7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perrine v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences2014See Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482 , 694 S.E.2d 815 . (“In this Court’s view, the criterion for determining whether the discretion is abused is whether the verdict form, together with any instruction relating to it, allows the jury to render a verdict on the issues framed consistent with the law, with the evidence, and with the jury’s own convictions. 2014See Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482 , 694 S.E.2d 815 . (“In this Court’s view, the criterion for determining whether the discretion is abused is whether the verdict form, to gether with any instruction relating to it, allows the jury to render a verdict on the issues framed consistent with the law, with the evidence, and with the jury’s own convictions. | 2 | 2 |
Perrine v. EI DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND CO.green2 sentences2014See Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482 , 694 S.E.2d 815 . (“In this Court’s view, the criterion for determining whether the discretion is abused is whether the verdict form, together with any instruction relating to it, allows the jury to render a verdict on the issues framed consistent with the law, with the evidence, and with the jury’s own convictions. 2014See Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482 , 694 S.E.2d 815 . (“In this Court’s view, the criterion for determining whether the discretion is abused is whether the verdict form, to gether with any instruction relating to it, allows the jury to render a verdict on the issues framed consistent with the law, with the evidence, and with the jury’s own convictions. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Daileygreen1 sentence2025See Granados v. Wilson, 523 P.3d 501, 516 (Kan. 2023) (acknowledging that a “party bearing the burden of production and persuasion [is] not entitled to remand for new trial after failing to sustain its burden of proof—‘its case should ordinarily have to stand or fall on the record it makes the first time around’” (quoting State v. Dailey, 497 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Kan. 2021))); DeVittorio v. Werker Bros., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“[A] party’s failure to present evidence at trial sufficient to sustain the burden of proof on an essential element of his claim is clearly not grou | 1 | 1 |
DeVittorio v. Werker Bros., Inc.green1 sentence2025See Granados v. Wilson, 523 P.3d 501, 516 (Kan. 2023) (acknowledging that a “party bearing the burden of production and persuasion [is] not entitled to remand for new trial after failing to sustain its burden of proof—‘its case should ordinarily have to stand or fall on the record it makes the first time around’” (quoting State v. Dailey, 497 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Kan. 2021))); DeVittorio v. Werker Bros., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“[A] party’s failure to present evidence at trial sufficient to sustain the burden of proof on an essential element of his claim is clearly not grou | 1 | 1 |
Granados v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2025See Granados v. Wilson, 523 P.3d 501, 516 (Kan. 2023) (acknowledging that a “party bearing the burden of production and persuasion [is] not entitled to remand for new trial after failing to sustain its burden of proof—‘its case should ordinarily have to stand or fall on the record it makes the first time around’” (quoting State v. Dailey, 497 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Kan. 2021))); DeVittorio v. Werker Bros., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“[A] party’s failure to present evidence at trial sufficient to sustain the burden of proof on an essential element of his claim is clearly not grou | 1 | 1 |
Calvert v. Scharfgreen2 sentences2013See Syl. pts. 1 & 4, Calvert, 217 W.Va. 684 , 619 S.E.2d 197 . 2013See Syl. pts. 1 & 4, Calvert, 217 W.Va. 684 , 619 S.E.2d 197 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.
green
2 sentences2004CAMC argues that it was deprived of an essential element of its defense when the instruction was not given about this duty of Appellee as established by the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 , 119 S.Ct. 1597 , 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). 2004CAMC argues that it was deprived of an essential element of its defense when the instruction was not given about this duty of Appellee as established by the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 , 119 S.Ct. 1597 , 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Woodson
green
2 sentences1993In syllabus point 3 of State v. Woodson, 181 W.Va. 325 , 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989), we held that under Rule 405(b), W.V.R.E. [1993], “a defendant in a criminal case who relies on self-defense or provocation may introduce specific acts of violence or threats made against him by the victim, and if the defendant has knowledge of specific acts of violence against third parties by the victim, the defendant may offer such evidence.” For a discussion of Woodson, see Dietz v. Legur-sky, 188 W.Va. 526 , 425 S.E.2d 202 (1992). 1993In syllabus point 3 of State v. Woodson, 181 W.Va. 325 , 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989), we held that under Rule 405(b), W.V.R.E. [1993], “a defendant in a criminal case who relies on self-defense or provocation may introduce specific acts of violence or threats made against him by the victim, and if the defendant has knowledge of specific acts of violence against third parties by the victim, the defendant may offer such evidence.” For a discussion of Woodson, see Dietz v. Legur-sky, 188 W.Va. 526 , 425 S.E.2d 202 (1992). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dietz v. Legursky
green
2 sentences1993In syllabus point 3 of State v. Woodson, 181 W.Va. 325 , 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989), we held that under Rule 405(b), W.V.R.E. [1993], “a defendant in a criminal case who relies on self-defense or provocation may introduce specific acts of violence or threats made against him by the victim, and if the defendant has knowledge of specific acts of violence against third parties by the victim, the defendant may offer such evidence.” For a discussion of Woodson, see Dietz v. Legur-sky, 188 W.Va. 526 , 425 S.E.2d 202 (1992). 1993In syllabus point 3 of State v. Woodson, 181 W.Va. 325 , 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989), we held that under Rule 405(b), W.V.R.E. [1993], “a defendant in a criminal case who relies on self-defense or provocation may introduce specific acts of violence or threats made against him by the victim, and if the defendant has knowledge of specific acts of violence against third parties by the victim, the defendant may offer such evidence.” For a discussion of Woodson, see Dietz v. Legur-sky, 188 W.Va. 526 , 425 S.E.2d 202 (1992). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Russell
green
2 sentences1982Rather, the court in Russell reaffirmed the principle that a defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime, rather than the type and degree of government conduct relating to that crime, constitutes the essential element of the defense of entrapment. 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. at 1643 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 374 . 1982Rather, the court in Russell reaffirmed the principle that a defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime, rather than the type and degree of government conduct relating to that crime, constitutes the essential element of the defense of entrapment. 411 U.S. at 433 , 93 S.Ct. at 1643 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 374 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.