essential element claim (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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essential element claim in Pennsylvania

20 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1900–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
Kituskie v. Corbmangreen
pa · 1998 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2012–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mariscol/i v. Tinari, 335 Pa. Super. 599 , 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (an essential element ofa claim oflegal malpractice is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275 , 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice "proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm"). 31.

2015See Mariscol/i v. Tinari, 335 Pa. Super. 599 , 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (an essential element ofa claim oflegal malpractice is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275 , 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice "proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm"). 31.

22
Mariscotti v. Tinarigreen
pa · 1984 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2012–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mariscol/i v. Tinari, 335 Pa. Super. 599 , 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (an essential element ofa claim oflegal malpractice is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275 , 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice "proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm"). 31.

2015See Mariscol/i v. Tinari, 335 Pa. Super. 599 , 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (an essential element ofa claim oflegal malpractice is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275 , 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice "proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm"). 31.

22
Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc.green
pasuperct · 2000 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522, 527 (Pa. Super. 2000). “[F]or a plaintiff to successfully maintain a cause of action for breach of contract requires that the plaintiff establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.” Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 692 (Pa. Super. 2002).

11
Gorski v. Smithgreen
pasuperct · 2002 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Staub v. Toy Factory, Inc., 749 A.2d 522, 527 (Pa. Super. 2000). “[F]or a plaintiff to successfully maintain a cause of action for breach of contract requires that the plaintiff establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.” Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 692 (Pa. Super. 2002).

11
Shepard v. Temple Universitygreen
pasuperct · 2008 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Consequently, there was no basis to submit ARSC’s claims regarding the York stockpile to the fact-finder, and summary judgment was properly entered as to those counts. 5 See, e.g., Shepard v. Temple Univ., 948 A.2d 852, 856 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on ____________________________________________ 5 ARSC also pled a unjust enrichment as a quasi-contract theory of recovery.

11
Commonwealth v. Lairdgreen
pa · 2015 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020See Laird, supra. As this is an essential element of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCRA court did not err in denying this claim.

11
U.S. Bank, N.A. Ex Rel. Bank of America, N.A. v. Pautenisgreen
pasuperct · 2015 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019In Pautenis, this Court stated that “proof of the amount of indebtedness is an essential element of a claim in mortgage foreclosure.” Id. at 394 (quotations and citation omitted).

11
Commonwealth v. Dunphygreen
pasuperct · 2011 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa.Super. 2011).

11
Krajewski v. Gusoffgreen
pasuperct · 2012 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016We noted that this Court has provided that an action for invasion of privacy is “actually comprised of four analytically distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or likeness, (3) publicity given to private life and (4) publicity placing the person in a false light.” Krajewski - 11 - J-A12044-16 v. Gusoff, 53 A.3d 793, 805 (Pa.Super. 2012).

11
Kentucky v. Grahamgreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007However, the Court also reiterated that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in every instance where a civil rights violation has occurred, stating that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 .

2007However, the Court also reiterated that attorney's fees are not recoverable in every instance where a civil rights violation has occurred, stating that "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, . . . the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 .

11
Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Centergreen
pa · 2000 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The premise is that one who “is not present at the scene of tortious conduct... is buffered against the full impact that presence and observation would have entailed.... ‘By contrast, the relative who contemporaneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to brace his or her emotional system.’” Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176, 183, 754 A.2d 650, 653 (2000), citing Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 279 , 516 A.2d 672, 679 (1986). (citations omitted) In this case, the complaint does not aver that the plaintiffs actually witnessed the erroneous admini

2006The premise is that one who “is not present at the scene of tortious conduct... is buffered against the full impact that presence and observation would have entailed.... ‘By contrast, the relative who contemporaneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to brace his or her emotional system.’” Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176, 183, 754 A.2d 650, 653 (2000), citing Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 279 , 516 A.2d 672, 679 (1986). (citations omitted) In this case, the complaint does not aver that the plaintiffs actually witnessed the erroneous admini

11
Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everinghamgreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The premise is that one who “is not present at the scene of tortious conduct... is buffered against the full impact that presence and observation would have entailed.... ‘By contrast, the relative who contemporaneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to brace his or her emotional system.’” Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176, 183, 754 A.2d 650, 653 (2000), citing Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 279 , 516 A.2d 672, 679 (1986). (citations omitted) In this case, the complaint does not aver that the plaintiffs actually witnessed the erroneous admini

2006The premise is that one who “is not present at the scene of tortious conduct... is buffered against the full impact that presence and observation would have entailed.... ‘By contrast, the relative who contemporaneously observes the tortious conduct has no time span in which to brace his or her emotional system.’” Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176, 183, 754 A.2d 650, 653 (2000), citing Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 279 , 516 A.2d 672, 679 (1986). (citations omitted) In this case, the complaint does not aver that the plaintiffs actually witnessed the erroneous admini

11
Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhausergreen
pa · 1964 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005See Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhauser, 416 Pa. 61 , 204 A.2d 465 (1964); Fay, supra. ¶23 Given this fundamental deficiency, the court was justified in dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice.

