54 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1883–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Purtill v. Hessgreen2 sentences2026Id. (citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986)). ¶ 25 If the respondent moves for summary judgment based on a lack of evidence, then the burden shifts to the petitioner to provide factual support for the elements of his or her claim. 2025Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 , 240–41 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). | 2 | 3 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Green v. State, 2023 IL App (1st) 220245, ¶ 22 . 2023See Green v. State of Illinois, 2023 IL App (1st) 220245, ¶ 22 (where we noted that this is “perhaps a more clarifying name”). | 2 | 2 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen2 sentences2025Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 2025Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 , 240–41 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Lesmangreen2 sentences2010Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Lesman, 186 Ill. 2010Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Lesman, 186 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
American Federation v. LABOR RELATIONS BD.green2 sentences2006Again, in this context, the essential element in the analysis is “ ‘whether a putative joint employer’s control over employment matters is direct and immediate.’ ” American Federation, 216 Ill. 2d at 580, quoting Airbourne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597 , 597 n.1 (2002). 2006Again, in this context, the essential element in the analysis is A >whether a putative joint employer=s control over employment matters is direct and immediate.= @ American Federation, 216 Ill. 2d at 580, quoting Airbourne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597 , 597 n.1 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Morris v. Margulisgreen2 sentences2005Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 , 754 N.E.2d 314, 318 (2001). 2005Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 , 754 N.E.2d 314, 318 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Prakash v. Parulekargreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 1 | 1 |
D'Attomo v. Baumbeckgreen1 sentence2026See D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865 , ¶ 64. ¶ 38 B. | 1 | 1 |
Bill Daily, M.D., & Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs., P.C. v. Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C.green1 sentence2025Daily v. Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., 2018 IL App (5th) 150384, ¶ 31 (“An essential element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is damages proximately caused by the breach.”). | 1 | 1 |
Maldonado v. Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc.green1 sentence2024See Maldonado, 296 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2023In Jackson, the court found the error in jury polling was not structural error because an error in the permissive procedure did not necessarily deny the fundamental right to juror unanimity and was “not an essential element of the framework within which a criminal trial proceeds.” Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶¶ 47, 65 . | 1 | 1 |
Hermansen v. Riebandtgreen1 sentence2023See Hermansen v. Riebandt, 2020 IL App (1st) 191735, ¶ 79 (reciting elements). | 1 | 1 |
Waltz v. Schlattmangreen1 sentence2022See Waltz v. Schlattman, 81 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Vaughn v. Speakergreen1 sentence2021See Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 161-62 (1988) (“a waiver does not necessarily imply that the party asserting it has been misled to his detriment”). ¶ 56 Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, their claim in count I of the second amended complaint for damages resulting from ComEd’s trespassing. | 1 | 1 |
| Jackiewicz v. Village of Bolingbrookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aero Services International, Inc. v. Human Rights Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hayward v. C.H. Robinson Company, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lagen v. Balcor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 726155green | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Vanden Dorpelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swager v. Courigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1991App.3d 1075 , 103 Ill.Dec. 546 , 501 N.E.2d 863 , cited by defendant, defendant here was not deprived of evidence of an essential element of his defense because of the lack of proper instruction. 1991App.3d 1075 , 103 Ill.Dec. 546 , 501 N.E.2d 863 , cited by defendant, defendant here was not deprived of evidence of an essential element of his defense because of the lack of proper instruction. | 4 | 1987–1991 |
David Netto v. Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation)
green
2 sentences1999Netto, 863 F.2d at 1214 . 1998The Netto court did, however, make that decision implicitly when it stated: “[E]ven if we were to allow such claims, Netto’s failure to adduce any evidence to establish an essential element of his claim — unconscionable or outrageous conduct by Amtrak — would preclude recovery.” (Emphasis added.) Netto, 863 F.2d at 1214 . | 3 | 1998–1999 |
Garrido v. Arena
green
2 sentences2026Id. - 14 - No. 1-24-0650 ¶ 52 This court has determined that a claim is “meritless” if the movant disproves an essential element of the claim. 2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Moore
green
2 sentences2010Plaintiff responded that pursuant to this court’s decision in People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162 (1990), collateral estoppel did not apply to statutory summary suspension hearings, so that issues decided in those hearings could be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. 2010Plaintiff responded that pursuant to this court’s decision in People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162 (1990), collateral estoppel did not apply to statutory summary suspension hearings, so that issues decided in those hearings could be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Harris v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1999Harris, 720 F.Supp. at 568 . 1999Harris, 720 F. Supp. at 568 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Cole v. Chicago Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2026“Evidence, such as hearsay, that is inadmissible at trial, may not be considered in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion.” Lacey v. Perrin, 2015 IL App (2d) 141114, ¶ 52 . ¶ 26 “A defendant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of production, which can be met by either presenting evidence that disproves the plaintiff’s case or showing that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the claim.” Cole v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2025 IL App (1st) 230797, ¶ 31 . 2026If the defendant satisfies this burden, “the plaintiff must then provide factual support for the elements of their claim.” Id. ¶ 27 In addition, a plaintiff may not resist summary judgment by asserting factual allegations that do not appear in its complaint. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Stein v. Krislov
green
1 sentence2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lacey v. Perrin
green
1 sentence2026“Evidence, such as hearsay, that is inadmissible at trial, may not be considered in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion.” Lacey v. Perrin, 2015 IL App (2d) 141114, ¶ 52 . ¶ 26 “A defendant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of production, which can be met by either presenting evidence that disproves the plaintiff’s case or showing that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the claim.” Cole v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2025 IL App (1st) 230797, ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Id. (citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986)). ¶ 25 If the respondent moves for summary judgment based on a lack of evidence, then the burden shifts to the petitioner to provide factual support for the elements of his or her claim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Association
green
1 sentence2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca
green
1 sentence2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Goral v. Kulys
green
1 sentence2026See, e.g., Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819, ¶ 38 ; Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 171958 , ¶¶ 92-93; Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶¶ 37-40 ; Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca, 2014 IL App (1st) 121545, ¶ 29 ; Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17 ; Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶¶ 18-19 . ¶ 23 Anderson argues that the appellate court’s departure from First District precedent applying the “meritless and retaliatory” standard shifts procedural protections in the movant’s favor. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Rogers v. Matanda, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Matanda, 393 Ill. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stearns v. Ridge Ambulance Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Farrar v. Hobby
green
1 sentence2022“When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief [citation], the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115 . ¶ 73 Snow was a prevailing party on his due process claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Schlosser
green
1 sentence2022Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶ 28 . - 13 - No. 1-18-2601 ¶ 36 Here, in contrast to Turner and Schlosser, postconviction counsel did not fail to make a routine amendment to the petition or fail to amend the petition to include an essential element of a claim that was raised pro se. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Huang v. Brenson green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corporation green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Pesek v. Discepolo green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Cochrane's of Champaign, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Lang v. Parks green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Roberts neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Foreman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Shestiuk neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| F. E. Holmes & Son Construction Co. v. Gualdoni Electric Service, Inc. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. MacK green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Russell green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Ezaugi green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Woods v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Galena & Chicago Union Railroad v. Jacobs green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.