essential element violation (Virginia) · Go Syfert
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essential element violation in Virginia

5 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1989–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Norris v. Mitchellgreen
va · 1998 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Although a final order is an essential element for the bar of res judicata to apply, Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239-40 , 495 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1998), we find no merit in Harris’ contention for two reasons.

2000Although a final order is an essential element for the bar of res judicata to apply, Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 239-40 , 495 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1998), we find no merit in Harris’ contention for two reasons.

11
Food Lion, Inc. v. Meltongreen
va · 1995 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999In Food Lion v. Melton, 250 Va. 144, 151 (1995), the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the issue of particularity in proving publication as an essential element of a claim for defamation and ruled that: in order to establish prima facie evidence of publication, a plaintiff is not required to present testimony from a third party regarding what that person heard and understood, or to identify the person to whom the defamatory words were published.

11
Greenspan v. Osheroffgreen
va · 1986 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989In Greenspan v. Osheroff, 232 Va. 388 (1988), the Supreme Court stated: [Wjhen the fact-finder is satisfied from the evidence that the defendant’s primary and overriding purpose is to injure his victim in his reputation, trade, business or profession, motivated by hatred, spite or ill-will, the element of malice required by Code § 18.2-499 is established .... 232 Va. at 399 (emphasis added).

1989In Greenspan v. Osheroff, 232 Va. 388 (1988), the Supreme Court stated: [Wjhen the fact-finder is satisfied from the evidence that the defendant’s primary and overriding purpose is to injure his victim in his reputation, trade, business or profession, motivated by hatred, spite or ill-will, the element of malice required by Code § 18.2-499 is established .... 232 Va. at 399 (emphasis added).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Adkins v. Dixon green
va · 1997
1 sentence

2023Although the statute of limitations does not bar Formica’s legal malpractice claim, the successful termination of his post-conviction proceedings is an essential element of his claim, without which he has “no right of action.” Id.

12023–2023
Glover v. Commonwealth green
vactapp · 1986
2 sentences

1994In Glover , we held that it was proper to admit an authenticated court order showing that Glover had been convicted of a crime listed in the statute to prove that he had been convicted of the specifically enumerated felony listed in Code § 18.2-308.2. 3 Va. App. at 162 , 348 S.E.2d at 441 .

1994In Glover , we held that it was proper to admit an authenticated court order showing that Glover had been convicted of a crime listed in the statute to prove that he had been convicted of the specifically enumerated felony listed in Code § 18.2-308.2. 3 Va. App. at 162 , 348 S.E.2d at 441 .

11994–1994
Batson v. Kentucky green
scotus · 1986
1 sentence

1994We also hold that the record supports the trial judge’s determination that the Commonwealth’s peremptory jury strikes were not in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); that the court did not err in allowing a witness to testify as an expert in gunshot residue; that Essex waived any double jeopardy claim by failing to timely raise it in the trial court; and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

11994–1994

Where else courts name it

NC 401 (1977–2026) TN 391 (1966–2026) CA 177 (1922–2026) TX 168 (1920–2026) IN 124 (1897–2024) MA 97 (1984–2026) MS 93 (1963–2026) OH 90 (1872–2026) ND 75 (1984–2025) WA 68 (1931–2026) NY 68 (1952–2025) GA 60 (1924–2025) IL 54 (1883–2026) AR 51 (1953–2025) LA 50 (1967–2022) WY 47 (1975–2026) MO 41 (1909–2024) MI 41 (1976–2026) AZ 40 (1966–2025) FL 38 (1951–2022) AL 32 (1978–2018) CT 28 (1972–2022) WI 28 (1951–2025) ID 26 (1965–2026) ME 23 (1982–2025) MN 22 (1924–2014) IA 22 (1915–2024) PA 20 (1900–2022) NM 17 (1967–2026) SC 17 (1924–2026) DE 17 (1941–2026) UT 16 (1994–2026) NJ 15 (1984–2023) MT 11 (2000–2026) KY 9 (1929–2024) OK 9 (1937–2009) SD 9 (1946–2016) RI 9 (1984–2026) NV 9 (1986–2022) MD 8 (1966–2024) NE 8 (1942–2023) KS 8 (1994–2026) HI 8 (1984–2018) OR 8 (1922–2010) WV 7 (1982–2025) CO 7 (1981–2025) VT 6 (2010–2025) DC 6 (1964–2021) VA 5 (1989–2023) NH 4 (1996–1999) VI 3 (2013–2023) AK 3 (1989–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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