2005See Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhauser, 416 Pa. 61 , 204 A.2d 465 (1964); Fay, supra. ¶23 Given this fundamental deficiency, the court was justified in dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice.

11
Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurancegreen
pasuperct · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1997); see also, Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 437 Pa. Super. 108, 125 , 649 A.2d 680, 688 (1994). (5) In addition, proof of harm is an essential element of the claim.

2002Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1997); see also, Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 437 Pa. Super. 108, 125 , 649 A.2d 680, 688 (1994). (5) In addition, proof of harm is an essential element of the claim.

11
cluster 741753green
ca3 · 1997 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1997); see also, Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 437 Pa. Super. 108, 125 , 649 A.2d 680, 688 (1994). (5) In addition, proof of harm is an essential element of the claim.

11
Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomerygreen
pasuperct · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997See Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomery, 452 Pa.Super. 158 , 681 A.2d 757 (1996); General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance Company, 430 Pa.Super. 526 , 635 A.2d 173 (1993).

1997See Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomery, 452 Pa.Super. 158 , 681 A.2d 757 (1996); General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance Company, 430 Pa.Super. 526 , 635 A.2d 173 (1993).

11
Carey v. Piphusgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997Based on this view, the Court held that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, see Carey [v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 ,] 256-57, 264, [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1048-49, 1053 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252, 260, 265 (1978) ], the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, supra, at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 .

1997Based on this view, the Court held that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, see Carey [v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 ,] 256-57, 264, [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1048-49, 1053 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252, 260, 265 (1978) ], the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, supra, at 115 , 113 S.Ct. at 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d at 506 .

11
Moyer v. Brockway Clay Co.green
pacommwct · 1974 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
2 sentences

1976J & L presses the argument that there is no testimony supportive of the necessary element of proving a silica hazard, and as authority, cites us to John F. Moyer v. Brockway Clay Company, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610, 612-13 , 324 A.2d 876, 877 (1974): Proof of the claimant’s disability as well as of a silica hazard in his employment is an essential element of a claim seeking total disability benefits under the Occupational Disease Act as a result of exposure to a silica hazard.

1976J & L presses the argument that there is no testimony supportive of the necessary element of proving a silica hazard, and as authority, cites us to John F. Moyer v. Brockway Clay Company, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610, 612-13 , 324 A.2d 876, 877 (1974): Proof of the claimant’s disability as well as of a silica hazard in his employment is an essential element of a claim seeking total disability benefits under the Occupational Disease Act as a result of exposure to a silica hazard.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corporation green
ca3 · 1998
2 sentences

2018Next, the court noted that an "evaluation of the parties' intent at the time the agreement was made is an essential element of this inquiry." Id.

2018Next, the court noted that an “evaluation of the parties’ intent at the time the agreement was made is an essential element of this inquiry.” Id.

22018–2018
Farrar v. Hobby green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2007However, the Court also reiterated that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in every instance where a civil rights violation has occurred, stating that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 .

2007However, the Court also reiterated that attorney's fees are not recoverable in every instance where a civil rights violation has occurred, stating that "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, . . . the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 .

21997–2007
Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young green
pa · 1987
1 sentence

2015The plaintiffs must present evidence sufficient for which damages may be determined on "some rational basis and other than by pure speculation or conjecture." Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, 361 Pa. Super. 17, 25 , 521A.2d451, 455 (1987). 32.

12015–2015
Fay v. Erie Insurance Group green
pasuperct · 1999
1 sentence

2005See Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhauser, 416 Pa. 61 , 204 A.2d 465 (1964); Fay, supra. ¶23 Given this fundamental deficiency, the court was justified in dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice.

12005–2005
General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance green
pasuperct · 1993
2 sentences

1997See Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomery, 452 Pa.Super. 158 , 681 A.2d 757 (1996); General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance Company, 430 Pa.Super. 526 , 635 A.2d 173 (1993).

