391 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1966–2026 48 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.red2 sentences2019We determined that the Hospital failed to demonstrate, under Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), that Plaintiffs could not prove an essential element of their claim at trial (causation), explaining that “[w]ithout such a limitation [such as a scheduling order or deadline for disclosing expert witnesses] on the Plaintiffs’ ability to retain another expert, the Hospital . . . simply demonstrated that the Plaintiff could not establish an essential element of their case with that expert [Dr. Lim’s] testimony.” Smith, 2012 WL 3777139 , at *6 (citing Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 19-20 ) 2019We determined that the Hospital failed to demonstrate, under Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), that Plaintiffs could not prove an essential element of their claim at trial (causation), explaining that “[w]ithout such a limitation [such as a scheduling order or deadline for disclosing expert witnesses] on the Plaintiffs’ ability to retain another expert, the Hospital . . . simply demonstrated that the Plaintiff could not establish an essential element of their case with that expert [Dr. Lim’s] testimony.” Smith, 2012 WL 3777139 , at *6 (citing Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 19-20 ) | 170 | 248 |
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green2 sentences2026Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2025); Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). 2025Transwood must do one of two things to prevail on its motion: (1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the other’s claim, or (2) demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the claim. § 20-16-101; see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). | 73 | 75 |
Byrd v. Hallgreen2 sentences2014The moving party may carry its burden by “(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Id. (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)); see also McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5). 2014The moving party may carry its burden by “(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Id. (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)); see also McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5). | 32 | 94 |
McCarley v. West Quality Food Servicegreen2 sentences2015McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 . -6- To make this showing and shift the burden of production, a moving party may affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. 2014The moving party may carry its burden by “(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Id. (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)); see also McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5). | 23 | 44 |
Blair v. West Town Mallgreen2 sentences2014In order to negate an essential element of the claim, “the moving party must point to evidence that tends to disprove an essential factual claim made by the nonmoving party.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768 ). 2013Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)).5 In order to negate an essential element of the claim, “the moving party must point to evidence that tends to disprove an essential factual claim made by the nonmoving party.” Id. at 84 (citing Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768 ). | 21 | 26 |
Tennie Martin, et.al. v. Southern Railway Company, et.al.green2 sentences2015“The moving party may make the required showing and therefore shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by either: (1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s *620 claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn.2008)). 5 In order to negate an essential element of the claim, “the moving party must point to evidence that tends to disprove an essential factual claim made by the nonmoving party.” Id. at 84 (citing Bla 2015McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 . -6- To make this showing and shift the burden of production, a moving party may affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. | 19 | 67 |
Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass'ngreen2 sentences2011Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn.1993) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 213 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). 2002See Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn.1993); Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs, Gilbert & Milom, 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). | 14 | 14 |
Strauss v. WYATT, TARRANT, COMBSgreen2 sentences2002See Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn.1993); Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs, Gilbert & Milom, 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). 2001Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn.1993); Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs, Gilbert & Milom, 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). | 11 | 11 |
Robinson v. Omergreen2 sentences2013When the moving party has made a properly supported motion, the “burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 5 ; see Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993). 2013Acts ch. 498 §§ 1, 3 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 ).3 When the moving party has made a properly supported motion, the “burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 5; see Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993). | 10 | 10 |
Mills v. CSX Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences2013In order to obtain a grant of summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, the movant employer “must produce evidence or refer to evidence in the record ‘that affirmatively negates an essential element of the [employee’s] claim or shows that the [employee] cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.’” Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 782 (quoting Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8-9 )); see also McCarley v. W. 2012In summary, to successfully shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage, Shelby County must either produce or identify evidence “that affirmatively negates an essential element of the nonmov-ing party’s claim or shows that the non-moving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tenn.2009). | 8 | 10 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen2 sentences2019Id. at 255-56 (emphases omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 4 In the present case, the disputed issues of fact identified by the trial court were not material to the question of whether Employee’s medical evidence of causation, an essential element of her claim, was insufficient at the summary judgment stage. 2019When the moving party does not bear the burden of production at trial, “the moving party may either negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or show that the non-moving party does not have sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, No. M2017-00423-SC-R11- CV, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 296 , at *21 (Tenn. July 22, 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986)). | 4 | 8 |
