50 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Townley v. City of Iowagreen2 sentences2012See also Townley v. City of Iowa, 97-493 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97) , 702 So.2d 323 . 2010See also Townley v. City of Iowa, 97-493 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97) , 702 So.2d 323 . | 2 | 10 |
Alex v. Dr. Xgreen2 sentences2010As such, the burden shifted to Mr. Crochet to "sufficiently establish the existence of proof of an essential element of his claim on which he is to bear the burden of proving at trial." Alex v. Dr. X, 96-1196, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 499, 502 ; La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C). 2009As such, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs to “sufficiently establish the existence of proof of an essential element of his claim on which he is to bear the burden of proving at trial.” Alex v. Dr. X, 96-1196, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 499, 502 ; La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C). | 1 | 3 |
Haywood v. Louisiana Sugar Cane Productsgreen2 sentences2008Haywood, 692 So.2d 524 . 1997Haywood, 692 So.2d 524 . | 1 | 2 |
Westerfield v. LaFleurgreen2 sentences2000In the seminal case of Westerfield v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600 (La. 1986), our Supreme Court held that a plaintiff attempting to come within coverage of an uninsured motorist clause need not prove, as an essential element of the claim, that he was actually physically touching the vehicle at the time of the injury. 1999It is not necessary for a plaintiff, to come within coverage of an uninsured motorist clause, to prove, as an essential element of his claim, that he was actually physically touching the car at the time of the injury.” Id. at 603 . | 1 | 2 |
Day v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.green2 sentences1999The court then cited with approval the case of Day v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., 420 So.2d 518, 520 (La.App. 2 Cir.1982): It is not the physical contact with the vehicle that serves as a basis to determine whether a person is injured while alighting from a vehicle but it is the relationship between the person and the vehicle, |r,obviously of time and in distance with regard to the risk of alighting that determines specific coverage. 1986Smith v. Girley, supra ; Day v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. 420 So.2d 518 (La. | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Girleygreen2 sentences1986In dicta the Supreme Court said in Smith : "[I]t is not necessary for a plaintiff, to come within coverage of an uninsured motorist clause, to prove, as an essential element of his claim, that he was actually physically touching the car at the time of the injury." 255 So.2d at 751 . 1982Our supreme court has not had occasion to squarely construe the term while alighting from, but has observed "... it is not necessary for a plaintiff, to come within the coverage of an uninsured motorists clause, to prove, as an essential element of his claim, that he was actually physically touching the car at the time of *520 the injury." Smith v. Girley, 260 La. 223 , 255 So.2d 748, 751 (1971). | 1 | 2 |
Moresi v. State, Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheriesgreen1 sentence2022See Moresi v. State Through Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095 ( La. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Tomaso v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2017See Tomaso v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 14-1467 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 6/5/15), 174 So.3d 679, 682 . | 1 | 1 |
730 BIENVILLE PARTNERS v. First Nat. Bankgreen1 sentence2015See 730 Bienville Partners, 596 So.2d at 836 . | 1 | 1 |
Samaha v. Raugreen1 sentence2008See Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880 . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bradfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hillsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Cavet v. Louisiana Extended Care Hosp., 47,141 (La.App.2d Cir.5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1122 . 2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Caret v. Louisiana Extended Care Hosp., 47,141 (La.App.2d Cir.5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1122 . | 5 | 2012–2014 |
Cavet v. Louisiana Extended Care Hospital
green
2 sentences2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Cavet v. Louisiana Extended Care Hosp., 47,141 (La.App.2d Cir.5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1122 . 2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Caret v. Louisiana Extended Care Hosp., 47,141 (La.App.2d Cir.5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1122 . | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Short v. Giffin
green
2 sentences2006The burden thus shifted to Plaintiffs to "sufficiently establish the existence of proof of an essential element of their claim on which they are to bear the burden of proving at trial." Alex v. Dr. X, 96-1196, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 499, 502 (citing Short v. Giffin, 96-0361 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96) , 682 So.2d 249 , writ denied 96-3063 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1372 ). 1997Short, 682 So.2d 249 . | 2 | 1997–2006 |
Fisher v. Westbank Roofing
neutral
2 sentences2005R.S. 23:1081, the claimant must be tested for drug use immediately after the- accident.” See also Reuben v. Tidewater Marine, 97-521, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/13/98), 712 So.2d 263, 264 , writ denied, 98-1486 (La.9/4/98), 721 So.2d 916 (emphasis added), in which the court stated: “The immediacy of the test is an essential element for the presumption of intoxication.” In Fisher, 670 So.2d 1328 , the employer had requested a drug screen to be performed on the day of the accident, but that request was not carried out until six days later. 2005Even though the delay in testing was not attributable to the employer, the court nonetheless found that “the immediacy requirement of R.S. 23:1081(7)(a) had not been met and, therefore, the presumption was not available.” Id. at 1331 . | 2 | 1998–2005 |
Hayes v. Autin
green
2 sentences1997Hayes, 96-287; 685 So.2d 691 . 1997Hayes , 96-287; 685 So.2d 691 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Roy Bufkin, Jr. v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC
green
1 sentence2021Bufkin, 171 So.3d at 858 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Powell v. Gramercy Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2017Powell v. Gramercy Inc. Co., 13-928 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14) ; 140 So.3d 324, 326 . 2017Powell v. Gramercy Inc. Co., 13-928 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14) ; 140 So.3d 324, 326 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Clark v. J-H-J Inc.
