51 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co.green2 sentences2011Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 759 , 911 S.W.2d 586, 590 (1995). 2011Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 759 , 911 S.W.2d 586, 590 (1995). | 3 | 5 |
Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc.green2 sentences2010Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249 , 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104 , 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988). 2010Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249 , 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104 , 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988). | 2 | 8 |
O'MARA v. Dykemagreen2 sentences2000O’Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 316 , 942 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1997). 2000O’Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 316 , 942 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1997). | 2 | 2 |
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen1 sentence2021See TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 89 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (when the nonmoving party has the burden of 7 proof at trial, the moving party may either negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or show that the nonmoving party does not have sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of its claim)). | 1 | 1 |
Dunaway v. GARLAND CTY. FAIR AND LIVESTOCK SHOW ASSOCIATION, INC.green1 sentence2018App. 181 , 189, 245 S.W.3d 678 , 685 (2006) ( "If a party responding to a summary-judgment motion cannot meet proof with proof on an essential element of his claim, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). | 1 | 1 |
O'Neal v. Ellisongreen2 sentences2015Under common law, our supreme court has recognized that “color of title is not an essential element to a claim of adverse possession if there is actual possession.” O’Neal v. Ellison, 266 Ark. 702, 705 , 587 S.W.2d 580, 581 (1979). 2015Under common law, our supreme court has recognized that “color of title is not an essential element to a claim of adverse possession if there is actual possession.” O’Neal v. Ellison, 266 Ark. 702, 705 , 587 S.W.2d 580, 581 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Bushong v. Garman Co.green2 sentences2008Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375 , 830 S.W.2d 861 (1992); see also Bushong v. Carman Co., 311 Ark. 228 , 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992). 2008Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375 , 830 S.W.2d 861 (1992); see also Bushong v. Carman Co., 311 Ark. 228 , 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Allisongreen2 sentences2008See Allen v. Allison, 356 Ark. 403 , 155 S.W.3d 682 (2004). 2008See Allen v. Allison, 356 Ark. 403 , 155 S.W.3d 682 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Sundeen v. Krogergreen2 sentences2007See Sundeen v. Kroger, 355 Ark. 138 , 133 S.W.3d 393 (2003) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff offered no proof of coercive actions or efforts to extort anything from him in abuse-of-process case against grocery store and its security officer); Irvin v. Jones, supra (affirming summary judgment because plaintiffs presented no proof of delivery, an essential element of their claim that certificates of deposit were gifts inter vivos); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., supra (affirming summary judgment where plaintiffs claiming negligence and strict liability for manufacture and sale of a 2007See Sundeen v. Kroger, 355 Ark. 138 , 133 S.W.3d 393 (2003) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff offered no proof of coercive actions or efforts to extort anything from him in abuse-of-process case against grocery store and its security officer); Irvin v. Jones, supra (affirming summary judgment because plaintiffs presented no proof of delivery, an essential element of their claim that certificates of deposit were gifts inter vivos); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., supra (affirming summary judgment where plaintiffs claiming negligence and strict liability for manufacture and sale of a | 1 | 1 |
Kellerman v. Zenogreen1 sentence2001See also Kellerman v. Zeno, 64 Ark. | 1 | 1 |
Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corporationgreen2 sentences1998Moreover, Wal-Mart’s conduct was privileged.” The Trial Court granted Wal-Mart’s motion, holding that Mr. Mason “cannot present proof of improper interference as required in an intentional interference with a contractual relationship claim” and that, “when a party cannot present proof on an essential element of its claim, there is no remaining genuine issue of material fact thereby entitling the party moving for summary judgment to a judgment as a matter of law.” The Trial Court said that an interference in a contractual relationship must be “improper” in order to be “actionable.” The Trial Co 1998Moreover, Wal-Mart's conduct was privileged." The Trial Court granted Wal-Mart's motion, holding that Mr. Mason "cannot present proof of improper interference as required in an intentional interference with a contractual relationship claim" and that, "when a party cannot present proof on an essential element of its claim, there is no remaining genuine issue of material fact thereby entitling the party moving for summary judgment to a judgment as a matter of law." The Trial Court said that an interference in a contractual relationship must be "improper" in order to be "actionable." The Trial Co | 1 | 1 |
Culpepper v. Smithgreen2 sentences1996However, “where the defendant makes a full, fair, and truthful disclosure of all the facts known to him before competent counsel and then acts bona fide upon [such] advice [this will be a good defense to a claim of malicious prosecution].” Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 564 , 792 S.W.2d 293, 298 (1990) (quoting Larry C. 1996However, “where the defendant makes a full, fair, and truthful disclosure of all the facts known to him before competent counsel and then acts bona fide upon [such] advice [this will be a good defense to a claim of malicious prosecution].” Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 564 , 792 S.W.2d 293, 298 (1990) (quoting Larry C. | 1 | 1 |
West v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See West v. State, 265 Ark. 52 , 576 S.W.2d 718 (1979). 1995See West v. State, 265 Ark. 52 , 576 S.W.2d 718 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Halfacre v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See Halfacre v. State, 277 Ark. 168 , 639 S.W.2d 734 (1982). 1991See Halfacre v. State, 277 Ark. 168 , 639 S.W.2d 734 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Germania Fire Insurance v. Ballygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sanders v. Banks
green
2 sentences2022Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375 , 830 S.W.2d 861 (1992). 2022Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375 , 830 S.W.2d 861 (1992). | 7 | 1995–2022 |
The Ballard Grp. Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA Inc.
green
2 sentences2025In fact, Tilley testified that he never represented to anyone involved in the real estate development project that the roads within it would be paved— let alone that they would be paved because of the $350,000 loan that MNB allegedly 34 Ballard Grp., Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 2014 Ark. 276, at 14 , 436 S.W.3d 445, 454 . 35 Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. 2025In fact, Tilley testified that he never represented to anyone involved in the real estate development project that the roads within it would be paved— let alone that they would be paved because of the $350,000 loan that MNB allegedly 34 Ballard Grp., Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 2014 Ark. 276, at 14 , 436 S.W.3d 445, 454 . 35 Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Steve Wilson and Susan Wilson v. Voy Gillentine and Stephanie Gillentine
neutral
2 sentences2025Wilson v. Gillentine, 2021 Ark. 2025Wilson, 2021 Ark. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Worley v. City of Jonesboro
green
2 sentences2021Id. 2014Worley v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. | 2 | 2014–2021 |
Rowdean v. State
green
2 sentences2017It was error to do so because her character is not an essential element of her claim of self-defense.” Id. at 149 , 655 S.W.2d at 415 . 2017It was error to do so because her character is not an essential element of her claim of self-defense.” Id. at 149 , 655 S.W.2d at 415 . | 2 | 1994–2017 |
Eady v. Lansford
green
2 sentences2010Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249 , 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104 , 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988). 2010Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249 , 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104 , 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Smith v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2001Harold McLaughlin Reliable Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Cox, supra; Smith v. Anderson, 259 Ark. 310 , 532 S.W.2d 745 (1976). ... 2001Harold McLaughlin Reliable Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Cox, supra; Smith v. Anderson, 259 Ark. 310 , 532 S.W.2d 745 (1976). ... | 2 | 1999–2001 |
Lee v. Martin
green
2 sentences2014Lee v. Martin, 74 Ark.App. 193 , 45 S.W.3d 860 (2001). 2014Lee v. Martin, 74 Ark.App. 193 , 45 S.W.3d 860 (2001). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mercy Health System of Northwest Arkansas, Inc. v. Bicak