Gary M. GOSSETT v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.red2 sentences2014See Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 781-83 (rejecting the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage in discriminatory and retaliatory discharge cases and applying the standard in Hannan).6 To obtain summary judgment under this standard, the movant employer must negate an essential element of the employee’s claim or defense or show by undisputed evidence that the employee cannot prove an essential element of the claim or defense at trial. 2014“The moving party may make the required showing and therefore shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by either: (1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.”7 Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Hannan v. Alltel 7 In Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., 320 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tenn. 2010), our Supreme Court held that the Hannan standard is applicable to motions for summary judgment on retaliatory discharge claims, not the federal McDonnell Douglas framewo | 4 | 5 |
Bell Ex Rel. Snyder v. ICARD, ETC.green2 sentences2024Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 1999) (“[W]e conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege one of the - 11 - essential elements of abuse of process—an improper act in the use of process; therefore the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Goetz v. Autin, No. W2015-00063-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 537818 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016) (“Because the amended complaint fails to allege one of the essential elements of a claim for abuse of process, it fails to state a claim for abuse of process.”); K 2002Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A, 986 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tenn.1999) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim where the complaint did not allege facts supporting an essential element of the claim). | 3 | 3 |
Rains v. Bend of the Rivergreen2 sentences2007Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89 ; Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 2004Where the moving party satisfactorily challenges the nonmoving party’s ability to prove an essential element of its claim, the nonmoving party has the burden of pointing out, rehabilitating, or providing new evidence to create a factual dispute as to that element. 5 Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89 ; Rains, 124 S.W.3d at 587-88 . | 2 | 4 |
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford Housegreen2 sentences2014Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tenn. 2011). 2011Id. “[A] moving party who seeks to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim; or (2) show that the non-moving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2008). | 2 | 3 |
McClenahan v. Cooleygreen2 sentences2019Although we certainly find no error in this practice, to prevent any confusion upon future readings of this case, we note that “foreseeability, both as to proximate causation and superseding intervening cause . . . is a question of fact rather than of law[.]” McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 776 (Tenn. 1991). -7- Based upon the testimony in this case and the applicable law, [the Kims] have failed to prove an essential element of their claim, namely, that the Defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the minor’s fall. 2019Although we certainly find no error in this practice, to prevent any confusion upon future readings of this case, we note that “foreseeability, both as to proximate causation and superseding intervening cause . . . is a question of fact rather than of law[.]” McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 776 (Tenn. 1991). -7- Based upon the testimony in this case and the applicable law, [the Kims] have failed to prove an essential element of their claim, namely, that the Defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the minor’s fall. | 2 | 2 |
Timmy Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2015See Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 25 (explaining that pursuant to the applicable summary judgment standard, a moving party may shift the burden of production to the non-moving party by “show[ing] that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.”) (quoting Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2008)). 2011Sykes, 2011 WL 2517145, at *5 (quoting Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 5, 8-9 ). | 2 | 2 |
B & B Enterprises of Wilson County, LLC v. City of Lebanongreen2 sentences2014B & B Enter. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, 318 S.W.3d 839, 844-45 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 2 As this Court has explained: Section 20-16-101 was enacted to abrogate the summary-judgment standard set forth in Hannan [v. Alltell Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)], which permitted a trial court to grant summary judgment only if the moving party could either (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. 2014B & B Enter. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, 318 S.W.3d 839, 844-45 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 2 As this Court has explained: Section 20-16-101 was enacted to abrogate the summary-judgment standard set forth in Hannan [v. Alltell Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)], which permitted a trial court to grant summary judgment only if the moving party could either (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial. | 2 | 2 |
Forrester v. Stockstillgreen2 sentences1997Proof of this sort of motivation is an essential element of a claim for interference with an employment relationship, see Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tenn. 1994), and without it Mr. Holloway’s case should never have gone to the jury. _____________________________ WILLIAM C. 1997Proof of this sort of motivation is an essential element of a claim for interference with an employment relationship, see Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tenn.1994), and without it Mr. Holloway’s case should never have gone to the jury. | 2 | 2 |
Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2014The moving party may carry its burden by “(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Id. (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)); see also McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5). 2014The moving party may carry its burden by “(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.” Id. (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008)); see also McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 ; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5). | 1 | 12 |
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Barbeegreen1 sentence2026However, the Court disagrees with the Town of Watertown that, by deeming admissions admitted, it must dispense its proposed remedy because it has been “conclusively established.” The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, “The purpose of admissions is to limit and narrow the issues, thereby reducing trial time.” Tenn. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 714 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
TWB Architects, Inc. v. The Braxton, LLCgreen1 sentence2025TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tenn. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bankgreen1 sentence2024Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 1999) (“[W]e conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege one of the - 11 - essential elements of abuse of process—an improper act in the use of process; therefore the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Goetz v. Autin, No. W2015-00063-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 537818 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016) (“Because the amended complaint fails to allege one of the essential elements of a claim for abuse of process, it fails to state a claim for abuse of process.”); K | 1 | 1 |
Goodloe v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tenn. 2001) CoStar has met its burden to show that Ms. Lawson is missing an essential element of her claim: an event that would produce a sudden and unusual stimulus for an ordinary employee and that does not involve the threat of harm or loss to employment or employment opportunities. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of George Lambert v. John Arnold Fitzgeraldgreen1 sentence2020See Estate of Lambert v. Fitzgerald, 497 S.W.3d 425, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Berube & Associatesgreen1 sentence2018See Baugh, 340 S.W.3d at 388 (listing that “the statement was reasonably relied upon” as the fourth element of fraudulent inducement); Goodall, 2009 WL 528784 , at *6 (“[Reasonable] reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment.”); Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“An essential requirement of any action for fraud, deceit, failure to disclose or negligent or innocent misrepresentations is detrimental reliance on a false premise”). | 1 | 1 |
Baugh v. Novakgreen1 sentence2018See Baugh, 340 S.W.3d at 388 (listing that “the statement was reasonably relied upon” as the fourth element of fraudulent inducement); Goodall, 2009 WL 528784 , at *6 (“[Reasonable] reliance is an essential element of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment.”); Williams v. Berube & Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“An essential requirement of any action for fraud, deceit, failure to disclose or negligent or innocent misrepresentations is detrimental reliance on a false premise”). | 1 | 1 |
Sharon P. Diamond v. State of Michigan, Michigan Department of Career Development/rehabilitation Servicesgreen1 sentence2017See Diamond v. Mich., 431 F.3d 262, 267 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that procedural violations by a state rehabilitation services agency, which did not cause the client substantive harm, could not be the basis for relief under the Rehabilitation Act). | 1 | 1 |
Evco Corporation v. Rossgreen1 sentence2015Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84 .5 As stated by this court in Evco Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 25 (Tenn. 1975): The summary judgment procedure was designed to provide a quick, inexpensive means of concluding cases, in whole or in part, upon *25 issues as to which there is no dispute regarding the material facts. | 1 | 1 |
| Camper v. Minorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Forry, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc. And Michael Neundorfergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bennett v. Trevecca Nazarene Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence Ex Rel. Powell v. Stanfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit Uniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robin Lee Stanfill v. John T. Mountaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trostgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donna Faye Shipley v. Robin Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cheryl Brown Giggers v. Memphis Housing Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blanchard v. Kellumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Horton v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2002In Horton v. Hughes, 971 S.W.2d 957 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998), the Court said: A party may obtain a summary judgment by demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove an essential element of its case, see Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 212-13 (Tenn.1993), because the failure of proof on an essential element of a claim necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 2001In Horton v. Hughes, 971 S.W.2d 957 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), the Court said: A party may obtain a summary judgment by demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove an essential element of its case, see Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 212-13 (Tenn. 1993), because the failure of proof on an essential element of a claim necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. | 2 | 2001–2002 |
| Allyn v. Wright neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Illinois Central Railroad v. Acuff green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Little Stores v. Isenberg green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Janice M. Crawford v. Samuel K. Skinner, Secretary, Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Johnson v. John Hancock Funds green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Seavers v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Cardwell v. Bechtol green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Morgan v. Brush Wellman, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| AM International, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (In Re AM International, Inc.) green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Buchanan v. Nixon green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.