green
1 sentence2016See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966C; Clark, 136 So.3d at 818 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Farrar v. Hobby
green
2 sentences2014Thus, "[wjhen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief ..., the only reasonable attorney fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. 566 . 2014Thus, "[wjhen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief ..., the only reasonable attorney fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. 506 U.S. at 115 , 113 S.Ct. 566 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Orgeron on Behalf of Orgeron v. McDonald
green
1 sentence2014In Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So.2d 224 (La.1994), the court discussed in detail the application of the “course and scope” concept and initially pointed out that an employer is answerable for the damage occasioned by his servant in the exercise of the functions in which the servant is employed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lewis v. Pine Belt Multipurpose Community Action Acquisition Agency, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 00-0078 (La.06/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Lewis v. Pine Belt Multipurpose Community Action Acquisition Agency, Inc., 48,880 (La.App.2d Cir.05/07/14), 139 So.3d 562 , units denied, 14-0988, 14-1190 (La.08/25/14), 147 So.3d 1120 , 1121. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Price v. Valenti
neutral
1 sentence2014Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 00-0078 (La.06/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Lewis v. Pine Belt Multipurpose Community Action Acquisition Agency, Inc., 48,880 (La.App.2d Cir.05/07/14), 139 So.3d 562 , units denied, 14-0988, 14-1190 (La.08/25/14), 147 So.3d 1120 , 1121. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Klein v. Cisco-Eagle, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 00-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37 ; Klein v. Cisco-Eagle, Inc., 37,398 (La.App.2d Cir.9/24/03), 855 So.2d 844 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Short v. Giffin
green
1 sentence2006The burden thus shifted to Plaintiffs to "sufficiently establish the existence of proof of an essential element of their claim on which they are to bear the burden of proving at trial." Alex v. Dr. X, 96-1196, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 499, 502 (citing Short v. Giffin, 96-0361 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96) , 682 So.2d 249 , writ denied 96-3063 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1372 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Reuben v. Tidewater Marine
neutral
1 sentence2005R.S. 23:1081, the claimant must be tested for drug use immediately after the- accident.” See also Reuben v. Tidewater Marine, 97-521, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/13/98), 712 So.2d 263, 264 , writ denied, 98-1486 (La.9/4/98), 721 So.2d 916 (emphasis added), in which the court stated: “The immediacy of the test is an essential element for the presumption of intoxication.” In Fisher, 670 So.2d 1328 , the employer had requested a drug screen to be performed on the day of the accident, but that request was not carried out until six days later. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Reuben v. Tidewater Marine
neutral
1 sentence2005R.S. 23:1081, the claimant must be tested for drug use immediately after the- accident.” See also Reuben v. Tidewater Marine, 97-521, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/13/98), 712 So.2d 263, 264 , writ denied, 98-1486 (La.9/4/98), 721 So.2d 916 (emphasis added), in which the court stated: “The immediacy of the test is an essential element for the presumption of intoxication.” In Fisher, 670 So.2d 1328 , the employer had requested a drug screen to be performed on the day of the accident, but that request was not carried out until six days later. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kumpe v. State
neutral
1 sentence1998Kumpe v. State, 97-386 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97) ; 701 So.2d 498 , writ denied, 98-0050 (La.3/13/98); 712 So.2d 882 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kumpe v. State
green
1 sentence1998Kumpe v. State, 97-386 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97) ; 701 So.2d 498 , writ denied, 98-0050 (La.3/13/98); 712 So.2d 882 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Fisher v. Westbank Roofing
neutral
1 sentence1998Fisher v. Westbank Roofing, 95-964 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/96) , 670 So.2d 1328 , writ denied, 96-0809 (La.5/10/96), 672 So.2d 926 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Campbell v. DEPTARTMENT OF TRANSP. & DEV.
green
1 sentence1996E.g., Campbell v. DOTD, 94-1052 at 5-6 (La.1-17-95), 648 So.2d 898, 901 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation & Heil-Quaker Corporation green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United Transportation Union v. Maine Central Railroad green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Stang v. United States District Court for the Central District of California green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| New Jersey v. T. L. O. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Bloxom v. Bloxom green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mella v. Continental Emsco green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wall v. Sun Insurance neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wall v. Sun Insurance Co. of New York neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Elledge v. Warren green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Hendricks v. American Employers Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v. Allain green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.