essential element claim in Mississippi

2016When a party who opposes summary judgment will bear the burden of proof at trial and “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

2014In Galloway v. Travelers Insurance Co., 515 So.2d 678, 684 (Miss.1987), the supreme court explained that [w]hen a party opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial[ ] fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to [a] judgment as a matter of law.

2026When the non-moving party who “will bear the burden of proof at trial” “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 973 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Miss. 1996)).

2024When the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 973 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Miss. 1996)).

2025As such, “regardless of the invitee’s precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is an essential element of her claim.” Jones, 187 So. 3d at 1104 (¶12). 6 I.

2025Walker, 309 So. 3d at 24 (¶29). “[R]egardless of the invitee’s precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is an essential element of her claim.” Thomas, 331 So. 3d at 71 (¶17) (quoting Jones, 187 So. 3d at 1104 (¶12)). ¶30.

2024When “the party opposing the motion for summary judgment on a claim or defense upon which it bears the burden of proof at trial, and the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, other issues become immaterial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Grisham v. John Q.

2023When “the party opposing the motion for summary judgment on a claim or defense upon which it bears the burden of proof at trial, and the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, other issues become immaterial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Grisham v. John Q.

2026When the non-moving party who “will bear the burden of proof at trial” “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 973 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Miss. 1996)).

2024When the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 973 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Miss. 1996)).

2021We agree. ¶17. “[R]egardless of the invitee’s precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is an essential element of her claim.” Jones, 187 So. 3d at 1104 (¶12). “[A] property owner cannot be found liable for the plaintiff’s injury where no dangerous condition exists.” Stanley v. Boyd Tunica Inc., 29 So. 3d 95, 97-98 (¶10) (Miss.

2018As the foregoing discussion indicates, "regardless of the invitee's precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a 'dangerous condition' is an essential element of her claim." Jones , 187 So.3d at 1104 (¶ 12). "[A] property owner cannot be found liable for the plaintiff's injury where no dangerous condition exists." Stanley v. Boyd Tunica Inc. , 29 So.3d 95 , 97-98 (¶ 10) (Miss.

2010However, “[w]here a party opposes summary judgment on a claim or defense [on] which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, and when the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other issues become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Grisham, 519 So.2d at 416 ; see also Gallo *730 way v. Travelers Ins.

2008Where a party opposes summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, and when the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other issues become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 519 So.2d at 415-16 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

2006See Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1272 (¶ 10) (Miss.2006) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So.2d 749, 757 (¶ 25) (Miss.2005) (citing Galloway v. Travelers Ins.

2006See Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1272 (¶ 10) (Miss.2006) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So.2d 749, 757 (¶ 25) (Miss.2005) (citing Galloway v. Travelers Ins.

2017Tucker v. Hinds Cty., 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). “[Wjhere the party opposing the motion for summary judgment on a claim or defense upon which it bears the burden of proof at trial, and the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, other issues become immaterial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of Moose Inc., 641 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Miss. 1994).

2017Tucker v. Hinds Cty., 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). “[W]here the party opposing the motion for summary judgment on a claim or defense ... bears the burden of proof at trial, and the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, other issues become immaterial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment[.]” Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of Moose Inc., 641 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Miss. 1994) (emphasis in original). *197 DISCUSSION ¶ 8.

2015Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Palmer v. Anderson Infirmary Benevolent Ass’n, 656 So.2d 790, 794 (Miss.1995) (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). “[Wjhen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or de

2011Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Palmer v. Anderson Infirmary Benevolent Ass’n, 656 So.2d 790, 794 (Miss.1995) (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). “[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or de

2008Gas Pipe Line Corp., 551 So.2d 182, 186 (Miss.1989)). "[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Galloway, 515 So.2d at 684 . ¶ 11.

2007Gas Pipe Line Corp., 551 So.2d 182, 186 (Miss. 1989)). "[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Galloway v. Travelers Ins.

2008See also Richardson v. Norfolk S. Ry., 923 So.2d 1002, 1007 (Miss.2006).

2006See also Richardson v. Norfolk S. Ry., 923 So. 2d 1002, 1007 (Miss. 2006).