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Taylor v. Samuel
neutral
2 sentences2005Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551 , 916 S.W.2d 109 (1996); Taylor v. Samuels, 238 Ark. 70 , 378 S.W.2d 200 (1964). 2005Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551 , 916 S.W.2d 109 (1996); Taylor v. Samuels, 238 Ark. 70 , 378 S.W.2d 200 (1964). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Eichelberger v. State
green
2 sentences2005Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551 , 916 S.W.2d 109 (1996); Taylor v. Samuels, 238 Ark. 70 , 378 S.W.2d 200 (1964). 2005Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551 , 916 S.W.2d 109 (1996); Taylor v. Samuels, 238 Ark. 70 , 378 S.W.2d 200 (1964). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ultracuts Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Ultracuts Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 343 Ark. 224 , 33 S.W.3d 128 (2000). 2004Ultracuts Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 343 Ark. 224 , 33 S.W.3d 128 (2000). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Company, Inc. And Ronald C. Inman
green
2 sentences1998Moreover, Wal-Mart’s conduct was privileged.” The Trial Court granted Wal-Mart’s motion, holding that Mr. Mason “cannot present proof of improper interference as required in an intentional interference with a contractual relationship claim” and that, “when a party cannot present proof on an essential element of its claim, there is no remaining genuine issue of material fact thereby entitling the party moving for summary judgment to a judgment as a matter of law.” The Trial Court said that an interference in a contractual relationship must be “improper” in order to be “actionable.” The Trial Co 1998Moreover, Wal-Mart's conduct was privileged." The Trial Court granted Wal-Mart's motion, holding that Mr. Mason "cannot present proof of improper interference as required in an intentional interference with a contractual relationship claim" and that, "when a party cannot present proof on an essential element of its claim, there is no remaining genuine issue of material fact thereby entitling the party moving for summary judgment to a judgment as a matter of law." The Trial Court said that an interference in a contractual relationship must be "improper" in order to be "actionable." The Trial Co | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Johninson v. State
green
2 sentences1994Johninson v. State, 317 Ark. 431 , 878 S.W.2d 727 (1994); Thompson v. State, supra. Here, the appellant was not allowed to fully develop his theory of self-defense through Mr. Foxx’s testimony to show whether or not he reasonably believed he was in danger of suffering unlawful deadly physical force. 1994Johninson v. State, 317 Ark. 431 , 878 S.W.2d 727 (1994); Thompson v. State, supra. Here, the appellant was not allowed to fully develop his theory of self-defense through Mr. Foxx’s testimony to show whether or not he reasonably believed he was in danger of suffering unlawful deadly physical force. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hudson v. Bradley
green
2 sentences1993Thus, appellants offered no proof of the element of delivery, which the foregoing case law, especially Hudson [v. Bradley, 176 Ark. 853 , 4 S.W.2d 534 (1928)], establishes in an essential element of the claim of a valid gift inter vivos. 1993Thus, appellants offered no proof of the element of delivery, which the foregoing case law, especially Hudson [v. Bradley, 176 Ark. 853 , 4 S.W.2d 534 (1928)], establishes in an essential element of the claim of a valid gift inter vivos. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McClellan v. State
green
2 sentences1983The method of proving character is specifically limited on direct examination to “testimony as to reputation or testimony in the form of an opinion.” Under Rule 405 (b) testimony of specific acts can be used only if necessary to prove an “essential element of the defense.” In McClellan v. State, 264 Ark. 223 , 570 S.W.2d 278 (1978) the court held that the character trait of a victim as an aggressor is not an essential element in the defense of self-defense. 1983The method of proving character is specifically limited on direct examination to “testimony as to reputation or testimony in the form of an opinion.” Under Rule 405 (b) testimony of specific acts can be used only if necessary to prove an “essential element of the defense.” In McClellan v. State, 264 Ark. 223 , 570 S.W.2d 278 (1978) the court held that the character trait of a victim as an aggressor is not an essential element in the defense of self-defense. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Coons v. Lawler green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.