[AJttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.”); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See John Price Assoc., 615 P.2d at 1214 .

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all”); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) (“[AJttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.”); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all"); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) ("[A]ttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages."); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all”); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) (“[AJttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.”); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all"); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) ("[A]ttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages."); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all”); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) (“[AJttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages.”); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1998See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 , 113 S.Ct. 566 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (holding that if plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all"); see also Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1996) ("[A]ttorney fees and costs are usually not appropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages."); Griffith v. Colorado Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir.1994) (failure of plaintiff to obtain success in litigation precluded attorney fee award);

1994See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550 cmt. a, at 118 (1977); see also Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah App.1994) (failure of proof on an essential element of claim properly results in summary judgment).