1997See Tiburzio-Kelly v. Montgomery, 452 Pa.Super. 158 , 681 A.2d 757 (1996); General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance Company, 430 Pa.Super. 526 , 635 A.2d 173 (1993).

11997–1997
Atchison v. United Presbyterian Board of Publication green
pa · 1920
1 sentence

1937He was required to show that he had knowledge of the bank’s actions and was misled thereby (Atchison et al. v. United P. Board of Pub., 266 Pa. 47 , 109 A. 597 ; Gianni v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 311 Pa. 121 , 166 A. 553 ); that is an essential element of this doctrine.

11937–1937
Anhaltzer v. Benedum green
pa · 1920
1 sentence

1937He was required to show that he had knowledge of the bank’s actions and was misled thereby (Atchison et al. v. United P. Board of Pub., 266 Pa. 47 , 109 A. 597 ; Gianni v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 311 Pa. 121 , 166 A. 553 ); that is an essential element of this doctrine.

11937–1937
Gianni v. Union Bank & Trust Co. neutral
pa · 1933
2 sentences

1937He was required to show that he had knowledge of the bank’s actions and was misled thereby (Atchison et al. v. United P. Board of Pub., 266 Pa. 47 , 109 A. 597 ; Gianni v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 311 Pa. 121 , 166 A. 553 ); that is an essential element of this doctrine.

1937He was required to show that he had knowledge of the bank’s actions and was misled thereby (Atchison et al. v. United P. Board of Pub., 266 Pa. 47 , 109 A. 597 ; Gianni v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 311 Pa. 121 , 166 A. 553 ); that is an essential element of this doctrine.

11937–1937
Troop v. Franklin Savings & Trust Co. neutral
pa · 1927
2 sentences

1937Acts of the bank, unknown to him, of course, could not have misled him: Troop v. Franklin Sav. & Trust Co., 291 Pa. 18 , 139 A. 492 .

1937Acts of the bank, unknown to him, of course, could not have misled him: Troop v. Franklin Sav. & Trust Co., 291 Pa. 18 , 139 A. 492 .

11937–1937
Commonwealth v. Swallow green
pasuperct · 1898
1 sentence

1912“In the admission of testimony bearing on the questions of malice, negligence and intent, when the absence of these is an essential element of the defense on an indictment for libel, a liberal latitude should be permitted, and nothing reasonably calculated to show a tenable ground of defense should be excluded through technical narrowness in construing or applying the rules of evidence:” Com. v. Swallow, 8 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , at page 609.

11912–1912
Chambers v. Davis green
pa · 1838
1 sentence

1900A set-off of this nature against the parties plaintiff on the record is available to the defendants as wrns held in Chambers v. Davis, 3 Wharton, 40 , which will be more particularly noticed in the next case, Kipp et al.’s Appeal, post, p. 116.

11900–1900

Where else courts name it

NC 401 (1977–2026) TN 391 (1966–2026) CA 177 (1922–2026) TX 168 (1920–2026) IN 124 (1897–2024) MA 97 (1984–2026) MS 93 (1963–2026) OH 90 (1872–2026) ND 75 (1984–2025) WA 68 (1931–2026) NY 68 (1952–2025) GA 60 (1924–2025) IL 54 (1883–2026) AR 51 (1953–2025) LA 50 (1967–2022) WY 47 (1975–2026) MO 41 (1909–2024) MI 41 (1976–2026) AZ 40 (1966–2025) FL 38 (1951–2022) AL 32 (1978–2018) CT 28 (1972–2022) WI 28 (1951–2025) ID 26 (1965–2026) ME 23 (1982–2025) MN 22 (1924–2014) IA 22 (1915–2024) PA 20 (1900–2022) NM 17 (1967–2026) SC 17 (1924–2026) DE 17 (1941–2026) UT 16 (1994–2026) NJ 15 (1984–2023) MT 11 (2000–2026) KY 9 (1929–2024) OK 9 (1937–2009) SD 9 (1946–2016) RI 9 (1984–2026) NV 9 (1986–2022) MD 8 (1966–2024) NE 8 (1942–2023) KS 8 (1994–2026) HI 8 (1984–2018) OR 8 (1922–2010) WV 7 (1982–2025) CO 7 (1981–2025) VT 6 (2010–2025) DC 6 (1964–2021) VA 5 (1989–2023) NH 4 (1996–1999) VI 3 (2013–2023) AK 3 (1989–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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