2004This Court has held that "[t]o make out a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the exercise of a dominion in exclusion or the defiance of the owner's right, or of an unauthorized and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand." Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc., 726 So.2d 144, 149 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). "[T]here is no conversion until the title of the lawful owner is made known and resisted or the purchaser exercises dominion over the property by use, sale or otherwise." Mississippi Motor Fin., Inc., v. Thomas, 246 Miss. 14 , 149 So.2d 20, 20 (1

2004This Court has held that "[t]o make out a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the exercise of a dominion in exclusion or the defiance of the owner's right, or of an unauthorized and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand." Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc., 726 So.2d 144, 149 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). "[T]here is no conversion until the title of the lawful owner is made known and resisted or the purchaser exercises dominion over the property by use, sale or otherwise." Mississippi Motor Fin., Inc., v. Thomas, 246 Miss. 14 , 149 So.2d 20, 20 (1

2004This Court has held that "[t]o make out a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the exercise of a dominion in exclusion or the defiance of the owner's right, or of an unauthorized and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand." Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc., 726 So.2d 144, 149 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). "[T]here is no conversion until the title of the lawful owner is made known and resisted or the purchaser exercises dominion over the property by use, sale or otherwise." Mississippi Motor Fin., Inc., v. Thomas, 246 Miss. 14 , 149 So.2d 20, 20 (1

2002This Court has held that "[t]o make out a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the exercise of a dominion in exclusion or the defiance of the owner's right, or of an unauthorized and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand." Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc., 726 So.2d 144, 149 (Miss. 1998) (emphasis added). "[T]here is no conversion until the title of the lawful owner is made known and resisted or the purchaser exercises dominion over the property by use, sale or otherwise." Mississippi Motor Fin., Inc., v. Thomas, 246 Miss. 14 , 149 So.2d 20, 20 (

2024“In every 5 premises-liability case, the plaintiff must show that a dangerous condition exists.” McCullar v. Boyd Tunica Inc., 50 So. 3d 1009, 1012 (¶13) (Miss.

2018Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation mark omitted). " In every premises-liability case, the plaintiff must show that a dangerous condition exists. " McCullar v. Boyd Tunica Inc. , 50 So.3d 1009 , 1012 (¶ 13) (Miss.

2026Inc., 664 So. 2d 170, 175 (Miss. 1995)). “[R]egardless of the invitee’s precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is an essential element of her claim.” Martin v. Trustmark Corp., 292 So. 3d 245 , 248 (¶11) (Miss.

2025The supreme court has further clarified that specific past acts are admissible on cross or direct examination “where a defendant alleges self-defense,” and “the character trait of violence was an essential element of the defense under 405(b).” Newsom v. State, 629 So. 2d 611, 614 (Miss. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) 18 (finding that a trial court erred in excluding a defense witness’s testimony that “he had seen [the victim] in fights before”). ¶46.

2025At the summary judgment stage, if the opposing party bearing the burden of proof at trial “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bonner, 117 So. 3d at 682 (¶10).

2024“Proof that a dangerous condition actually caused the invitee’s injury ‘is an essential element of the claim’ because ‘a property owner cannot be found liable for the plaintiff’s injury where no dangerous condition exists.’” Carroll, 309 So. 3d at 570 (¶7) (quoting Patterson, 270 So. 3d at 21 (¶7)).

2024In other words, “[w]hen the non-movant fails to establish the existence of an essential element to its claim, and that party will bear the burden of its proof at trial, summary judgment is mandated.” Evans v. Hodge, 2 So. 3d 683, 686 (¶5) (Miss.

2023Inc., 771 So. 2d 914, 918 (¶8) (Miss. 2000). “[R]egardless of the invitee’s precise theory of premises liability, proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is an essential element of her claim.” Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores E.

2023Cmty. Bank, Ellisville, Miss. v. Courtney, 884 So. 2d 767, 772 (¶10) (Miss. 2004).

2020See Lewis, 269 So. 3d at 235 (¶14) (finding that a Rule 41(b) motion should be granted where the plaintiff has failed to prove an essential element of her claim). ¶35.

2020See generally Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So. 2d 951 (¶¶42, 50) (Miss. 2007) (affirming summary judgment on malpractice claim for a failure of proof on an essential element of the claim).

2018But soon thereafter, Tennessee realized it had fallen into a burning ring of fire with its newly held standard.9 And in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W. 3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015), the Tennessee Supreme Court parted ways with it, holding: “Because the standard articulated in Hannan is unworkable and inconsistent with the history and text of Tennessee Rule 56, we . . . overrule Hannan, and fully embrace the standards articulated in the Celotex trilogy.” ¶56.

2018But soon thereafter, Tennessee realized it had fallen into a burning ring of fire with its newly held standard. 9 And in Rye v. Women's Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC , 477 S.W.3d 235 , 264 (Tenn. 2015), the Tennessee Supreme Court parted ways with it, holding: "Because the standard articulated in Hannan is unworkable and inconsistent with the history and text of Tennessee Rule 56, we ... overrule Hannan , and fully embrace the standards articulated in the Celotex trilogy." ¶ 56.

2017See Jackson, 114 So. 3d at 775 (¶17).

2017See Jackson, 114 So.3d at 775 (¶ 17).